The Baseball Research Journal

Volume 42

Fall 2013

Number 2

Published by

the Society for American Baseball Research

THE Baseball Research Journal, Volume 42, Number 2

Editor: Cecilia M. Tan

Design and Production: Lisa Hochstein

Cover Design: Lisa Hochstein

Fact Checker: Clifford Blau

Front cover: National Baseball Hall of Fame Library, Cooperstown, NY

Published by:

The Society for American Baseball Research, Inc.

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Copyright © 2013

The Society for American Baseball Research

ISBN 978-1-933599-62-5

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Reproduction in whole or part without permission is prohibited.

Note from the Editor

Let this introduction be an actual “introduction.” I’m pleased to present this volume of the Baseball Research Journal for your Hot Stove season reading, so let’s be formal about it. SABR member, interested reader, please meet the top-notch interdisciplinary peer-reviewed journal of any and all inquiries into baseball knowledge, the Baseball Research Journal. I feel the need to re-introduce you, since recent communications with SABR members made me think there is some confusion about what the BRJ is, and isn’t.

SABR’s publications program has had various periodicals over the decades, including not only the BRJ, but also The National Pastime (aka TNP ), the SABR Review of Books, and others. I was surprised to hear some members tell me they thought that in the past the BRJ was for novice researchers and TNP was for the seasoned pros. A more common, lingering perception is that The National Pastime was for history and the Baseball Research Journal was for stats. Even if that dichotomy was once somewhat true, there were always articles that were both history and stats. Which would you consider Herm Krabbenhoft’s articles on correcting the RBI and runs-scored records for Hank Greenberg, Babe Ruth, and Lou Gehrig—of which there is an additional piece in this issue? Or Steve Gietschier’s look into the performance of batters in the potential final out of the World Series in this issue? Or the examination of past 20- and 30-game winners, and their current dearth, by John Daniels?

But regardless how tricky it might be to divide “historical” articles from others, The National Pastime changed its function beginning in 2009. Since then TNP has been devoted annually to baseball history in whatever region the SABR national convention takes place, and has been edited, written, and directed by the local host chapter. When that change took place, the Baseball Research Journal became SABR’s flagship publication, open to submissions of any discipline being researched by SABR members. Since I took the editorial seat in 2011, the BRJ has included plenty of both history and stats, not to mention physics, economics, psychology, game theory, sociology, and physiology.

Historical topics have ranged from the Negro Leagues to international women’s baseball to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, with healthy doses of the minor leagues, college baseball, and nineteenth-century ball served alongside major league history. SABR’s thousands of members are knowledgeable in so many fields, it’s only a matter of time before some architecture, materials science, or meteorology comes across my desk, too.

Remember, if you’re a SABR member, the BRJ wants to see your research. Query me first at ctan@sabr.org and I’ll send you some guidelines and happily dispense advice. I would love to see more articles that are as meticulously researched (and footnoted) as the piece on Bill Veeck Sr. by Jack Bales that opens this issue or Bob Ruzzo’s article on the fate of the Federal League, as thought-provoking as Leonard Newman’s contribution from the world of psychology to the clutch-hitting debate, as germinal as Justine Siegal’s survey of current female baseball players and David Ogden et al.’s research into minor league attendance factors, as foundational as Alan Cohen’s history of the Hearst Sandlot Classic.

In other words, get to it. There’s a long winter ahead while the big leagues lie dormant. Now’s a perfect time to work on an article for publication in a future issue, don’t you think?

–Cecilia Tan

Publications Director

Baseball’s First Bill Veeck

Jack Bales

What with Bill Veeck Jr.’s gregarious nature, numerous achievements, and well-known career as “a champion of the little guy” (to quote from his Hall of Fame plaque), it is not surprising that writers have penned quite a few profiles of the flamboyant baseball executive. On the other hand, regrettably little ink has been spilled in coverage of his father, the lesser-known Veeck Sr. According to Dr. David Fletcher, founder and president of the Chicago Baseball Museum, the elder Veeck is an “unsung hero in MLB history.” After all, William Louis Veeck Sr. (called Bill by his friends) enthusiastically promoted Ladies’ Days and the radio broadcasts of ball games, figuring—correctly—that fans would flock to his ballpark. As president of the Chicago Cubs (a position similar to today’s general manager), he brought home two National League pennants (1929 and 1932) and helped build the foundations for two others (1935 and 1938). One could argue that the baseball world of the 1920s and early 1930s had in Veeck Sr. a visionary whose accomplishments and career rivaled the later ones of his namesake.1

That career began in Boonville, Indiana, a small village near Evansville, where he was born on January 20, 1877, the son of Dutch parents.2 Veeck’s first job was selling newspapers, and at age ten he became a messenger boy for Western Union. He next worked in the village drugstore and also helped his father, a wagon builder and cabinet maker. As detailed in a biographical sketch written by his friend, sportswriter Jim Gallagher, when the youth was fourteen “the lure of printers’ ink trapped him” and he sought employment as a pressroom helper and printer’s apprentice for his hometown newspaper.3

After six years on the Boonville Standard, however, young Bill felt that he was wasting his talents in a small village. He and a friend, Frank Snyder, came up with the idea of wandering from Indiana through Kentucky as traveling photographers, taking pictures of people, buildings, and scenes while selling the photos along their way. The picture-taking was easy, they discovered; it was the selling of them that proved difficult. A discouraged Snyder went home to Boonville, while Veeck drifted on to St. Louis and then back to Kentucky, where he landed a reporter’s position on the Louisville Courier-Journal. He returned to Boonville for a brief time, just long enough to marry his childhood sweetheart, Grace DeForest, on October 17, 1900. He might have remained in Louisville if a stifling heat wave had not hit the area during the following summer. When the thermometer registered 107 degrees on July 24, he told his wife, “Pack up, we’re going to Chicago. I can’t stand this any longer, it’s too hot for me. At least they got a lake up there.”4

Veeck resigned his job in Louisville but soon found another on the Chicago Inter Ocean newspaper and then with the Chicago Chronicle. He had played ball as a youngster, and with his older brother, Ed, having been a catcher on a semi-pro team in Evansville, he continued to follow the game while working as a journalist. Many years later, Ed W. Smith, a retired sports editor of several Chicago newspapers, recalled that he met Veeck when they both worked on the Chronicle. Smith reminisced that “it was in Bill’s blood, his love of [baseball],” and “he wouldn’t have traded jobs with the President.” That may have been true, but Veeck unfortunately had to leave his position in 1907, as did Smith, because the paper ceased publication on May 31. According to an article published that day in the Chicago Daily Tribune, the Chronicle “had not been a paying investment at any time,” and rumors of its suspension or change in ownership had been circulating for months. Perhaps the two friends, foreseeing the collapse of the newspaper, had inquired about other job opportunities, for as Smith commented, “Quickly we were together on The Chicago [Evening] American.”5

Veeck went right to work as a reporter. Decades later, the newspaper’s sports editor, Edward J. Geiger, recalled that even though Veeck was hired to cover the city news beat, “He spent much of his spare time in the baseball department watching the baseball ticker. He loved baseball like a dyed-in-the-wool fan and was a keen student of the game.” Two years later, when the American’s sportswriter left the paper, Veeck stepped into the vacant position, where he had the opportunity to put his baseball knowledge to good use. Researchers will never know the extent of his contributions to the American, however, as many of its news and sports features lacked bylines. A systematic review of the newspaper does reveal that his first signed piece—under the name of William L. Veeck—was an article on the Chicago White Sox and their race for the American League pennant, published on September 3, 1907, soon after he joined the staff.6

More articles followed this one, although on March 3, 1908, Veeck replaced his byline with that of “Bill Bailey.” His motives for adopting the pen name are unknown, though the decision was certainly no journalistic secret. Bill Veeck Jr. maintains in his autobiography that Bill Bailey was the paper’s “stock sports byline,” but if that were the case, why did other sportswriters, such as Ed W. Smith and Harry Neily, contribute articles under their own names? The March 3 piece, titled “Bill Bailey’s Column,” is an assortment of baseball-related anecdotes. If Veeck intended to regularly compile a collection of miscellaneous sports news, perhaps he wanted a new name to go along with the new feature. While “Bill Bailey’s Column” did not last long in the newspaper, the alliterative byline did, and Veeck apparently felt comfortable with his pseudonym.7

Although Veeck’s career as a sportswriter was off to a successful start, his personal life suffered a horrific tragedy on September 29, 1909. According to the Chicago Daily Tribune, that evening the Veeck’s young son, Maurice Forest Veeck, was playing “warrior” (a game with wooden guns and swords) with a friend, Preston Lavin. The two seven-year-old boys had been friends “ever since they were old enough to run about out of doors,” and every day after school they would play at one or the other’s home. On this particular evening they were at the Lavin residence and had come across a loaded revolver that Preston’s father had carelessly left on a table in the library. Preston was showing Maurice how the gun worked when it accidentally discharged, striking the Veeck boy under his right eye and killing him.

The death was ruled accidental. Paul Dickson, author of Bill Veeck: Baseball’s Greatest Maverick, writes that one of William L. Veeck’s grandchildren told him that after Maurice died, “My grandmother really didn’t want to have children—or at least that’s the impression she gave—but my grandfather prevailed.” Two years later, on April 27, 1911, Grace Veeck gave birth to Margaret Ann Veeck. Margaret was followed by William Louis Veeck Jr. on February 9, 1914. When young Bill was one year old, the family moved to Hinsdale, a western suburb of Chicago.

Dickson also mentions that Grace Veeck “never really got over” the death of her first son, “becoming much less social and given to long, solitary walks. For his part, William Veeck threw himself even more deeply into his work as a sportswriter....”8

Veeck’s concentration on his journalism career is evident from reading the sports pages of the Chicago Evening American. Even the articles he wrote during his first few years on the paper are not mere recordings of bare-bones facts, but they instead exhibit craftsmanship and the vivid portrayal of scenes for his readers. His descriptive, almost lyrical essays prompted Chicago’s “adless daily newspaper,” the Day Book, to refer to him as the Evening American’s “baseball literary gent.”9

William L. Veeck’s column of baseball-related anecdotes in the March 3, 1908, issue of the Chicago Evening American marks the first appearance of the sportswriter’s “Bill Bailey” pen name.

Veeck’s emphasis on striking details is reflected in an article he wrote on Babe Ruth in 1918. That was the ballplayer’s breakout year in terms of plate appearances (382 as compared to 142 the year before), and opposing pitchers had quickly discovered—and feared—his big bat. On July 11, the White Sox lost, 4–0, to the Red Sox, a game about which a sportswriter for the Washington Post pointed out, “[Eddie] Cicotte was hit safely nine times, three of them doubles to left by Babe Ruth.” The next day Veeck did not simply focus on the power of Ruth’s swing; he also adroitly weaved into his narrative why a pitcher needs a certain mental toughness and confidence each time he steps on the mound. Following are three paragraphs from “All Pitchers Look Alike to Ruth, Red Sox Slugger”:

How are you going to pitch to Ruth? Eddie Cicotte, veteran, cool, crafty, sharp in the art of pitching, did a bit of experimenting in this opening battle. He had read that the Cleveland twirlers tried speed, hooks, had kept the ball high and low, and, regardless of their wiles, Ruth kept right on driving it to the distant fences.

So Cicotte determined he would profit by their mistakes. The first time that Ruth strode to the plate, which was in the second inning, Cicotte determined to sneak one past him. He put all the speed he possessed on the sphere and shot it across the outside corner of the plate.

That it would have passed that point had Ruth kept his bat on his shoulder is certain. But he didn’t. He swung, and there was all the strength of his tremendous shoulders and broad back behind the swing. There was the crash of timber against horsehide and [Fred] McMullin had an excellent view of something resembling a pea shooting between him and the bag. By the time [Nemo] Leibold had retrieved the sphere Ruth was perched upon second base. And Cicotte was certain that a fast one was not the weakness o’ this giant.10

Veeck’s articles, however, are not limited to dashing accounts of athletic prowess. As a professional sports reporter, Veeck carefully studied the players and did not hesitate to point out problems and suggest solutions. When recalling the Cubs of 1917, for instance, he maintained that first baseman Vic Saier “could have discarded his bat for a toothpick and been just as effective against left-hand pitching.” After Veeck watched a March 1918 exhibition game, he wrote that catcher Bill Killefer “caught nicely enough, but his throwing arm isn’t anywhere near right.” While the ballplayers were preparing to leave their spring training site in Pasadena, California, at the end of March, Veeck observed that “an epidemic of sore arms and injured legs has swept the camp, with the result that the majority of the men are in anything but fit condition for a bruising campaign.” In April Veeck asked, “Is [Charlie] Hollocher going to prove a star in the field and a fizzle at the bat?... He’s the lead-off man, but so far has not displayed the patience of a great waiter, consequently seldom draws a base on balls.”11

Throughout Veeck’s journalism career he provided similar perceptive analyses about various aspects of many sports. A misconception held by some writers, however, is that his observations on the Cubs throughout the 1918 season were more caustic than critical, which eventually prompted club Director William Wrigley to challenge him, “If you think you can do a better job of running my ball club, why go ahead.” A reading of Veeck’s articles, though, reveals no scathing outbursts. Nor did he contribute a “series” of biting articles on the mismanagement of the team, as some writers have maintained. But then, with the Cubs playing particularly well that year, there was little reason for him to write such diatribes. As early as May, Veeck and other sportswriters publicly predicted the Cubs would have a winning season—albeit a war-shortened one—and the team went on to win the National League pennant.12

Alas, the Cubs fell to the Boston Red Sox in the World Series, 4 games to 2. A disappointed Veeck wrote a column on the “disastrous” outcome, but with the end of the season it was time to move on. His baseball coverage gave way to other sports, such as football, and with the advent of fall he was soon spending time on the gridiron rather than on the baseball grounds. In September and October, for instance, he profiled head football coaches Amos Alonzo Stagg at the University of Chicago and Fred J. Murphy of Northwestern University.13

The routine of the Chicago Cubs front office was undergoing changes as well. Shortly after restaurateur Charles Weeghman and other investors—including chewing gum magnate William Wrigley Jr.—purchased the team from Charles P. Taft in 1916, club president Weeghman found himself in financial difficulties. Wrigley liked Weeghman, and agreed to lend him money, receiving Cubs stock as collateral. Wrigley’s interest in the club gradually grew and he soon became not only a major stockholder but also “an enthusiastic fan,” in the words of the Chicago Daily Tribune. In 1917 the Cubs began spring training at the playing field he had built for them near his home in Pasadena, and Wrigley enjoyed mingling with both the players and the sportswriters who accompanied them.14

By late 1918, Wrigley had purchased Cubs stock from Weeghman and other stockholders. Weeghman resigned as president, and when the Cubs board of directors met in early December that year, the members elected team manager Fred Mitchell president of the club. William L. Veeck was elected vice president and treasurer, succeeding William Walker.

Veeck’s colleague on the Chicago Evening American, Harry Neily, said that people had known for several weeks that Mitchell would replace Weeghman, “but the appointment of Bill Veeck came as a distinct surprise to the fans.” Veeck, however, was well known in baseball circles; the care with which he had handled his responsibilities as the Chicago representative of the Baseball Writers’ Association of America had earned him favorable notice. Veeck had covered the Cubs’ spring training activities in Pasadena earlier that year and first met Wrigley while attending a dinner party with other newspapermen at the businessman’s home. Many years later, Veeck remarked during an interview that he had always tried to be an impartial reporter who was “telling the truth” and that his well-reasoned, occasionally critical articles in the Evening American had attracted Wrigley’s attention. “I never flattered [the players] when they didn’t have it coming,” he told Chicago Daily News sportswriter John P. Carmichael. “Nor do I like to see any writer now do that.” He added that “baseball fans are not dumb; they’re entitled to intelligent comment on the game.”15

It was this fair and intelligent commentary that had not only attracted Wrigley’s attention but also earned his respect. In July 1919, Veeck assumed the role as president of the Cubs after Fred Mitchell resigned so he could devote all his efforts to managing the team. The former sportswriter had little time to get accustomed to his new duties, however, for soon he was confronting an issue that threatened the public’s confidence not only in baseball but also in his own team.

That problem was gambling. The World Series that fall featured the Chicago White Sox facing off against the Cincinnati Reds. Hugh Fullerton, among a few other journalists, suspected that gamblers had bribed some of the players, and in mid-December he wrote the first of a series of articles for the New York Evening World, “Is Big League Baseball Being Run for Gamblers, with Players in the Deal?” Many baseball fans scoffed at the rumors, however, refusing to believe that the integrity of their favorite sport had been compromised. Owners may have had their suspicions, but they just wanted the whole controversy to disappear.16

For a while it did—but not for long. With spring came the start of the 1920 season, and as Geoffrey C. Ward and Ken Burns relate in their Baseball: An Illustrated History, “Other players on other teams evidently began to see the advantages of getting close to gamblers.” Unfortunately for Veeck, some of those players were with the Cubs. For instance, on February 21, the baseball club announced that utility player Lee Magee, who had joined the Cubs the year before, would not play with any National League team that summer. “There was mystery in the way the announcement was guarded,” contended a reporter for the Washington Herald, and sportswriters wondered what had led to Magee’s dismissal. The mystery was cleared up a few months later, when newspapers reported that on February 10, Magee had confessed to Veeck and National League President John Heydler that while he was with the Cincinnati Reds, he had tried to “toss” the first game of a July 25, 1918, doubleheader with the Boston Braves.

This apparently was not a solitary incident; The Sporting News disclosed that Veeck and Heydler said that Magee had “made a ‘clean breast’ of his crookedness … when they called him to Chicago to explain certain evidence of his dishonesty that had come into their possession.” Veeck and other baseball officials had decided in December 1919 that Magee should be released by the Cubs for “indifferent ball playing,” and he never played professional baseball again.17

National League officials formally commended the Chicago club in June 1920 “for forcing into the full light of publicity its reason for the discharge of Player Lee Magee.” Veeck’s integrity as the Cubs’ president was tested again two months later, when on August 31 he received six telegrams and two long-distance phone calls warning him that the Cubs–Phillies game that day was “fixed” for Philadelphia to win. The Chicago Herald and Examiner broke the story on September 4. The newspaper followed this article with a major piece the next day, announcing that Veeck “yesterday afternoon confirmed the news story ... that gamblers had renewed their effort to get control of baseball.... A betting pool of $50,000 was said to be up, and Philadelphia won, true to the ‘dope,’ defeating Chicago 3 to 0.”

The September 5 Chicago Herald and Examiner article revealed that the sender of one of the telegrams had advised Veeck that Pete Alexander should be substituted for scheduled pitcher Claude Hendrix. The article also included a lengthy statement by the Cubs president in which he furnished the text of the six telegrams and the content of the two phone calls. Veeck said in part:

Our unfortunate experience of last year [learning of Magee’s questionable playing] made us feel doubly responsible to the great baseball-loving public, and, after conference, Manager [Fred] Mitchell and I decided to pitch Mr. Alexander, though he had pitched but three days before, and it was another twenty-four hours until his turn should come.

We know that Alexander is a man above all suspicion and felt with our premier pitcher in the box we were doing all we could, if there was any foundation to the charges, to insure that a dastardly conspiracy, if any such existed, be thwarted.

I personally sent for Alexander and sketched the situation to him, offering him a bonus of $500 if he won that particular game, and I am sure that no man ever went into the box wanting to win more than did Alexander.

Chicago Cubs President William L. “Bill” Veeck Sr. was one of the most highly respected baseball executives during the 1920s and early 1930s. Yankees slugger Babe Ruth said upon his death in 1933: “If Bill Veeck would have been in the Cub lineup in 1932, I don’t think we’d have won in four straight games.”

Despite the pitcher’s efforts (and the monetary incentive), he was just not up to the task. Following the Cubs’ loss, Veeck contacted the manager of the Burns Detective Agency in Chicago and instructed him to locate the persons who had sent the telegrams and made the phone calls and to obtain from them any evidence they might have. He also asked the Chicago Chapter of the Baseball Writers’ Association for assistance in identifying the parties. In a letter to Tribune sportswriter Irving Sanborn, president of the chapter, Veeck wrote that “my sole idea is to have this investigation open and effective [so] that the charge can never be brought that the Chicago National League ball club attempted to protect in any manner whatsoever any player against whom there is any evidence.”18

Events moved swiftly after that. On September 8 the newspapers reported that Chief Justice Charles A. McDonald of Chicago’s Criminal Court had ordered a grand jury investigation into the scandal. Within two weeks, however, disgruntled baseball fans had also clamored for an investigation into the 1919 World Series, and soon the focus shifted from the Cubs to the White Sox.

The grand jury never issued a decision concerning the August 31 Cubs–Phillies game. Although Hendrix and several other Cubs players who also had been under suspicion were never formally charged or banned from baseball, all were dropped by the team before the start of the 1921 season. In a February 8, 1921, Chicago Daily Tribune article, sportswriter James Crusinberry relates that according to Veeck, there was no evidence against Hendrix; the Cubs simply wanted to build a team of younger players. Nevertheless, Crusinberry does note that the pitcher’s name “was mentioned in an incident that started the big fireworks which culminated in the confessions of three White Sox players that the world’s series of 1919 was thrown.”19

One could argue that it was Veeck who lit the first fuse to the aforementioned big fireworks (and who helped extinguish a few stray sparks by prominently serving on a committee that in 1920 elected Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis as baseball’s first commissioner). In early 1922, Veeck’s name was facetiously connected to the White Sox controversy after he directed that Cubs ballplayers had to wear clean uniforms. No longer could a superstitious player on a batting streak wear the same suit without washing it, and Veeck promptly ordered four uniforms for each player—two for home games and two for those on the road. Baseball writer, poet, and humorist William F. Kirk commemorated the mandate with a poem, “The Nice Clean Cubs.” The first verse reads:

PRESIDENT VEECK, of Chicago’s Cubs,

Is taking a stand for laundry tubs.

He says he wants his Cubs to play

In spotless uniforms every day.

Whatever those White Sox might have been,

The Cubs, says Veeck, must all come clean!20

Veeck’s stipulation was not as frivolous as the rhyme perhaps makes it appear, for both he and William Wrigley recognized that an attractive ballpark setting (including the appearance of its denizens) sells more tickets and puts more fans in the seats than one that is not well maintained. For instance, to help keep game days running smoothly and orderly, they employed Andy Frain, whose uniformed, well-trained ushers were fixtures around the park for decades. In a 1937 Sporting News interview, Club Secretary Margaret Donahue remarks that Wrigley and Veeck “were strong for the clean, well-kept grounds and stands, an idea many clubs have followed.”21

Donahue (whom Veeck hired in 1919 as a stenographer and who rose to corporate secretary in 1926 and became a vice president in 1950) helped her boss promote the weekly Ladies’ Days at the Cubs’ ballpark. Although Veeck did not originate Ladies’ Days, as he is sometimes credited, he certainly refined the concept. In the summer of 1927, the former journalist contributed an article to Printer’s Ink magazine on the success he and the Cubs had with their “Every Friday is ‘Ladies’ Day’ at Wrigley Field” advertisements in Chicago’s newspapers. He explains that by the Cubs admitting women free on Fridays, “We have also added many women to our list of regular patrons.” Furthermore, the women who attended games “saw that the park was an attractive spot and that the atmosphere was of such a nature as to make it a wholesome place....”

Margaret Donahue and William Veeck go through stacks of ticket requests for the 1929 World Series at Wrigley Field. Veeck hired Donahue in 1919 as a stenographer and promoted her to corporate secretary in 1926.

Others saw the significance of Veeck’s thinking. In the August 28, 1930, issue of The Sporting News, Francis J. Powers remarks that Veeck “went far out of his way to make the women understand they were welcome at the Cub Park.” Powers also observes that the one day each week that is set aside for the free admission of women not only fosters goodwill but also encourages the women to become “regular followers of the Bruins,” which helps fill the ballpark on other days.22

In a similar vein, Veeck and Wrigley advocated the broadcasting of games, for they realized that radio would increase fan interest as well as introduce baseball—and the Cubs—to a whole new group of enthusiasts, many of whom would then enjoy spending afternoons outdoors watching the teams play. In the early 1920s, most club owners were skeptical of radio and feared the opposite would happen: fans would prefer to relax at home and listen to games rather than pay money and go to the ballpark. The two Cubs executives were undoubtedly pleased when the team made its radio debut on October 1, 1924, with A. W. “Sen” Kaney broadcasting the opening game of the Cubs–White Sox City Series from atop the grandstand roof of the park’s single deck.

That week, radio station WMAQ in Chicago began its play-by-play coverage of the Washington Senators–New York Giants World Series. In radio’s early days, WMAQ broadcast games on a limited basis, and in the spring of 1925, program director Judith Waller sounded out William Wrigley about her station putting Cubs’ games on the air. “Whether he was intrigued by the fact that a woman was asking him for this privilege, or just because the whole venture was so new, I don’t know,” she recalled years later, but he listened carefully to her suggestion.23

One cannot help but wonder if Veeck—a former newspaperman—was also initially intrigued by radio. Most print journalists at the time felt threatened by the development of broadcast journalism, but if Veeck had any misgivings, the marketing-conscious team owner undoubtedly reassured him. “Mr. Wrigley was a man of action,” Veeck later remembered. “He was a great believer in advertising; that laid the basis for the radio [broadcasts] and the ladies day[s].” The two men mulled over Waller’s proposal and gave her the go-ahead for a thirty-day trial. Listeners were asked to comment on the wireless transmission of Cubs games, and by the end of the month, thousands of people had expressed their enthusiastic approval. “Don’t stop it,” wrote an Indiana farmer. “I have a radio in the field with me. I plow one turn, sit down for a cool drink out of the jug and listen to the score. It’s great.”

Wrigley and Veeck needed no more convincing, and they arranged for baseball programming throughout the entire season. At the time, Wrigley was more interested in broadcast listeners than broadcast rights (“the more outlets the better,” he insisted. “That way we’ll tie up the entire city”). Consequently, both stations WMAQ and WGN were at Cubs Park on Opening Day to describe the home team’s 8–2 victory over the Pirates.24

Even though the Cubs ended the 1925 season with a dismal 68–86 record, the ballpark’s attendance total of 622,610 that year surpassed the National League teams’ average of 544,213. Radio broadcasts and Ladies’ Days continued to publicize the Cubs, and Wrigley and Veeck put a second tier of seating over the left-field grandstands in time for the 1927 season. As Veeck and a Chicago Daily Tribune reporter looked around the crowded stadium on Opening Day, the journalist observed that baseball seemed as popular as ever. “It’s a surprise even to us,” Veeck replied. “They keep coming faster than we can build.” Five years later, a Tribune columnist analyzed factors affecting ballpark attendance and succinctly concluded: “Bill Veeck, Cub president, is not dumb in his advocacy of broadcasting and ‘ladies’ days.”25

Many of those Ladies’ Day tickets were carefully mailed out by young Bill Veeck Jr., who began going to the ballpark with his father at age ten. The younger Veeck reflects in his autobiography, “Unlike me, my father was far too dignified a man to pull any promotional stunts. He was a man of imagination, though, and easily the greatest innovator of his time.” Perhaps William Veeck Sr. did not engage in any “stunts,” but he and William Wrigley Jr. (a wealthy entrepreneur who twice sent a package of chewing gum to every telephone customer in the United States) recognized the value of publicity and promotional ventures. At the same time, they also realized that the players had to do their part on the field. “All I ask,” Veeck told an interviewer in 1932, “is that they keep physically and morally fit and play ball. The club is entitled to that much in its efforts to keep baseball popular with the men and women who have supported it.” In 1927 the Cubs became the first National League team to draw more than a million fans in a season, and in 1929 it set a then-National League record after 1,485,166 persons passed through Wrigley Field’s gates that year.26

As president of the Chicago Cubs from 1919 until his death in 1933, Bill Veeck Sr. helped mastermind two National League pennants (1929 and 1932) and built the foundations for two others (1935 and 1938).

Veeck’s judgment and ideas generally worked out well for the Cubs, and as the Chicago Daily Tribune declared in a 1925 newspaper headline, “Veeck Seethes with Ideas.” Probably none of them that year matched his decision in October to hire Joe McCarthy as manager, who in 1929 would lead the team to the National League pennant. (McCarthy’s arrival was swiftly followed by the departure of the fun-loving, hard-drinking Rabbit Maranville, whose hiring as player-manager was one of Veeck’s ideas that did not work out so well.) Wrigley, who pledged a million dollars to help McCarthy rebuild the team, knew that he could count on the financial assistance of the Decatur Staleys football team (later called the Chicago Bears), as in 1921 coach George Halas reached an agreement with Veeck to lease Cubs Park each fall.

Soon after the 1922 football season was over, Wrigley and Veeck began to renovate Cubs Park, increasing its seating capacity. One of their decisions concerning the ballpark will probably strike a chord with today’s fans who want Wrigley Field to remain untouched (and unscathed) by a Jumbotron and other forms of modernization. In 1924 Veeck removed all advertising on the scoreboard in favor of simply displaying major league team scores. Furthermore, an April 23 article in the Chicago Daily Tribune informs those going to the park that afternoon for the Cubs home opener that “there’ll be no highly colored signs in center field to dazzle the spectators and batters.”27

Veeck’s ideas also focused on innovative ways to improve not just the Cubs and Wrigley Field but also baseball as a spectator sport. For example, in 1933, with the Depression crippling attendance, Veeck urged interleague games as a way of creating a “wider interest” in baseball by making it “more attractive” to fans. “We can’t go on operating on the same basis as we did twenty-five years ago,” he emphatically told an Associated Press reporter. Many baseball officials agreed with him (including National League President John Heydler, who referred to Veeck as a “progressive”), but interleague play would not be a part of major league baseball until 1997. Also, even though Chicago Daily Tribune sports editor Arch Ward first envisioned the 1933 All-Star Game, it was Veeck who exclaimed, “Great. Let’s go through with it,” and lobbied club owners and other baseball officials for their support.28

Just a few weeks after he endorsed interleague games, William Veeck began suffering from a high fever and other flu-like symptoms. His doctor prescribed a tonic for him, but when he didn’t improve, the physician tested his blood and found a high level of white corpuscles. Veeck entered St. Luke’s Hospital in Chicago on September 29, 1933, and he died in his sleep in the morning of October 5 at age 56. The cause of death was leukemia.29

Within a few days, the Veeck family received more than five hundred telegrams of condolence and over four hundred floral arrangements. The funeral service was held at their home and was conducted by the rector of the Grace Episcopal Church in Hinsdale, of which Veeck was a parishioner. The Chicago Evening American reported that “every member of the Cubs’ official family was present” as well as players from the Chicago White Sox. Veeck’s pallbearers included Cubs Vice President John Seys and five other “old neighbors.” One was longtime friend George Dreher, with whom Veeck had regularly played bridge and golf (Veeck had been president of the Hinsdale Golf Club and had especially enjoyed relaxing on the golf course while at William Wrigley’s Catalina Island estate off the coast of California). Andy Frain and his blue-coated ushers lined up as a guard of honor on both sides of the sidewalk, and between them the pallbearers carried the casket.

On the lawn outside the large white house, friends and business associates recalled Veeck’s commitment to the sport—and team—he loved, and newspapers published tributes in his honor. The Chicago Evening American editorialized that baseball fans “knew that he wanted the Cubs to be winners and that he worked hard and thought hard and planned diligently to make them winners, but that he esteemed honesty and manliness and good sportsmanship above victory.”30

Many of the remembrances focused on Veeck’s journalism career, which solidly prepared him for the Cubs’ front office. The Sporting News contended that Veeck “was one of the few baseball writers to graduate to the presidency of a prominent ball club and make a success on the job.” Harry Grabiner, vice president and secretary of the White Sox, declared that “as a baseball writer [Veeck’s] stories were most intelligent. He knew baseball and knew how to express himself in baseball terms.” Grabiner went on, adding that Veeck also possessed the ability to teach the sport, as “he had a great baseball mind and he could instruct his players along lines that made stars out of promising youngsters.” Veeck signed or traded for many of those same ballplayers, some of whom became the stars Grabiner mentioned and who were members of the Cubs’ pennant-winning teams. They included Woody English, Charlie Grimm, Stan Hack, Billy Jurges, Charlie Root, and Riggs Stephenson, as well as Hall of Famers Kiki Cuyler, Gabby Hartnett, Billy Herman, Rogers Hornsby, and Hack Wilson.31

In their testimonials, Veeck’s friends and acquaintances recounted his enthusiasm and love of baseball. Some of them listed his many accomplishments. Others mentioned that the team owners depended upon his leadership and that they listened attentively whenever he spoke. Perhaps the highest compliments paid Veeck concerned his integrity. “He was the fairest and squarest man in the game,” John Seys asserted. Cubs manager Charlie Grimm offered his opinion: “He was the best ‘scout’ baseball ever knew, and the squarest shooter.” As the Chicago Evening American, Veeck’s old newspaper, correctly pointed out, even “those with whom he had clashed” respected him.

One of those persons who may not have clashed with Veeck, but certainly did with his team, ranks among baseball’s elite. “He was a fighter and a great guy,” Babe Ruth said. “If Bill Veeck would have been in the Cub lineup in 1932, I don’t think we’d have won in four straight games.”32

Ruth’s mention of the 1932 Cubs–Yankees World Series puts one in mind of his famous home run at Wrigley Field during the fifth inning of Game Three. Opinions vary about the gesture he made before slamming the ball into the center-field bleachers, but when it came to characterizing Bill Veeck Sr., Babe Ruth definitely called his shot.

Notes

1. David Fletcher, “Chicago Baseball Museum to Honor Veeck Family on Sept. 20,” Society for American Baseball Research, http://sabr.org/latest/chicago-baseball-museum-honor-veeck-family-sept-20-event (accessed August 12, 2013). Several tributes published after Veeck’s death mention that he was usually called Bill, not William. E.g., “‘Bill’ Veeck, President of the Cubs, Is Dead,” Chicago Daily News, October 5, 1933, 1; Edward J. Geiger, “Geiger Says: ‘Bill Veeck Ardent Baseball Man in Days As Scribe,’” Chicago Evening American, October 6, 1933, 37. I occasionally refer to him as William or Veeck Sr. to avoid confusion with his son.

2. “‘Bill’ Veeck, President of the Cubs, Is Dead,” 1; Jim Gallagher, “Lifetime Story of Bill Veeck, Cub President,” Chicago Evening American, October 5, 1933, 25, 30. Veeck’s birth year has been recorded as 1876, 1877, and 1878. Dr. David Fletcher of the Chicago Baseball Museum sent me a photograph of Veeck’s tombstone in Hinsdale, Illinois, which bears 1877. See also Jack Bales, “‘It Was His Fairness That Caught Wrigley’s Eye’: William L. Veeck’s Journalism Career and His Hiring by the Chicago Cubs,” NINE: A Journal of Baseball History and Culture 20, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 10, note 3.

3. Gallagher, “Lifetime Story of Bill Veeck,” 30. See also “‘Bill’ Veeck, President of the Cubs, Is Dead,” 1, 21; Paul Dickson, Bill Veeck: Baseball’s Greatest Maverick (New York: Walker & Co., 2012), 7.

4. Gallagher, “Lifetime Story of Bill Veeck,” 30; “‘Bill’ Veeck, President of the Cubs, Is Dead,” 21. Veeck’s marriage is in “William L. Veeck, Head of Cubs, Dies,” The New York Times, October 6, 1933, 17; Dickson, Bill Veeck, 7. Veeck quotation about the heat is from John P. Carmichael, “Prexy Bill Veeck: The Man Behind the Cubs,” Chicago Daily News, September 15, 1932, sec. 2, 17. (“This is the first of a series of articles on the career of William Veeck, president of the Cubs.” Carmichael wrote a five-part series of articles on Veeck that ran in the Daily News on September 15–17, 19, and 20, 1932.) Gallagher notes that Veeck and his wife left Louisville in 1902, but the temperature reached 107 degrees on July 24, 1901, Louisville’s hottest day on record. See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service Weather Forecast Office, Louisville, Kentucky, “Top Ten Heat Events for Kentucky and Southern Indiana,” www.crh.noaa.gov/lmk/?n=top10heat (accessed July 30, 2013).

5. Ed W. Smith, “Ed Smith Writes of Early Days with Bill Veeck,” Chicago Evening American, October 6, 1933, 39; “Chronicle Quits; Last Issue Today,” Chicago Daily Tribune, May 31, 1907, 1. Veeck and his brother playing baseball is in Carmichael, “Prexy Bill Veeck,” September 15, 1932, sec. 2, 17 (see n. 4).

6. Geiger, “Geiger Says,” 37; William L. Veeck, “Sox Can Almost Tie for First Place by Winning Today’s Game,” Chicago Evening American, September 3, 1907, 9.

7. “Bill Bailey’s Column,” Chicago Evening American, March 3, 1908, 8; Bill Veeck with Ed Lynn, Veeck—as in Wreck: The Autobiography of Bill Veeck (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1962), 25. See also Ed W. Smith, “Mowatt Has $3,000 to Bet on Papke at 7–10,” Chicago Evening American, February 28, 1908, 8; Harry Neily, “Cubs Ready to Start; Archer Missing,” Chicago Evening American, February 21, 1917, 7. For articles that show Veeck’s pen name was well known, see “New Cub Heads Get Stock in Chicago Club,” The Sporting News, December 12, 1918, 6; “Chicago’s Greatest Sporting Pages,” Chicago Daily Tribune, May 5, 1918, G11.

8. “Boy Kills His Chum at Play,” Chicago Daily Tribune, September 30, 1909, 3; Dickson, Bill Veeck, 8–9.

9. “Sporting Items,” Chicago Day Book, July 23, 1912, 18.

10. Ruth’s plate appearances are in “Babe Ruth,” Baseball-reference.com, www.baseball-reference.com/players/r/ruthba01.shtml (accessed August 12, 2013). “Red Sox Keep Up Shut-Out Pace, Beating White Sox As Ruth Gathers Three Doubles,” Washington Post, July 12, 1918, 8; Bill Bailey, “All Pitchers Look Alike to Ruth, Red Sox Slugger,” Chicago Evening American, July 13, 1918, 7. First names of players are from www.baseball-reference.com.

11. Vic Saier’s “toothpick” quotation is from Bill Bailey, “Cubs Now Have Six Right-Hand Batters,” Chicago Evening American, February 14, 1918, 6. Bill Killefer’s “throwing arm” quotation is from Bill Bailey, “Hollocher Hits Poorly; Shines in Field,” Chicago Evening American, March 23, 1918, 7. William Wrigley building a spring training field for the Cubs is in James Crusinberry, “Regular Park in California, Plan for Cubs,” Chicago Daily Tribune, February 28, 1917, 11. The “epidemic of sore arms” quotation is from Bill Bailey, “Cubs Hit Trail After Vernon Game To-Day,” Chicago Evening American, March 27, 1918, 7. Charlie Hollocher’s “star in the field” quotation is from Bill Bailey, “Alexander and Tyler Blank All Comers,” Chicago Evening American, April 2, 1918, 6.

12. Wrigley quotation is in “Head of Cubs Fights for Life,” Washington Post, October 3, 1933, 17. Veeck’s pointed articles are also mentioned in “‘Bill’ Veeck, President of the Cubs, Is Dead,” 21; “William Louis Veeck,” The Sporting News, October 12, 1933, 4; “William Veeck: He Made the Cubs Popular,” The Sporting News, October 12, 1933, 4. When Bill Veeck Jr. declared in Veeck—as in Wreck (23, 25) that his father had published a “series” of articles on the Cubs’ mismanagement, other writers repeated the statement. For example, see Peter Golenbock, Wrigleyville: A Magical History Tour of the Chicago Cubs (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 176–77. The story that Veeck routinely lambasted the team likely originated with United Press staff correspondent Dixon Stewart in 1931. See Dixon Stewart, “Challenge Led to Success of Cub President,” Berkeley (California) Daily Gazette, January 17, 1931, 9; Bales, “‘It Was His Fairness That Caught Wrigley’s Eye,’” 1–2, 8. Wrigley as a Cubs director is in J.J. Alcock, “Cubs a $1,000,000 Ball Club; Directorate Raised to Nine,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 8, 1916, 15. Season predictions are in Bill Bailey, “Cubs Have Good Chance in Flag Race, Says Expert,” Chicago Evening American, May 6, 1918, 6; “Giants Climb Fast in Pennant Chase: Chicago Appears to Be Only Club Which Can Halt McGraw’s Speedy Team,” The New York Times, May 6, 1918, 10; James Crusinberry, “Cubs, Other Teams, Have Flag Chance; Giant Defense Weak,” Chicago Daily Tribune, May 29, 1918, 11.

13. Column on World Series is Bill Bailey, “Tyler’s Lapse of Memory Fatal,” Chicago Evening American, September 16, 1918, 5. Profiles include Bill Bailey, “Athletes Make Ideal Soldiers, So Says Coach A. A. Stagg: Wants Mass Athletics for All,” Chicago Evening American, September 26, 1918, 7; Bill Bailey, “Stagg to Start Herculean Task Tomorrow,” Chicago Evening American, October 12, 1918, 7; Bill Bailey, “Murphy Finds a Real Friend of Boys,” Chicago Evening American, October 30, 1918, 7.

14. An excellent article on Weeghman’s many interests and investments is Hugh S. Fullerton, “Baseball Magnate Who Made Success Success [sic] Possible Once a Waiter,” Chicago Day Book, March 2, 1914, 27–28. Purchase of the Cubs is in James Crusinberry, “Weeghman Owns Cubs; Hands Over $500,000,” Chicago Daily Tribune, January 21, 1916, 11; James Crusinberry, “Rivals in Loop Now Partners in New Cubs, Chicago Daily Tribune, January 23, 1916, B1; I. E. Sanborn, “The Big Chicago Deal Completed,” Sporting Life, January 29, 1916, 6; “Half Million in Cash on Deadline! And Cubs Are His,” Chicago Daily Tribune, January 4, 1936, 19. Weeghman in financial difficulties is in “Baseball Career Costs Weeghman Over $1,000,000,” Washington Herald, October 7, 1918, 6; “Baseball Costly to Weeghman,” New York Tribune, August 11, 1920, 10. Wrigley buying stock is in James Crusinberry, “Wrigley Buys Another Block of Cubs’ Stock,” Chicago Daily Tribune, December 12, 1916, 15. Wrigley is referred to as a major stockholder and “enthusiastic fan” in James Crusinberry, “Killefer Wagers Ten Cent Cigar; Cashes $1,000,” Chicago Daily Tribune, September 8, 1918, A5. Material on Wrigley mingling with players and reporters and visiting the spring training site is in James Crusinberry, “Regular Park in California, Plan for Cubs,” Chicago Daily Tribune, February 28, 1917, 11; James Crusinberry, “Alex Refuses to Take Part in Cubs’ Drill,” Chicago Daily Tribune, March 17, 1918, A1; Irving Vaughn, “Wrigley’s Son to Carry on Dream of Winner,” Chicago Daily Tribune, January 27, 1932, 19.

15. Weeghman’s finances and resignation are in “Weeghman, Boss of Cubs, Will Resign,” Washington Herald, November 20, 1918, 6; “Mitchell’s Elevation As Head of Cubs Pleases Chicago Fans,” The Sporting News, November 28, 1918, 2; Harry Neily, “Death Ends Meteoric Career of Charley Weeghman, Angel of Federal League and Former Owner of Cubs,” The Sporting News, November 10, 1938, 7. New Cubs officers are in James Crusinberry, “Mitchell, Veeck, and Seys Named to Direct Cubs,” Chicago Daily Tribune, December 8, 1918, A5; “New Officers for Cubs,” The New York Times, December 8, 1918, 31; “New Cub Heads Get Stock in Chicago Club,” The Sporting News, December 12, 1918, 6. The “distinct surprise” quotation is from Harry Neily, “Bill Veeck Is Made a Cub Official,” Chicago Evening American, December 9, 1918, 7. Carmichael quotations are from John P. Carmichael, “Prexy Bill Veeck: The Man Behind the Cubs,” Chicago Daily News, September 16, 1932, sec. 3, 32. (“This is the second of a series of articles on the career of William Veeck, president of the Cubs.” See n. 4.)

16. “Mitchell Resigns As Cub President; Veeck Is Advanced,” Chicago Daily Tribune, July 7, 1919, 14; Hugh S. Fullerton, “Is Big League Baseball Being Run for Gamblers, with Players in the Deal?,” New York Evening World, December 15, 1919, 3, 20; Geoffrey C. Ward, Ken Burns, and others, Baseball: An Illustrated History, updated ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), 140–42.

17. Ward, Baseball: An Illustrated History, 142; “After Statement on Lee Magee Case,” Washington Herald, February 22, 1920, 8. “Toss” quotation and Veeck’s decision to release Magee are from “Magee Testifies He Bet on Reds,” The New York Times, June 9, 1920, 12. “‘Clean breast’ of his crookedness” quotation is from “Magee Makes a Sorry Showing Before Jury,” The Sporting News, June 17, 1920, 2. “Indifferent ball playing” quotation is from “Cubs Are Named in Gambling Charges,” The New York Times, September 5, 1920, S16.

18. “Full light of publicity” quotation is from “Magnates of League Laud Cub Stand on Magee Case Publicity,” Chicago Daily Tribune, June 24, 1920, 15. “Warned of Fixed Game, Says Veeck; Demands Inquiry,” Chicago Herald and Examiner, September 5, 1920, final edition, sec. 1, 1–2 (text of telegrams also in “Start Quiz to Save Baseball from Gamblers,” Chicago Daily Tribune, September 5, 1920, 1). “My sole idea” quotation is from “Scribes Will Go into ‘Fixed Game’ Charge on Request of Cubs,” Chicago Daily Tribune, September 6, 1920, 15.

19. Grand jury investigation is in “Jurors Cheer As Judge Orders Baseball Quiz,” Chicago Daily Tribune, September 8, 1920, 9. Disgruntled fans are in Fred M. Loomis, “Is Anything Wrong with Sox?: 1919 World Series Scandal Revived; Fan Seeks Answer to Rumors,” Chicago Daily Tribune, September 19, 1920, A1; “Fans Lose Patience at Official Lagging in Baseball Scandal,” Chicago Daily Tribune, September 20, 1920, 21. “Big fireworks” quotation and building up a young team are from James Crusinberry, “Claude Hendrix Handed Release by Boss of Cubs,” Chicago Daily Tribune, February 8, 1921, 14; Young Material for Trojan’s Cubs,” Washington Post, January 28, 1921, 10.

20. “Landis the ‘Big Umpire,’” Chicago Daily Tribune, November 13, 1920, 1; Veeck, Veeck—as in Wreck, 25; David Pietrusza, Judge and Jury: The Life and Times of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis (South Bend, IN: Diamond Communications, 1998), 163, 168–70; “Frisky Cub Players Must Show in Clean Togs, Even If Jinxed,” Chicago Daily Tribune, February 8, 1922, 14; William F. Kirk, “Strolls Through Sportville: The Nice Clean Cubs,” Washington Times, April 28, 1922, 20.

21. Andy Frain was hired in 1928. See “Family’s Ticket to Fame,” Chicago Tribune, November 24, 1991; Rex Lardner, “‘The Crowd Is Your Enemy,’” Sports Illustrated, October 2, 1961, 49–50. Edward Burns, “Margaret Donahue, Cub Secretary, One-Time Sox Fan, Joined Bruins Against Will in 1919,” The Sporting News, November 4, 1937, 5. See also “William Veeck: He Made the Cubs Popular,” 4 (see n. 12): Veeck “believed in making the park attractive, furbishing it up every spring, and presenting a spic and span corps of ushers.”

22. “New Cubs Secretary,” Chicago Daily Tribune, December 14, 1926, 23; Howard Roberts, “Miss Donahue Didn’t Want Cubs Job: Leaves After 39 Years,” Chicago Daily News, February 1, 1958, 16; “Former Cubs’ Exec Margaret Donahue Dies,” Chicago Tribune, January 31, 1978, B4; Tim Wiles, “Ladies Step Out in Numbers to the Ballpark,” Memories and Dreams 26, no. 4 (Winter 2004), 24–25; William L. Veeck, “The Chicago ‘Cubs’ Do Advertise—To Women,” Printer’s Ink, July 14, 1927, 52; Francis J. Powers, “Current Comment,” The Sporting News, August 28, 1930, 4; John P. Carmichael, “Prexy Bill Veeck: The Man Behind the Cubs,” Chicago Daily News, September 20, 1932, sec. 2, 17. (“This is the last of a series of articles on the career of William Veeck, president of the Cubs.” See n. 4.) See also Roberts Ehrgott, Mr. Wrigley’s Ball Club: Chicago and the Cubs During the Jazz Age (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2013), 53–55.

23. Ehrgott, Mr. Wrigley’s Ball Club, 37–53; Eldon L. Ham, Broadcasting Baseball: A History of the National Pastime on Radio and Television (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2011), 35–36, 45–48, 52, 54, 67–68; Jonathan Fraser Light, The Cultural Encyclopedia of Baseball, 2d ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2005), 186; Elmer Douglass, “Say, You! Meet Elmer, Radio Baseball Fan,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 2, 1924, 10; “‘Sen’ Kaney Is Coming Over to W-G-N Tuesday,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 26, 1924, 10; Bruce A. Linton, “A History of Chicago Radio Station Programming, 1921–1931, with Emphasis on Stations WMAQ and WGN” (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 1953), 117, 136, 178–79; “Radio Programs for Today,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 14, 1925, 10. Judith Waller quotation is from Mary E. Williamson, “Judith Cary Waller: Chicago Broadcasting Pioneer,” Journalism History 3, no. 4 (Winter 1976–1977): 112.

24. Veeck and Indiana farmer quotations are from John P. Carmichael, “Veeck Sets Out to Make the Cubs a Pennant-Winning Team: President of Club Recalls Deals He Made,” Chicago Daily News, September 17, 1932, sec. 1, [2]. (“This is the third of a series of articles on the career of William Veeck, president of the Cubs.” See n. 4.) Wrigley quotation is from Curt Smith, Voices of the Game: The Acclaimed Chronicle of Baseball Radio and Television Broadcasting—From 1921 to the Present, updated ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 14. Veeck’s enthusiasm for baseball broadcasting is mentioned in “W-G-N to Broadcast All Home Games of Cubs and White Sox,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 3, 1927, H8. Journalists’ distrust of radio is in “Says Radio Cannot Rival Newspaper,” The New York Times, January 23, 1923, 7; “Baseball Writers Oppose Radio Use,” The New York Times, May 26, 1923, 11; Gwenyth L. Jackaway, Media at War: Radio’s Challenge to the Newspapers, 1924–1939 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995). WMAQ and WGN broadcasting Opening Day game is in Ehrgott, Mr. Wrigley’s Ball Club, 41–42; “Radio Programs for Today,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 14, 1925, 10.

25. Chicago Cubs Attendance Data, Baseball Almanac, www.baseball-almanac.com/teams/cubsatte.shtml (accessed August 11, 2013); “In the Wake of the News,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 14, 1927, 19; “In the Wake of the News,” Chicago Daily Tribune, December 20, 1932, 19. Additional attendance figures are in Warren Brown, The Chicago Cubs (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1946), 109. See also Don Maxwell, “Speaking of Sports,” Chicago Daily Tribune, September 14, 1929, 21.

26. Veeck, Veeck—as in Wreck, 25–26. Chewing gum anecdote is in Rose C. Feld, “Chewing-Gum King’s Rise a Modern Business Romance,” The New York Times, March 1, 1925, sec. 8, 5. Veeck quotation is from Carmichael, “Prexy Bill Veeck,” September 20, 1932, sec. 2, 18 (see n. 22). The 1927 season total was 1,159,168, as per Chicago Cubs Attendance Data, Baseball Almanac.com. Attendance record in Light, The Cultural Encyclopedia of Baseball, 51.

27. Irving Vaughan, “Veeck Seethes with Ideas, but Tells Only One,” Chicago Daily Tribune, December 7, 1925, 29. For McCarthy and Maranville see “M’Carthy Signs As Manager of Cub Ball Team,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 13, 1925, 27; Irving Vaughan, “Rabbit Through As Cub, but New Job Is Unknown,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 15, 1925, 25; Irving Vaughan, “Grimm, Cooper, and Maranville Traded to Cubs,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 28, 1924, 23; “Wrigley to Spend $1,000,000 on Cubs,” The New York Times, October 14, 1925, 21. For football see “Staleys Lease Cubs’ Park for Next Football Season,” Chicago Daily Tribune, June 29, 1921, 18; Larry Mayer, “Wrigley Field, 1921–70: When Cubs Were Bears,” Chicago Cubs Vine Line, November 2002, 32–33; Stephen Green and Mark Jacob, Wrigley Field: A Celebration of the Friendly Confines (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 2003), 127–33. For renovation of Cubs Park see Frank Schreiber, “Cubs’ ‘New’ Park Ready by April 17,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 5, 1923, 25; “Cubs to Blast Open Local N.L. Season Today with Cards,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 23, 1924, 21.

28. Veeck, Veeck—as in Wreck, 25; For interleague games see Associated Press, “Veeck Urges Inter-League Games to Revive Interest in Baseball,” The New York Times, August 23, 1933, 22; Light, The Cultural Encyclopedia of Baseball, 491. For All-Star Game see Arch Ward, “Talking It Over,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 6, 1933, 31; David Vincent, Lyle Spatz, and David W. Smith, The Midsummer Classic: The Complete History of Baseball’s All-Star Game (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), xi.

29. “W. L. Veeck, President of Cubs, Dies,” Chicago Evening American, October 5, 1933, 1, 25–26; “William L. Veeck, Head of Cubs, Dies,” The New York Times, October 6, 1933, 17.

30. Jimmy Corcoran, “Sports World Notables at Services,” Chicago Evening American, October 7, 1933, 2; John W. Keys, “Cubs Give Their Parting Salute to ‘Bill’ Veeck,” Chicago Daily News, October 7, 1933, sec. 2, 13–14; Jim Gallagher, “Friends at Bier of Veeck,” Chicago Evening American, October 7, 1933, 17; Ehrgott, Mr. Wrigley’s Ball Club, 129; Carmichael, “Prexy Bill Veeck,” September 20, 1932, sec. 2, 18 (see n. 22). Carmichael mentions that Veeck also enjoyed horseback riding while vacationing on the Pacific coast. Veeck playing golf on Catalina is in Irving Vaughan, “Wield Duster in Cub Office; Boss Due Back,” Chicago Daily Tribune, January 31, 1931, 20; Edward Burns, “Veeck Brings Back Optimism and Contracts,” Chicago Daily Tribune, February 1, 1933, 25. Editorial is “William L. Veeck: Sportsman,” Chicago Evening American, October 6, 1933, 48.

31. “William Veeck: He Made the Cubs Popular,” 4 (see n. 12); “Ball World Mourns Loss of Bill Veeck, Cub Chief,” Chicago Evening American, October 5, 1933, 30.

32. “Hold Services Tomorrow for William Veeck,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 6, 1933, 31; Associated Press, “Associates Mourn Him,” The New York Times, October 6, 1933, 17. John Seyes and Babe Ruth quotations are from “Ball World Mourns Loss of Bill Veeck, Cub Chief,” 30. Charlie Grimm quotation is from “W. L. Veeck, President of Cubs, Dies,” 26. “With whom he had clashed” quotation is from “William L. Veeck: Sportsman,” 48.

The Veracity of Veeck

Norman L. Macht and Robert D. Warrington

In his excellent biography of Bill Veeck, author Paul Dickson tackles the controversy over whether National League president Ford Frick and/or Commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis blocked Veeck’s attempt to buy the Phillies in 1942 and field a team of players from the Negro Leagues, as Veeck alleges in his 1962 book, Veeck—as in Wreck.

Dickson’s take: the story is true.

His evidence:

1. Several sources testify that Veeck told them of his plans at the time.

2. Veeck told the story in numerous interviews before the book was published.

3. Veeck was not a liar.

We’re still skeptical—not that Veeck didn’t consider or even inquire into buying the Phillies, and not that he didn’t think and talk about and desire to integrate baseball—but that Ford Frick or Judge Landis was responsible for stopping him.

First, some background.

In the 1998 issue of The National Pastime, Larry Gerlach, David Jordan, and John P. Rossi wrote an article debunking Veeck’s story of trying to buy the Phillies and use all Negro players, only to be blocked by Frick or Landis or both. The authors claim that nothing about the story had appeared in print until Veeck told it in Veeck—as in Wreck, concluding that Veeck made it up to enliven the book. But evidence emerged that the story had been written about well before 1962. Critics therefore consigned the entire article to the bunk bin. But the nagging question remained unanswered: Was the story itself true?

Historian Jules Tygiel, while charging (correctly) that Gerlach and the others had erred in accusing Veeck of concocting the story “at the time of the writing of his book,” admitted, “The story may still be untrue and the source may still ultimately be Veeck himself.”

We agree.

What follows is the result of our independent research and conclusions subsequent to the publication of Dickson’s book.

NL president Ford Frick’s reputation for blocking Veeck’s efforts to integrate MLB may not be warranted.

The story begins in late 1942 with the perennially last-place Phillies, milked dry by club owner Gerry Nugent for ten years, broke and in hock to the National League. Bill Veeck was operating the Milwaukee Brewers in the American Association at the time. The National League, headed by Ford Frick, was looking for somebody to rescue the Phillies.

In a 1986 interview, John Carmichael of the Chicago Daily News told of encountering Veeck carrying a suitcase one day in the winter of 1942.

“Where you going?” asked Carmichael.

Veeck said he was going to Philadelphia to buy the Phillies. “And do you know what I’m going to do? I’m going to put a whole black team on the field.”

As Dickson tells it, after revealing his plans to Carmichael and before leaving Chicago, Veeck and his friend Abe Saperstein—a sports promoter who was supposed to line up the black players—went to see Judge Landis. Veeck told Shirley Povich in 1960, “[W]e told Judge Landis we wanted to field an entire team of Negroes.”

There is no evidence to corroborate this story. In fact, there is testimony from Veeck and Saperstein that contradicts it. But we’ll get to that.

Bill Veeck confers with his Milwaukee manager Charlie Grimm.

Bill Veeck was an intelligent man. He was aware of the campaigning by some baseball writers to give black players a chance in Major League Baseball, and he knew of the resistance from big league owners. Veeck was also familiar with the racial climate of the time, defined by segregation of the armed forces, defense plants, the nation’s capital, and the American mindset.

So it’s difficult to believe that Bill Veeck would have advertised such radical intentions so openly. If he seriously expected to buy the Phillies (the rest of the Carmichael interview includes the writer’s saying that Veeck “didn’t have the money”) and field an all-Negro team, he wouldn’t broadcast it to a newspaperman, then go out of his way to tip off the commissioner of baseball that he was about to detonate a hundred years of baseball tradition by setting loose a social tsunami—and expect it to remain a secret.

It was also out of character for a man who, four years later, checked into a Cleveland hotel under an assumed name to keep secret his efforts to buy the Indians.

Veeck loved to tweak and nettle stodgy baseball officials. If Carmichael’s memory was accurate 44 years later (not a sure bet), what better way for Veeck to put their knickers in a twist than to make brash statements about fielding an all-Negro team?

Dickson writes that Veeck and Saperstein left Landis’s office and Veeck headed for Philadelphia believing he "had a major league ball club.”

What made him believe that?

Dickson cites an October 22, 1942, Sporting News article as early evidence that “Veeck was involved in some kind of attempt to buy the Phillies,” and relies on subsequent mentions of Veeck having been “a prospective buyer” as supporting the Landis/Frick story, which they do not. What’s more, the full text of the October 22 item, datelined Milwaukee, suggests otherwise:

That he was a serious bidder for the Philadelphia National League club was revealed here by Bill Veeck, president of the Milwaukee Brewers. He went to Boston [why Boston?] after the World’s Series for what he said was just a visit but instead he and General Manager Rudie Shaffer conferred with Gerry Nugent, president of the Phils. Previously, a story had been circulated [by whom isn’t said] that Veeck, manager Charlie Grimm and their Milwaukee colleagues would buy the NL club.

Veeck, of course, denied the rumor, but admits it gave him an idea. ‘So I called on Nugent and we talked about his club,’ the Brewers’ head man told Sam Levy of the Milwaukee Journal. ‘He quoted some large figures, of course, but that was all.’

Had he closed the deal, Sport Shirt Bill would have remained in Milwaukee and Grimm would have moved to Philadelphia, Veeck said.

On November 4 Gerry Nugent acknowledged that Veeck had visited him after the World Series and inquired about buying the Phillies, but he said he hadn’t heard from Veeck since then. Veeck had no basis to believe he had bought a ball club; he had made no offer that had been accepted. Dickson never claims that Veeck and Nugent had come to an agreement. And even if they had, Veeck knew he would still need the approval of a majority of the National League owners, who would certainly have learned of his not-so-secret plans—if the visit to Landis’s office had actually occurred.

Dickson writes, “Before reaching Nugent’s office, however, Veeck discovered that the Phillies had been officially taken over by the National League the night before and that a new owner was being sought.”

Veeck “in conference” in his usual informal style.

That didn’t happen until February 9, 1943, four months after Veeck’s first and—as far as is known—only meeting with Nugent.

Veeck maintained in later interviews that “I always will believe Landis leaked our plans to Frick. Frick wouldn’t talk business with us.”

But reading on we discover that Dickson himself provides compelling evidence to refute this version of the story that blames Landis and Frick for stopping Veeck. Dickson references quotations by Veeck in the September 1948 issue of Baseball Digest that clash with his supposedly telling Carmichael and Landis in advance what he planned to do if he bought the Phillies: It was really intended to be a big surprise to everybody, including Landis and Frick.

Dickson writes, “[Veeck] is quoted as saying he had not thought about buying the Phillies until he read in the papers that he was rumored to be interested in the ailing franchise and that he was one of the likely buyers.” (This testifies to the pitfalls of historians relying on the speculative or fabricated rumors from “reliable authorities” or “knowledgeable insiders” that fill many a column on a slow news day.)

Dickson goes on, “[Veeck] explained that he had a leading promoter of Negro baseball [Abe Saperstein] compile a list of Negro All-Stars, who he had planned to recruit, train, and spring on the world [italics added] on Opening Day 1943. ‘What could they have done,’ Veeck asked? ‘They would have had to play my team or forfeit the game.’”

Dickson adds a statement by Abe Saperstein from a 1954 Associated Negro Press story that also contradicts the tip-off to Landis version:

“Do you know what Veeck planned to do? He was going to take the Phils to spring training in Florida and then—on the day the season opened—dispose of the entire team. Meanwhile, with a team composed entirely of Negroes, who would have trained separately, he could have opened the National League season.”

This assertion also makes little sense to us. It was the middle of World War II, and spring training was limited to northern states east of the Mississippi. We’re asked to believe that Veeck could have spirited away such players as Satchel Paige, Willard Brown, and Buck O’Neil from the Kansas City Monarchs, Cool Papa Bell, Josh Gibson, and Buck Leonard from the Homestead Grays, Leon Day from the Newark Eagles, and a dozen more players, sequester them in a secret training camp (while simultaneously running the Phillies’ camp)—and nobody would notice? And then on Opening Day sign them all and release or “dispose of” the entire Phillies’ roster.

Fanciful minds yield fantastical plots, and the complexities and difficulties associated with Veeck’s claim, regardless of whether it could be kept secret, makes it implausible in our view. It might have been fun to speculate about the plot over a case of beer, but there is no corroborating evidence—convincing, verifiable, independent, and reliable—that the alleged scheme ever became anything more than that.

We judge it more likely that Landis and Frick were set up as fall guys for preventing Veeck from doing something he thought about, talked about, and wished he had done but never seriously attempted. Why? It’s impossible to know exactly Veeck’s motivations in making the claims he did. Aware of the praise and exalted place in history Branch Rickey had gained by integrating major league baseball in 1947—the same year Dickson says Veeck first talked about his plan in print—Veeck may have wished to portray himself as baseball’s first true visionary in breaking the major leagues’ color barrier by resurrecting and embellishing his 1942 flirtation with the notion of buying the Phillies and fielding an all-Negro roster. Veeck needed villains to explain his failure and still remain a hero for at least trying, and casting Landis and Frick as the bad guys in thwarting his noble endeavor was a convenient way to do that.

Dickson points out that Frick, who died in 1978, never denied Veeck’s version of the story about telling Judge Landis of his intentions after seeing John Carmichael. It is not surprising that Frick declined to comment because replying risked being dragged publicly into a feckless “did-so”–“did-not” mud puddle with Veeck. The lack of a retort is not a tacit admission that a charge is true. In all likelihood, Frick adopted the diplomatic stance of silence, as people often do in refusing to dignify an unfounded accusation with a response.

Veeck enjoyed relaxing at his farm in Easton, Maryland.

Memory changes as a man ages, becoming more an act of imagination than recollection. Details are added or forgotten. Selective editing takes place. It is said that hindsight is 20–20. But as we age it becomes 20–40, then 20–60. The older we get the more clearly we remember things that never happened. None of this makes anybody a liar, any more than an old Texan who recollects hunting jackrabbits as big as buffalo when he was a youngster.

Baseball lore is full of phony stories that have metamorphosed into accepted truths through repetition. As authors we have heard plenty of them while interviewing over a hundred old ballplayers. The stories include exaggeration, events heard of or read about but not personally witnessed, and plain old wishful thinking. As Babe Ruth purportedly said about his called shot, “It makes a good story.” Lefty Gomez made a living out of such good stories on the rubber-chicken circuit.

Dickson admits that Veeck was capable of elaborating or repeating made-up stories, thus validating them as fact in perpetuity thereafter. On page 129 he cites a dramatic but fallacious 1949 account by Shirley Povich “that fall[s] apart under scrutiny” about Larry Doby’s first big league at-bat. The “story circulated for years after Veeck himself repeated the tale on a New York radio station in 1961,” even unto Doby’s Sports Illustrated obituary in 2007.

In Veeck—as in Wreck there’s a story in which Veeck describes negotiating over a party line from his farm outside Milwaukee with Connie Mack for the sale of outfielder Hal Peck. As the story goes, listeners on the party line kept telling Veeck he was asking for too little while Mr. Mack complained that the line was noisy. Veeck upped the asking price and Mack agreed. Veeck rewarded his kibitzers with a case of whisky. But the Peck deal took place in the middle of the 1944 season, at a time when Veeck was with the Marines in the South Pacific. Mack dealt with Mickey Heath, who was left in charge of the Brewers by Veeck.

When this was mentioned to Dickson as an example of Veeck’s stretching the truth for the sake of a good story, he conceded, “That is a problem.”

People believe what they want to believe. As researchers and historians we believe what the evidence allows us to believe.

The Hearst Sandlot Classic

More than a Doorway to the Big Leagues

Alan Cohen

Set against the backdrop of a country emerging from war, and entering into a period of prosperity, the Hearst Sandlot Classic, over 20 years offered a showcase for young baseball talent. Many of those who participated signed professional contracts and others were able to obtain scholarships to further their education. Everyone who participated gained memories to last a lifetime.

In 1946, sportswriter Max Kase of the New York Journal-American was instrumental in creating the Hearst Sandlot Classic. The game featured the New York All-Stars against the U.S. All-Stars. The annual event was held at the Polo Grounds in New York through 1958, and was moved to Yankee Stadium in 1959. The program had the backing of media magnate William Randolph Hearst who, early on, stressed the goals of the program. “This program will be conducted in all Hearst cities from coast to coast. The purpose of the program will not be to develop players for organized baseball, but will be designed to further the spirit of athletic competition among the youth of America.”1

Of the young men who appeared in the games, 89 advanced to the major leagues, but the story is incomplete without a mention of those behind the game, and those whose lives were touched by the experience. From Hall of Famers to those whose careers consisted of the proverbial cup of coffee, to those who gained success outside of organized baseball—it all started when they were young.

Getting into the game was no easy task. Hearst Newspapers throughout the country sponsored tournaments, All-Star contests, and elections to determine candidates for the game in New York. Newspapers that sponsored events included the Milwaukee Sentinel, Pittsburgh Sun-Telegraph, San Francisco Examiner, Los Angeles Herald-Express, Baltimore News-Post, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Detroit Times, Albany Times-Union, Chicago Herald-American, and the Oakland Tribune.2

The New York team was selected from tryouts held in the leagues that comprised the Journal-American City Sandlot Alliance. Hall-of-Famer Walter James Vincent “Rabbit” Maranville headed up the program and managed the New York team.

Maranville was truly one of the game’s legends. He began his major league career in 1912 with the Boston Braves and played in the majors for 23 years. He arranged clinics for youngsters in the New York area under the tutelage of players, coaches, and managers from the three New York major league squads. In the weeks leading up to the 1946 event, he contributed a daily column in the Journal-American extolling the talents of his 20-man roster. Although sentiment did play a role in his election to the Hall of Fame in 1954, (he had died just prior to the voting), his work with the youth program and his stellar fielding during 23 major league seasons were also significant factors.

George Vecsey of The New York Times stated, in 1989, that Maranville’s two greatest attributes were longevity and good deeds as the sandlot ambassador for a newspaper chain with many Hall of Fame Electors.3

An exceptional middle infielder, Maranville still holds the career record for assists with 8,967. As his career wound down, his fielding skills were as good as ever. In 1930, at the age of 38, he led the league’s shortstops in fielding percentage and two years later he moved to second base and duplicated the feat. Not noted for his batting, he nevertheless ranks 19th all-time with 177 triples.

Arthur Daley of The New York Times was an ardent supporter of Maranville, voting for him on several occasions before he gained entrance to the Hall of Fame. Maranville had been named on 62.1% of the ballots in 1953. Noting Maranville’s off-the-field escapades (he definitely enjoyed a good time), Daley stated that “there was a certain amount of irony in the fact that the Rabbit’s later years were spent in doing an extraordinarily fine job in promoting sandlot baseball for the Journal-American. He was helping and inspiring the kids, although he would have shuddered in horror if any of them had ever followed his (off-the-field) example. But maybe there was not so much irony in his job at that. The Rabbit was always a kid himself, a Peter Pan who didn’t want to grow up.”4

The Rabbit managed the New York team for the first eight years of the event. Al Simmons took over in 1954. Simmons, a Hall-of-Famer, got his start playing sandlot ball in Milwaukee as a youngster, and managed in the Classic for two years until his untimely death in 1956.5 George Stirnweiss took over in 1956 and Tommy Holmes in 1959.

Ray Schalk and Oscar Vitt led the U.S. All-Stars. Schalk managed the team through 1948. He stepped aside after three years, as his contract as baseball coach at Purdue did not allow him to engage in any outside activities. At the time he left, he said that he “liked being around the kids and the biggest kid of all, Rabbit Maranville.”6 Vitt took over the head job, ably assisted by such greats as Charlie Gehringer and Lefty Gomez, and stayed with the program until illness forced him to step aside in 1962. Vitt was a veteran of the game. He played with the Detroit Tigers from 1912 through 1918, and the Red Sox from 1919 through 1921. He managed the Cleveland Indians from 1938 through 1940. He retired in 1942 after a two-year stint in the Pacific Coast League, and became headmaster at a school near San Rafael, California.

The Brooklyn Eagle competed with the Journal-American and got into the act with its “Brooklyn Against the World” games at Ebbets Field from 1946 through 1950. The main forces behind the game were Branch Rickey of the Dodgers and Lou Niss, the sports editor of the Eagle. One player for the 1946 “World” team was sent east by the Los Angeles Times. Vic Marasco had the time of his life. “Those people from the Brooklyn Eagle and the Brooklyn Dodgers didn’t spare the horses when it came to taking us around.” He summed it all up by saying “I think I learned more on this trip than all the time I was in Fremont High and I just want to congratulate the kid who makes it next year. He’s in for the biggest treat of his life.”7 Marasco signed with Brooklyn and spent 10 seasons in the minor leagues, putting up some pretty good numbers. But Triple A was as far as he would get.

Brooklyn Against the World contests had top flight managers. In 1946 the Brooklyn team was managed by Leo Durocher and the World team by Hall of Famer George Sisler. It was a three-game series, played August 7–9. Playing right field in the second game was Ed Ford of Astoria, Queens and Aviation High School. It was his only appearance in the series. His natural position was pitcher, but others were lined up ahead of him in 1946. Prior to the first game of the series, Brooklyn legend Gladys Gooding performed the National Anthem.8

Durocher used six pitchers during the three games. Several signed on to contracts with big league teams, but none made it to the majors. Ed Fordsigned with the Yankees. Along the line, he became known as “Whitey” Ford and had a Hall-of-Fame career with the Bronx Bombers.

The inaugural Hearst game was played on August 15, and set the bar as to the visitors having a lifetime memory. A trip around Manhattan Island by boat, a Broadway show—that year it was “Showboat,” a trip to West Point, dinner at the Bear Mountain Inn, accommodations at the Hotel New Yorker, and an opportunity to perform in front of major league scouts and meet with major league players. Nine players from the inaugural teams went on to play in the big leagues. The game was won 8–7 in eleven innings by the New Yorkers in front of 15,269 fans.

Umpiring that first game was the dean of umpires and reigning National League Umpire-in-Chief, Hall of Famer Bill Klem. He was assisted by Butch Henline and Dolly Stark. Klem and Henline had also, along with Jim Druggoole, umpired the inaugural Brooklyn Against the World games earlier in August.

Billy Harrell, who appeared in the 1947 game, holds the distinction of being the first player of color to appear in the Hearst Classic and make it to the majors. Harrell grew up in Troy, New York, and after playing in the Classic, attended Siena College, where he also played basketball. He signed with the Indians in 1952. He played with the Tribe in 1955, 1957, and 1958, and finished up his major league career with Boston in 1961. Harrell’s appearance was even more historical in that, when he played in the Hearst Classic for the first time, Major League Baseball was not integrated. In light of Harrell’s appearance, heavyweight champion Joe Lewis bought 1,000 tickets for the game, and these tickets were distributed by The Amsterdam News to children in Harlem.9

The MVP of the very first game was Dimitrios Speros “Jim” Baxes of San Francisco, who could easily be mistaken for Joe DiMaggio, to whom he bore an uncanny physical resemblance. Not only did he come from the same city as the Yankee Clipper, but he also adopted Joe’s batting style.10 He tore things up in the Classic, going 3-for-6 with a double, and contributing to the three rallies that generated all of his team’s runs. Baxes was signed by the Dodgers in 1947, and made it to the majors in 1959. That would be his only major league season. He got into 11 games with the LA Dodgers before being traded to Cleveland. In 280 major league at bats he batted .246 with 17 homers and 39 runs batted in.

Of the players in the 1946 Hearst Classic who made it to the majors, the best success was enjoyed by Billy Loes. Loes was signed by the Dodgers prior to the 1949 season for a bonus estimated at $22,000. Under the bonus rule in effect at the time, Loes could spend one year in the minors, after which he had to be placed on the major league roster or exposed to the Rule 5 draft. He split the 1949 season between Class B Nashua (NH) and Class AA Fort Worth, posting a 16–5 record. In 1950, with the Dodgers, he saw very little activity, getting into 10 games and pitching a total of 12²⁄3 innings. After a year in the military, he returned to Brooklyn and posted a 50–25 record over the next four seasons.

Earl Smith signed with the Pirates in 1949, but found himself stuck in their minor league system for far too long. In 1955, he finally got to the big club and wore number 21 for five games, garnering one hit in 16 at-bats. On April 29 he played his last game, and number 21 was reassigned for the last time—to Roberto Clemente.

The career of Paul Schramka was even shorter. He signed with the Cubs in 1949. After a good spring training in 1953, he started the season with the big club assigned uniform number 14. He got into two games, one as a pinch runner and the other as a defensive replacement. He never came to the plate. His last game was on April 16, 1953. A few days later, he was sent to the minors and number 14 was reassigned for the last time—to Ernie Banks.

The Class of 1947 produced the most major leaguers—10 in all—in the history of the Hearst Classic. Playing for the U.S. team, which won a lopsided 13–2 decision, were three men who would be reunited in the 1960 World Series: Gino Cimoli, Dick Groat, and Bill Skowron. An all-time record 31,232 fans attended the game which featured a Golf and Baseball exhibition by Babe Didrikson Zaharias and a performance by the Clown Prince of Baseball, Al Schacht. The icing on the cake was one of the last appearances by the game’s honorary chairman, Babe Ruth.

U.S. All-Star pitchers from the 1956 team demonstrate their grips. The staff included (L-R) Larry Foster, Gary Moore, Tom Prucha, Joe Horlen, Mel Dotterweich, Vince Magrino, and Mike McCormick. McCormick was selected the game’s MVP and went on to win 134 major league games, including 22 in his Cy Young Award season of 1967. Horlen, who played shortstop in the Hearst game, won 116 major league games, mostly with the White Sox. The only other member of this staff to play in the majors was Foster, who appeared in one game with the Tigers in 1963, pitched two innings, and had an ERA of 13.50 to show for his efforts. Foster, one of four Hearst alums to make only a single major league appearance, went on to become a Lutheran minister.

Harry Agganis, who made it to the majors with the Red Sox in 1954–55, represented Boston on the 1947 U.S. team, and signed with the Red Sox organization in 1952 after completing his studies at Boston University. He was en route to the most promising of careers, batting .313 in his second major league season, when he was hospitalized with what was diagnosed as a massive pulmonary embolism. He died six weeks later at the age of 26.

One of the New York pitchers on the short end of the thrashing was Bob Grim, who went on to success with the Yankees, winning the Rookie of the Year Award in 1954 with a 20–6 record.

The center fielder for the U.S. team in 1947 was only 15 years old at the time and still in high school. Billy Hoeft signed with Detroit in 1950 as a pitcher, and two years later made his debut with the Tigers. In 1955 he went 16–7 with a 2.99 ERA and was named to the All-Star team. The following year, he went 20–14 for his only 20-win season.

At Ebbets Field, San Francisco’s Gus Triandos caught in Brooklyn Against the World. He was signed by the Yankees and saw limited experience with the Bombers during the 1953 and 1954 seasons. Prior to the 1955 season, he was part of a deal with Baltimore involving 17 players. He spent eight years with Baltimore, banged 142 homers, and was named to four All-Star teams.

Baseball lost Babe Ruth on August 16, 1948, and the 1948 Hearst game was played in his memory. One tribute featured Al Schacht doing his pantomime of the Babe’s called shot in the third game of the 1932 World Series, and Robert Merrill brought tears to everyone’s eyes with his rendition of “My Buddy.”11 The tributes were many. Also on hand was Johnny Sylvester, who was eleven years old when the Babe made his fabled hospital visit in 1926—a visit which was said to have saved the young man’s life.12 To the end, The Babe was devoted to his young fans, and on his deathbed, made provisions in his will that 10 percent of this estate was bequeathed “to the interests of the kids of America.”13

Tom Morgan represented Los Angeles, started in centerfield for the U.S. All Stars, and went 2-for-3. After the game, he made a decision. “Right then and there I decided I had to play in New York, if I ever could prove myself good enough and that I had to do it as a Yankee. So when I got back home, I didn’t waste any time fooling. Five or six other scouts had been talking to my folks about me, but I signed right up with Joe Devine of the Yankees.”14 He signed in the spring of 1949, and went 29–17 during his first two minor league seasons. That earned him a rapid promotion to the majors and he went 9–3 for the 1951 World Champions. He stayed with the Yanks through 1956 and spent the next seven seasons with four different American League clubs. He finished up with the Angels in 1963. For his career, he went 67–47.

The 1948 U.S. squad included a player who became the first round draft pick of the Mets in the expansion draft after the 1961 season: Hobie Landrith. Landrith was one of seven catchers to play for the Mets in 1962. Early in the season, he was the “player to be named later” when the Mets traded him to Baltimore for Marv Throneberry.

Mike Baxes, Jim’s brother, ventured to the game from San Francisco’s Mission High School, and signed with the Phoenix Senators of the Class C Arizona-Texas League in 1949. By 1951 he was playing at Class B Yakima where he batted .318 with 37 doubles. Eventually he was traded to the Kansas City Athletics and made his major league debut in 1956. In parts of two major league seasons, he got into 146 games and batted .217.

Brooklyn Against the World took on a new look in 1948. After hosting a team from Washington, D.C., the Brooklyn forces hit the road for games in Washington, Montreal, Toronto, Providence, and Halifax, Nova Scotia. The Brooklyn aggregation was led by Billy Loes, who won two games during the trip and signed with the Dodgers after completing the trip.15

Loes was one of two players to play in both the Hearst game and Brooklyn Against the World and make it to the majors. Chris Kitsos of Brooklyn’s James Madison High School was the other. He appeared in both games in the inaugural year of 1946, signed with the Dodgers and spent five seasons in their minor league system before being drafted by the Chicago Cubs after the 1951 season. The Cubs called the shortstop up in 1954, and on April 21, he was inserted as a defensive replacement in the eighth inning. He handled two ground balls flawlessly, returned to the dugout, and never re-emerged. His major league career was over.

Loes’s battery mate in the 1948 BAW series also was signed by the Dodgers, but did not perform particularly well behind the plate in limited activity at his first minor league stops. In fact, the Dodgers released him. But he persevered, worked on his fielding with the help of George Sisler, and returned to the Dodger organization.16 After eight minor league stops and a two year stint in the military, Joe Pignatano played eight games for the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1957. He played all nine innings on September 29, 1957, in the last game played by the Brooklyn Dodgers. His major league career lasted through 1962 when he finished with the Mets. After a short trip back in the minors, he coached for twenty years with the Senators, Mets, and Braves.

In its final two years, 1949 and 1950, “Brooklyn Against the World” was scaled down, and it became a home and home series between the Brooklyn lads and a team representing Montreal, Canada. In 1949, the first game was played in Brooklyn on July 26 and won 9–7 by Montreal in eleven innings. The next game, in Montreal, was won by Brooklyn. In 1950, Brooklyn swept the two games by 10–4 and 11–1 margins.

Both the winning and losing pitchers in the 1949 Hearst game advanced to the majors. Representing Seattle in the 1949 game was a tall kid from Richland, Washington. He had just completed his freshman year at Washington State College. In the 1949 game, he entered the game in the fourth inning, and in three innings, allowed no hits, struck out six, and was credited with the win as the U.S. All Stars came back from a 0–5 deficit to defeat the New York squad 7–6.17 At WSC, he excelled in both baseball and basketball.

Gene Conley left WSC after two years and was signed by the Boston Braves. After going 20–9 at Hartford in 1951, he began the 1952 season with the Braves in Boston, but had limited success until the team moved to Milwaukee. In his first two years in Milwaukee, he went 25–16 and was named to two All-Star teams. His major league career ended with the Red Sox in 1963.

New York’s losing pitcher also signed with the Braves prior to the 1951 season. Frank Torre signed as a first baseman. He played, along with Conley, on the Braves pennant winners in 1957–58, and hit .300 as the Braves defeated the Yankees in the 1957 World Series. Torre shared first base duties with Joe Adcock through 1960.

In 1950 Pittsburgh’s representative played first base in the Hearst Classic. The Pirates signed him to a contract and Tony Bartirome was in the majors two years later, playing 124 games for the last-place Bucs. It would be his only major league season. After the season, he was drafted and spent two years in the Army. When he returned, he played in the minors and then spent 22 years as a trainer, 19 of them as head trainer for the Pirates from 1967 through 1985.

The 1951 game included Jersey Joe Walcott giving a two-round boxing exhibition as part of the pre-game festivities. Not only did Walcott appear, but he donated $500 to the cause after winning the money on a television quiz show, “Break the Bank.” His donation was matched by Yankee great Phil Rizzuto, and Walcott, himself, purchased 1,000 tickets to the game, to be used by area youngsters.18

John “Tito” Francona, who represented New Brighton High School and Pittsburgh, signed with the St. Louis Browns and went on to play 15 years in the big leagues.

That was quite modest compared to the fellow who was the MVP in the Hearst Classic that year. He hailed from Baltimore and had just completed his sophomore year of high school. His performance came as no surprise. As a high school freshman, he had been named to the All-State team. He went 2-for-4 in the Hearst Classic with a double and an inside-the-park homer that sailed over the center fielder’s head. In the field, he was equally adept, making five good plays and gunning down a runner at third base. He signed for a bonus when he completed high school in 1953 and, due to the bonus rule in effect at the time, went straight to the Tigers. Al Kaline played 22 years with the Tigers and was elected to the Hall of Fame in 1980.

Kaline was one of five Hearst alumni to sign for bonuses and go directly to the major leagues. His success far exceeded that of the four other “Bonus Babies” who had played in the Hearst game.

Although many kids who signed for bonuses during this time were given hostile receptions, Kaline was embraced by his teammates and the Tiger organization. It was obvious that he was a superlative fielder, and his hitting came around. Fate intervened and gave Kaline his big chance. An off-season injury to regular right fielder Steve Souchock kept him out of the lineup and Kaline was the only right fielder left. The Tigers were going no place and manager Fred Hutchinson played Kaline. As Don Lund said, “Although he started slowly, he gained confidence, enhanced his skills, and finished with a fine year. Al used the bonus rule to his advantage and had a minor league experience in the major leagues. The rest is history.”19

Milwaukee was represented, in 1952, by a shortstop whose father had played some minor league ball. He did not sign right away, as he was only 16 when the game was played in 1952. One of his highlights was having his picture taken with Yogi Berra.20 It wouldn’t be the last time. He went back to high school in Wisconsin and signed with the New York Yankees in 1954. Tony Kubek made his debut with the Yankees in 1957 and spent nine years in the Bronx. He was named American League Rookie of the Year in 1957, was named to All-Star teams in 1958, 1959, and 1961, and played in two All-Star games. He pinch hit in 1959 and started the first game in 1961.

The bonus rule of 1953 attached a player signing for a bonus and salary in excess of $4,000 to the major league team for two years. There were four Hearst players signed in 1953 who were tied to their teams. The experience did not prove beneficial to most of the young men involved.

One such player came from Holyoke, Massachusetts, and represented Boston in the 1953 Classic. A scholar-athlete, he stood 6'4" and weighed 210 pounds. As a high school senior, Frank Leja hit safely in each of his team’s 21 games and batted .432. After graduating, he was courted by several teams. The Giants, Braves, and Indians were cited for tampering.

Eventually, he signed with the Yankees for an estimated $60,000. For two years, Leja sat on the bench. He got into only 19 games, and had one hit in seven at-bats. He spent the next six seasons in the minors and returned to the majors with the Angels for a brief stay in 1962, going hitless in 16 at-bats. At the time of his death, his age (55) was higher than his career batting average (.043).

Leja’s feeling was that he had never gotten a fair shot. His first season with the Yankees was 1954. It was the only time in a 10-year span that they did not win the American League pennant and the players felt that his presence on the roster denied an opportunity to a player stuck in the minors. Manager Casey Stengel, with the pennant on the line, was not about to play an unproven talent. So Leja sat.21

U.S. All-Star outfield from the 1962 game have their bats locked and loaded. The players are (L–R) Tony Conigliaro, Ron Swoboda, and James Huenemeier. Conigliaro and Swoboda starred for the Red Sox and Mets, respectively. Huenemeier signed with the White Sox, but never got beyond Class A.

The 1954 game was played in some chilly weather in front of 9,143 spectators and Bill Monbouquette, representing Boston, won MVP honors, as the U.S. team won 5–3. Monbo, celebrating his 18th birthday, struck out five of the six batters he faced, and went on to a successful career with the Red Sox.

Barry Latman, from Los Angeles, was signed by the White Sox. He pitched 11 years in the majors and compiled a 59–68 record. He went 8–5 for the 1959 White Sox when they won the American League pennant, and was named to the All-Star team when he went 13–5 for Cleveland in 1961.

Fred Van Dusen is not known by many fans of the game. He played first base for the New York Stars in the 1954 game and went 0-for-2. At the tender age of 18, he was signed by the Phillies on August 20, 1955, and made his major league debut on September 11, 1955. At Milwaukee, he came up as a pinch hitter in the top of the ninth with one out and the Phillies trailing the Braves by a 9–1 count. In his only major league appearance, he was hit by a pitch.

Gary Bell was the first San Antonio player to make it all the way to the big leagues. He was signed by the Cleveland Indians and made it to the majors in 1958. Over the course of twelve major league seasons, he pitched to a 121–117 record and was named to four All-Star teams.

One of the participants on the New York squad in 1955 was Herman Davis. This fellow could hit and was snapped up by the Brooklyn Dodgers, but never got to play in Brooklyn. By the time he was ready for the big leagues, the Dodgers were in Los Angeles, and Tommy Davis made his first big league appearance on September 22, 1959. He went on to win batting championships in 1962 and 1963, and was selected to the National League All-Star team in each of those years. A knee injury in 1965 set him back, but he reemerged as a designated hitter in the 1970s with Baltimore. Over the course of his 18-year career, he batted .294 and amassed 2,121 base hits.

The California player of the year was named the MVP of the 1956 Hearst game, pitching the last two innings and striking out each of the six batters he faced. Mike McCormick signed for a bonus of $65,000 with the Giants. Since the bonus rule was still in effect, he went directly from the Polo Grounds to the Polo Grounds.22 During his first two years with the Giants, he had only seven starts, but saw more action when the team moved to San Francisco. He led the National League with a 2.70 ERA in 1960, and was named to the All-Star teams in 1960 and 1961. After the 1962 season, he was traded to Baltimore and then Washington before returning to the Giants in 1967 for his best year ever. He went 22–10 with a 2.85 ERA and was selected as the National League Cy Young Award winner. His 134–128 major league career ended in 1971.

McCormick was accepted well by his Giant teammates when he joined the club at the end of the 1956 season. However, the youngster did combat loneliness in the early days. He remembers that “I really valued my time at the ballpark, because that was the only time I was able to feel like I was part of something. When the game ended, because of the age discrepancy, guys would go drinking or something, and I didn’t know what alcohol was. This was on the road. Then at home they had families, so I spent an inordinate amount of time by myself. I ate by myself, went to a lot of movies, just did things to keep busy, looking forward to going to the park.”23

The other Los Angeles representative in 1956 went back to college after competing in the Hearst Classic. After two years at USC, Ron Fairly signed with the Dodgers for $75,000. Since the bonus rule was no longer in effect, he was sent to the minors for a brief spell before coming up to the Dodgers late in the 1958 season. He batted .238 in 1959 and spent most of 1960 at Triple A Spokane, batting .303. Fairly was up to stay in 1961. Over the course of his 20-year career, he batted .266 with 1,913 hits, and was named to two All-Star teams.

San Antonio had been sending players to the Hearst Classic for 10 years with only Gary Bell making the big time. Their 1956 representative would change that. Joe Horlen attended Oklahoma State University before signing with the White Sox in 1959. He made it to the show in 1961 and spent 12 years in the majors, 11 with the White Sox. His best season was 1967 when he went 19–7, led the league with a 2.06 ERA, and finished second in the Cy Young balloting.

The 1958 game featured two players who would make it to the major leagues in a very big way. Ron Santo, the starting catcher for the U.S. team, signed with the Cubs, was converted to third base in his Texas League days, and had a Hall-of-Fame career in the Windy City. Joe Torre, who started the game on the bench for the New York team, went on to stardom with the Braves and Cardinals, and managed the New York Yankees to six pennants and four World Championships.

Of those players from the 1959 game who made it to the majors, pitcher Wilbur Wood and infielder Glenn Beckert were named to All-Star teams during the course of their careers.

The U.S. Stars won the 1960 game 6–5. The pitcher who closed the deal had entered the game in the sixth inning to play right field, and went to the mound in the bottom of the eighth to pitch the last four outs. It wouldn’t be the last time he finished up a game in relief. He was with his fourth major league team, the Montreal Expos, when he achieved success. Mike Marshall was moved permanently to the bullpen and saved 23 games in 1971. In four seasons in Montreal, he saved 75 games and posted a 2.94 ERA. Then it was on to Los Angeles and a share of immortality. In 1974, he appeared in 106 games, posted a 2.42 ERA, was credited with 21 saves, made the All-Star team, and won the National League Cy Young Award.

The starting catcher for the U.S. Stars represented Detroit. Bill Freehan was signed by the Tigers prior to the 1961 season and saw action in Detroit as a late season call-up. After a solid 1962 at Denver in the American Association, Freehan returned to Detroit to stay in 1963. In 14 full seasons with the Tigers, he was named to 11 All-Star teams, including 10 in succession from 1964 through 1973. He was also awarded five consecutive Gold Gloves (1965–69).

The 1961 game produced still more future major leaguers. The most notable pair represented San Antonio.

The second baseman was actually a catcher. He signed with Houston in 1962. In two years with the Colt 45’s, he batted only .182. He was sent back to the minors and, after the 1965 season, was traded to the New York Mets. Jerry Grote appeared in his first game with the Mets on April 15, 1966, and went on to play 12 seasons in Queens. He was named to two All-Star teams, and has a rightful place in the Mets Hall of Fame.

The shortstop switched to second base and signed with the Baltimore Orioles in 1962. He was very highly thought of by assistant manager Buddy Hassett who commented, “I like his wrist action and the way he whips the bat around so fast.” Two long homers, one of which sailed to the upper deck at the Bronx ballpark, were particularly impressive.24 He signed with Baltimore and joined the Orioles in 1965. During the course of his playing career Davey Johnson was named to four All-Star teams and won three Gold Glove Awards. After his playing days, he managed the Mets to the 1986 World Championship, and won divisional championships with the Mets, Reds, Orioles, and Nationals.

The 1962 game was tied 4–4 and stopped by curfew after four hours and 11 innings. Three players from the U.S. team made it all the way to the big leagues, including two slugging outfielders. The right fielder represented Boston and had a “can’t miss” label. Tony Conigliaro went 1-for-3 in the game and enjoyed a fine, but shortened, career with the Red Sox. Ron Swoboda played left field in the 1962 game but was more noted for his play in right field with the Mets.

One player who caught everybody’s eye in 1963 was San Antonio’s Freddie Patek. He stood only 5'5" but packed a wallop. Patek was drafted by the Pittsburgh Pirates with their 22nd pick (434th overall) in the first amateur draft in 1965 and made it to the majors in 1968 with the Bucs. After three years with the Pirates, he was traded to the Kansas City Royals. With the Royals, he was named to three All-Star teams and was part of three consecutive divisional champions that lost in the League Championship Series to the Yankees.

The U.S. Stars lineup featured a Maryland slugger who was drafted in the first round in 1965. He first appeared with the Angels in 1968, but traveled often during his 15-year major league career. Jim Spencer was chosen to the American League All-Star team in 1973 and received two Gold Glove awards during the course of his career. In 1978, he returned to Yankee Stadium as a member of the Yankees and once again was on the same field with Patek in the Bronx for the League Championship Series.

The 1965 game was the last Hearst Sandlot Classic played in New York. The demise of the game was hastened by two New York City newspaper strikes. The first extended from December 8, 1962, through March 31, 1963. The second lasted for 23 days between September 16 and October 8, 1965. The losses from this strike were such that it effectively shut down the New York Journal-American which was the force behind the game. The Journal-American ceased publication on April 24, 1966.

Sandlot All-Star games, however, continued in New York through 1970, as the Yankees Juniors and Mets Juniors faced each other in the Greater New York Sandlot Alliance All-Star Game.

In the 1970 game at Yankee Stadium, the Yankees Kids beat the Mets kids 8–5, and the MVP was Edward Ford. His father, Whitey, had played in the first Brooklyn Against the World Series in 1946. In 1974 the younger Ford was the number one draft pick of the Boston Red Sox. The shortstop made it as far as Triple A Pawtucket, but reality set in in 1977.

Two years earlier, in 1968 at Shea Stadium, the experience of 18-year-old Ruben Ramirez showed that the game’s mission had been fulfilled. He had two triples, drove in five runs, and was selected as the MVP in a game won by the Yankees Juniors, 6–2. It was beyond the ball field that the full impact of the game was felt. Ramirez, never played Organized Baseball, but, based on his performance in the game, he was offered a scholarship to Long Island University and went on to a successful career as an educator. Thirty-one years later, in an interview with the New York Daily News, he said, “That game was the most important day of my life. If it wasn’t for that day, I don’t know if I would have graduated college, let alone be where I am today.”25

HEARST SANDLOT CLASSIC

Sources

“15th Hearst Sandlot Classic in August,” Milwaukee Sentinel, April 22, 1960. Part 2, 6.

1960 Annual Hearst Classic: U.S. All Stars vs. NY All Stars: Official Program GV880.4.A66.

“Alex, Knutson Named for Trip to Hearst Sandlot Classic,” San Antonio Light, July 22, 1959, 46.

“Corbo to Start for U.S. Stars,” San Antonio Light, August 28, 1958, 27.

“Hearst Stars Return Home Today,” Milwaukee Sentinel, August 13, 1954. Part 2, 4.

“Joost subs for Vitt as All-Star Skipper,” San Antonio Light, June 24, 1962, 5-C.

“Cleveland Indians sign Russ Peck to Contract,” Altamont Enterprise, August 15, 1958, 1.

“Kase, New York Sports Editor Retires,” The Sporting News, May 7, 1966.

“New Yorkers Defeat U.S. Stars,” San Antonio Light, August 11, 1955, 12.

“Ruth to Aid Hearst Star Game,” Milwaukee Sentinel, May 25, 1947, B–3.

“Texan Frazier starts for U.S. All-Stars,” San Antonio Light, August 14, 1963, 73.

“Week of Thrills for Stars” San Antonio Light, August 28, 1958, 27.

Hugh Bradley. “All-Star Yankee: Sandlot Classic set goal for Morgan,” New York Journal American, August 7, 1951, 18.

Lester Bromberg. “Yankees ‘Bonus baby’ Star in Four Sports in High School,” The Sporting News, February 10, 1954, 5–6.

Lou Chapman. “Five Hearst Contest Judges Named,” Milwaukee Sentinel, July 3, 1949. B–3.

Arthur Daley. “Sports of the Times: The Rabbit,” The New York Times, January 7, 1954, 34

Frank Graham. “Graham’s Corner: Morning at Stadium,” New York Journal-American, August 23, 1961, 33.

Don Hayes. “Two South Texas Baseball Stars Ready for Hearst Sandlot Classic,” San Antonio Light, August 13, 1958, 33.

Al Jonas. “Lefty Gomez to Help Vitt Prepare Hearst All-Stars,” San Antonio Light, August 13, 1950. Section D, 3.

Al Jonas. “U.S. Stars Defeat New York Team in Sandlot Classic,” The Sporting News, August 15, 1951, 28.

Brent P. Kelly. Baseball’s Biggest Blunder: The Bonus Rule of 1953–57. Scarecrow Press, Lanham, Maryland, 1997.

Dylan Kitts. “Dormant Summer Sandlot Showcase is revitalized on Brooklyn Diamonds,” New York Daily News, August 10, 2009.

Barney Kremenko. “U.S. Stars Win Classic,” New York Journal-American, August 22, 1965, 33.

Stanley Levine. “Harrell to Start for Stars; Fitzgerald is Reserve,” Albany Times Union, August 16, 1946.

Max P. Milians. “Hearst Classic Majors’ Bonanza,” Boston Record American, August 11, 1965.

Morrey Rokeach. “Hearst Grads could make All-Star Nine,” San Antonio Light, August 17, 1958, 4-C.

Murray Robinson. “Uniformed, Will Travel,” New York Journal-American, August 22, 1965, 35.

Harry H. Schlact. “The Hearst Sandlot Classic—A Living Memorial to Babe Ruth,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, August 25, 1948, 14.

Dennis Snelling. Glimpse of Fame, McFarland, Jefferson, NC, 1993.

Notes

1. Jack Conway, Jr., Boston Daily Record, July 14, 1953, 33.

2. San Antonio Light, March 31, 1957, 2-C.

3. George Vecsey, The New York Times, January 11, 1989, D25.

4. Daley, The New York Times, January 7, 1954, 34.

5. “Al Simmons Funeral Held at Church of his Boyhood,” Milwaukee Sentinel, May 29, 1956, part 2, 1.

6. Boston Traveler, August 6, 1949, 7.

7. Al Wolf, “Sportraits,” Los Angeles Times, August 15, 1946, 9.

8. James J. Murphy, Brooklyn Eagle, August 8, 1946, 1, 15–16.

9. The Amsterdam News, August 3, 1946, 10.

10. Barney Kremenko, New York Journal-American, August 16, 1946, 14.

11. Tommy Kouzmanoff, Milwaukee Sentinel, August 27, 1948, part 2, 3.

12. Al Jonas, New York Journal-American, August 22, 1948, L 27.

13. New York Journal-American, August 23, 1948, 1.

14. Hugh Bradley, New York Journal-American, August 7, 1951, 18.

15. James J. Murphy, Brooklyn Eagle, July 26, 1949, 1, 13.

16. Ben Gould, Brooklyn Eagle, July 21, 1950, 13.

17. Walla Walla Union Bulletin, August 19, 1949, 13.

18. The Syracuse Post-Standard, July 27, 1951, 25.

19. Kelly, 34-37.

20. Bob Lassanske, Milwaukee Sentinel, August 24, 1952 Section B, 5.

21. Kelly, 41–45.

22. “Giants pay $50,000 for L. A. Prep Hurler,” San Diego Union, August 30, 1956, b–4.

23. Kelly, 122–26.

24. Maury Rokeach, New York Journal-American, August 19, 1961, 15.

25. Dylan Kitts, New York Daily News, August 10, 2009.

Fate and the Federal League

Were the Federals Incompetent, Outmaneuvered, or Just Unlucky?

Bob Ruzzo

“War is the Province of Chance.”

— Count Carl von Clausewitz

THE FOG OF WAR

Even a bloodless, but nonetheless bitter “war,” such as the two-year (1914–15) battle between the outlaw Federal League and Organized Baseball proves Clausewitz’s point.1

For years, the convention has been to view the Federal League, the last challenger to actually take the field against Organized Baseball, as having been doomed from the start, ultimately suffering an “inevitable collapse.”2 After all, there is no immediately recognizable vestige of the Federal League in modern baseball, no “Federal Division,” no long-simmering rivalry between the Chicago Whales and the Saint Louis Terriers.3

Upon closer examination, however, the events of the Federal League war demonstrate once again that certainty is most expertly determined in hindsight. For while the distance of a century cloaks the demise of the Federal League with an air of dreary predictability, its struggle against the baseball establishment was, like so many other “wars,” determined to a significant extent by chance and circumstance.

The Federal League’s impending centennial has already generated renewed interest in and re-evaluation of the outlaw league’s rise, its downfall and its subsequent disappearance. Both Robert Peyton Wiggins, winner of the 2010 Larry Ritter Book Award, and Daniel R. Levitt, the 2013 Ritter awardee, add substantially to the depth and quality of modern understanding of the Federal League.4,5 Each of these entertaining works builds upon the pioneering effort of Marc Okkonen.6 Contrary to the conventional wisdom, these recent analyses acknowledge that the magnates of the Federal League gave it a pretty good go, presenting a well-organized and well-financed challenge to Organized Baseball. Even such generally favorable assessments as these, however, may understate both how close the Federals came to leaving a much more visible imprint on the face of the national pastime and the extent to which sheer fate played a role in the demise of the Federal League.

Three critical events described below—two involving mortality, and one based in morality—were instrumental in barring the path to success for the Federals. Quite naturally, the war between the Federal League and Organized Baseball must properly be viewed as a drawn-out and complicated affair with many significant chapters. A number of these inputs may, in retrospect, be seen as potential “pivot points” in that struggle, each with its own set of intricacies. For example, many important skirmishes were fought in the courts and were characterized by the well-established processes and finely honed reasoning that characterize high stakes litigation. Other events, in closed rooms and at the negotiating table, were marked by the strategic imperatives of complex business decision-making.

The three events described below are not like that. Each one was attributable solely to human frailty. The deaths of two men and the change of heart of another were simple but crucial events occurring in the midst of a sea of complexity.

These three events also eerily demarcate the phases of the Federal League war, occurring as they did, just after Opening Day of the outlaws’ inaugural major league season (the death of Charles C. Spink, publisher of The Sporting News); second, during the offseason between the league’s two years of operation as a major league (the vacillation of legendary pitcher Walter Johnson); and, third, only after the final thrilling Federal League pennant race had been concluded (the passing of Federal League vice president Robert B. Ward).

It is, of course, impossible to argue that, had these misfortunes not occurred, the Federal League would have triumphed, perhaps because it is so fundamentally difficult to determine what “winning” would have meant and what form of victory would have been acceptable to whom. Nonetheless, because the Federal League challenge to Organized Baseball was so substantial, it merits a closer examination of how these three wholly unexpected twists of fate derailed an alternative outcome.

The Federals on parade. The peace agreement that was concluded after the 1915 season was accompanied by far less fanfare.

A DIFFERENT KIND OF MUSHROOM

Part of the difficulty facing the Federal League lay in the failures of its immediate predecessors. Noted baseball chroniclers Professor Harold Seymour and his wife Dorothy documented the de-fanging, defeat or disappearance of no less than six minor league “outlaws” in the years between 1903 and 1912.7

Subsequently, two higher profile but nonetheless failed ventures had the effect of pushing the dramatic success of Ban Johnson’s American League further back in time than a look at the calendar might suggest.8 In 1912 John Powers organized the Columbian League outside the purview of the National Agreement. The venture was suspended after early financial backers pulled out. Thereafter, the United States League, an outfit that placed a number of its eight teams in major league cities, managed to get off the ground, but faltered in less than two months. Efforts to revive that venture in 1913 swiftly ran to ground.9

After the failure of his Columbian League venture, John Powers redoubled his efforts and launched the Federal League, initially operating in six cities in 1913. The Seymours observed that, in view of more than a decade strewn with failures, Organized Baseball had “no reason to assume that the Federal League would do anything except disappear, like so many of its ‘mushroom league’ predecessors;” consequently, the magnates of Organized Baseball initially “adopted a passive policy toward it.”10 In August 1913, the Federal League declared its intention to compete as a “Major League” after less than a full year as an outlaw, albeit minor, league.11 By the time the 1914 season opened, the Federal League consisted of franchises in four major league cities—New York, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and Chicago—and four cities with established minor league franchises operating in the International League and the American Association: Buffalo, Indianapolis, Kansas City, and Baltimore.

In the run-up to the 1914 season, the Federal League had already proven itself to be a more formidable challenger. Some in Organized Baseball still did not get the message. Perhaps the most colorful example of this occurred when Charles W. Murphy, the erratic owner of the Chicago Cubs, declared before spring training: “Why my corns are giving me more trouble than the Federal League. I fail to see where they will ever be able to open the season.”12 Had Murphy paid less attention to his corns, he may have observed that Charles “Lucky Charlie” Weeghman and his partner William Walker were planning a first class baseball plant on his city’s North Side that would later be described as “an Edifice of Beauty.”13 Not surprisingly, a sale of Murphy’s Cubs to Charles Taft (half brother of the former President) was successfully engineered before the month of February was out. While Murphy now had ample time and money to address his corns, American League President Ban Johnson and his allies were already implementing further counter-measures against the outlaws.

Charles Murphy famously observed that his corns gave him more trouble than the Federal League did. Once a sale of his Chicago Cubs was engineered, the mercurial owner had ample time and resources to address his most pressing concerns.

ACT ONE: A DEATH IN THE FAMILY

Public perception at the time of the Federal League challenge was shaped on a national basis by three sporting publications focusing on baseball. Two were weeklies, The Sporting News—self-identified as the “Organ of Organized Baseball” and operated by the Spink family out of St. Louis, and Francis Richter’s Philadelphia-based The Sporting Life—“Devoted to Baseball and Trap Shooting.” Baseball Magazine, headed by F.C. Lane, was published on a monthly basis. These national publications augmented the highly competitive general circulation newspaper industry that operated on a scale that was several orders of magnitude larger than what we know today.

The Sporting News had been instrumental in the rise and survival of the American League; indeed Ban Johnson “always acknowledged his debt to the Spink family, admitting he would have been unable to establish the American League if the paper had not been on his side.”14 With respect to the Federals, the established view of these three publications is that The Sporting Life was “fair” if not actively pro-outlaw, Baseball Magazine, which cherished its independence from organized baseball prided itself on a more considered, generally neutral analysis, and The Sporting News was vehemently opposed to the Federal insurgents.15,16

As one might expect, the truth was substantially more complicated than that. While The Sporting Life took on a pro-Federal League slant over time, initially it was entirely skeptical of the new enterprise. Indeed, it editorialized in November 1913 that there was “no public or press demand for a third major league... [nor] enough players of major league caliber to equip such a league... [nor enough] first class cities available to form a balanced circuit....” The Sporting Life concluded that for these and other reasons it saw “in the Federal League movement not one element of success,” predicting that “should it reach the stage of actual expansion its ultimate failure will be only a matter of time, contingent upon the depth of the purses of the promoters of the venture.”17

The monthly Baseball Magazine was necessarily a more detached observer of larger trends, but it, too, seemed to move over time. In the early days after the Federals announced their plan to “go major,” an article in Baseball Magazine caustically dismissed the boasts of the Federals. William A. Phelon sarcastically denigrated grandiose Federal predictions of the collapse of the established leagues: “Too bad, too bad— we have always liked those older leagues, and we will weep bitterly as they are trodden underfoot and the remnants sold for old brass at the junk yard.”18 By the following Spring, however, Baseball Magazine’s pages were already allowing that, “This season it is safe to say, the Federal League and its work will be watched with keen interest.”19 While Baseball Magazine would continue to publish neutral fact-based pieces (such as “Who’s Who in the Federal League?”) by early 1915 it had gravitated toward publishing more openly pro-Federal pieces such as “Eventually There Will Be A Third Big League Why Not Now?”20,21

The most interesting case by far, however, is the attitude of the acknowledged industry leader, The Sporting News (The Sporting Life was, after all, devoted to both “Baseball and Trap Shooting”). Much of that fascination stems from the timing of the first of our three unpredictable events. On April 16, 1914, Charles Spink attended the Federal League’s opening day festivities at Handlan’s Park in St. Louis. He fell ill shortly thereafter and never again returned to his office, dying some days later.22

Charles Spink’s sudden passing warrants close attention because of the accepted notion that the father and his son, J.G. Taylor Spink, broke over the issue of the Federals.23 In 1942, the New York Post’s Stanley Frank endorsed that view in The Saturday Evening Post when he wrote that “[m]ounting differences between father and son came to an angry boil in 1914 with the formation of the Federal League. Old Charlie Spink believed baseball was ready to embrace a third major circuit. Taylor opposed the Federals....”24 While this thesis supports the view of this article, it actually seriously overstates and oversimplifies the case.

The pages of The Sporting News in early 1914 hardly ring with an endorsement of a third major league. In February, The Sporting News editorialized that “[t]he Federal League may exist for a day, a month or a season but it is built on a foundation of sand and neither it nor what it stands for will have any permanency.”25 Similarly in April, just before the season opened, it declared: “The Federals can proceed on [their way]—as moral and legal outlaws, and by no means should there ever be any other status accorded them. It is our opinion still that their way will be brief and that its end will be disaster.”26

These and other similar editorial views expressed in early 1914 do much to refute the notion that father and son were diametrically opposed in their views of the Federal League. Despite this record, however, there is nonetheless strong support for the proposition that the loss of Charles Spink and the passing of baseball’s pre-eminent weekly news organ to his son dealt a considerable blow to the fortunes of the Federal League.

While Charles Spink’s editorial criticisms of the Federals were indeed numerous, at 51 he was a fully formed man, one capable of seeing subtlety and secure enough to criticize his allies. For example, The Sporting News blasted the Philadelphia Phillies and the Boston Braves for suing the Federals, decrying their decision to fight the new league “in the law courts instead of at the turnstiles.”27 Despite the anti-Federal League views The Sporting News expressed, Spink would still accept an invitation from his friends to attend the Federal League opener, being shrewd enough to jest that he was doing so because “they [were] paying for the box.”

Taylor Spink, still in his mid-twenties, was on the other hand “enthusiastic to a fault”28 and his relationship with American League President Ban Johnson “practically amounted to idolatry.”29 Charles Spink, the father, had on the occasion of his final professional game, “complimented the Federals on their neat park,” had spoken of “the crowd and the men he had noted in it,” and had like a true fan lamented the fact that the home team lost. Even his son had to remark in his father’s obituary, that his father “could enjoy the Federal’s game on the field because deeper than all thoughts of policy or politics or base ball, he was a lover of the game for the game’s sake.”30 The son, while a lover of the game to be sure, was not as idealistically imbued.

Further evidence that Charles Spink’s death made a significant difference in the editorial path of The Sporting News is garnered from a more nuanced reading of some of his criticisms of the new venture. Many of them evidence a classic Missouri “show me” attitude. For example, early on in the Federal League war, the weekly declared: “In Saint Louis, the Federals are honest enough to admit that there is but one chance for the League—a park that will be as attractive as those of the major league clubs and a team that will include players known to the public as major leaguers—and there is no prospect of either.”31

A few months later came the editorial pronouncement: “[I]t is an undeniable fact that the fan is going to see the game where the best ball is exhibited, and as President Johnson aptly remarked, the battle with the Federals will simmer down to a fight of the turnstiles.”32 As we have seen, one of Charles Spink’s last mortal impressions was a favorable one relating to Handlan’s Park, the home of the St. Louis Terriers. Unfortunately, he did not live to see the 1915 Federal League pennant race, nor did he have the chance to assess its impact upon the “fight of the turnstiles.”

While Terriers attendance sagged badly as the 1914 campaign turned bleak, the team’s fortunes improved the following year. Indeed, Baseball Magazine pointed out that the “habit of winning has been responsible for the firm establishment of Federal League baseball in St. Louis.”33 One July doubleheader between St. Louis and Baltimore featuring a matchup of Eddie Plank and Chief Bender drew some 9,000 fans while a mere 300 attended the competing game between the Browns and the Yankees.34 Baseball Magazine believed such support proved “St. Louis fans [would] rally to the support of the deserving, whether it be Federal or other League baseball.”35 The Browns were found to be particularly undeserving, as their attendance dropped from 244,714 in 1914 to 150,358 in 1915.36

The Federal League pennant race went down to a last thrilling weekend while the Cardinals and the Browns both sank well below .500.37 Given the civic pressure in a city starved for on-field success and the fact that the Terriers had successfully met at least some of the challenges that Charles Spink had issued to them, there is ample reason to conclude that, had he lived, The Sporting News would have, like The Sporting Life and Baseball Magazine before it, migrated towards a more favorable view of the Federal League. With Taylor Spink, Ban Johnson’s leading fan at the helm, no such possibility existed.

The negative (to the Federals) reverberations caused by the ascension of the younger Spink were further compounded by the biting prose of correspondent Joe Vila of the New York Daily Sun. While working for his father, Taylor Spink had originated the idea of recruiting correspondents in every vital location. Joe Vila was among his correspondent corps. After Charles Spink’s death, his son was inclined to lean heavily on the fruits of this innovation. Vila, for his part, had been given a bad tip by a Federal League source in the early days of the new league and when the information proved bogus, a natural skeptic was transformed into an obsessed critic. Vila embraced that role, telling an Organized Baseball magnate that he “intended to roast the Federal League from hell to breakfast hereafter.”38 The breakfast reference was particularly appropriate, as Vila incessantly referred to the Feds as the “Flap Jack Circuit” or the “Lunchroom League.”39 This insult was Vila’s “clever” way of reminding folks that Chicago Federals owner Charles Weeghman had made his money largely by operating a number of lunchtime restaurants in the Chicago area.40

Much of Vila’s writing can only be characterized as shrill, and even then only if one is kind-hearted. Take, for example, the November 19, 1914, issue of The Sporting News in which Vila (incorrectly) trumpeted the collapse of the Federal League. He advised Federal supporters that if there were a “big hole” near at hand “these misguided individuals [should] crawl in without further delay.” He of course had predicted, based on his 25 years of experience, that “the third league could not succeed.” Vila then declared: “[b]ecause I told the truth about this crazy baseball scheme, pin heads who didn’t know what they were talking about wrote me in bitter terms....”41 Presumably, some if not all of these “pin heads” were readers of the Daily Sun and The Sporting News.

The incessant pounding provided by Taylor Spink, who bought ink by the barrel, and Vila, who possessed enough venom to stop a regiment in its tracks, constantly whittled away at the credibility of the Federals. Money was unquestionably the most decisive factor in recruiting players from Organized Baseball, but the source of that money also had to be—and be perceived as—stable, durable, and professional: a real “Major” League. The virulent antipathy of The Sporting News could not help but undermine the Federal League’s efforts to sway players as they assessed their options. Had Charles Spink survived, he would likely have been unable to restrain Vila from his chosen course; nonetheless, his maturity and his professionalism suggest that he would have declined to bash the upstarts in such a frankly reckless manner.

A July 1915 doubleheader between the St. Louis Terriers and the Baltimore Terrapins drew more than 9,000 fans, while a competing American League battle between the Browns and the Yankees drew only about 300 spectators.

ACT TWO: “A HUMILIATING POSITION TO BE IN”

Battered by the unrelenting hostility of The Sporting News, the Federals continued to struggle in their effort to sign true marquee talents despite the skills of Joe Tinker, Fielder Jones, and others as salesmen, the deep pockets of Federal League ownership, and that ownership’s willingness to spend money. The Federals were also plagued by a recurring habit of sending mixed, if not blatantly contradictory, messages to the press. As Daniel Levitt noted, “several leading executives did not know when it was best to keep their mouths shut.”42 Amongst the Federal League executives afflicted in this manner was league president James Gilmore. In November 1914, Gilmore proclaimed that the Federals “would no longer go after the higher-priced stars of Organized Baseball” and would instead adopt an approach of upgrading the overall level of talent playing for their teams.43

Notwithstanding this pronouncement, after peace talks with the magnates of Organized Baseball faltered, the Federals renewed their efforts to sign new talent.

While Joe Tinker provided the Federals with both a big name and considerable skills as a salesman for the new league, he was nearing the end of his career when he jumped to the upstart’s Chicago franchise.

The first few days of December 1914 may be seen as a high water mark in this regard. Connie Mack, stung by bitterness after being swept by the upstart Boston Braves in the 1914 World Series, and under the pressure of increasing salaries, decided to waive the leading lights of his pitching staff: Jack Coombs, Chief Bender, and Eddie Plank.44 Coombs joined the Brooklyn Nationals, but the Federals were able to sign both Bender and Plank to contracts for the 1915 season. In New York, meanwhile, the well-financed Brooklyn “Tip Tops” obtained the signature of Rube Marquard of the New York Giants on both an affidavit certifying that he was indeed a free agent and a new Federal League contract. But the real triumph for the outlaws came when Walter Johnson, the pre-eminent American League pitcher of the day, put pen to paper at player-manager Joe Tinker’s urging and joined the Chicago Federals (soon to be known as the Whales).

Johnson’s decision to sign with the Federals rocked the baseball world, although The Sporting Life insisted that the signing of Johnson (and Plank) did not “create the sensation that the signing of Marquard did” because of the longstanding rumors that “these two would eventually line up with the new league.”45 Johnson, however, was exactly the kind of superstar drawing card that the newcomers had sought for so long. In the view of the Boston Herald as re-presented in The Sporting Life: “[t]he securing of Johnson is about the biggest card that the Federals could have played at this time.... Getting Johnson means several things to all hands at interest. It means, primarily, that the Federals are not yet down and out as Organized Ball has so everlastingly proclaimed.... The fact that Johnson has been willing to make the jump will probably make it easier for the Federals to get other men whom they are after.... And in addition to everything else, Johnson will not only prove a drawing card, as he always has been, but should also win a lot of games for his new employers.”46 The prospect of rising gate receipts thus also provided at least some hope for undercapitalized Federal teams in Buffalo, Baltimore, and Kansas City.

Conversely, Walter Johnson was in his prime when he signed with Tinker’s club, then changed his mind and jumped back to Organized Baseball.

Unfortunately for the Federals, the high tide of early December soon receded. Marquard, after some wrangling, was returned to the Giants to complete the two years that did, in fact, remain on his contract. Marquard’s reputation as a bit of a risky proposition had been presaged by his wooing of fellow vaudeville star Blossom Seeley, much to the dismay of Blossom’s then-husband, Joseph Kane. According to press accounts, Mr. Kane, accompanied by two detectives, had on one occasion arrived too late (at 2:00AM) to his wife’s hotel room because “by that time the two occupants had gone out walking. They left at a brisk, athletic pace by way of the fire escape.”47 Walter Johnson, by contrast, was a paragon of American baseball virtue, whose decision to execute a “double flop,” renounce his Chicago contract, and return to Washington, had to have come as a complete shock to the Federals.

The long wooing of Walter Johnson, the momentary triumph of his signing, and Johnson’s rapid change of heart stands out as the premier human drama of the Federal League war, one so richly textured that it would be difficult to do it justice in a mere few paragraphs. What matters most for the purposes of this account is that Johnson succumbed to the pleas of Fred Clarke, the manager of the Pittsburgh Pirates, to return to the fold of Organized Baseball. Clarke was acting as an emissary for Clark Griffith, a man who had developed a strong bond with Johnson over the years. One Johnson biographer described their bond as “part father-son relationship, part mutual professional admiration, and the rest genuine friendship.”48 Griffith hurried from the nation's capital to Kansas City to follow up on Clarke’s breakthrough and return Johnson to Washington’s roster.

Federal District Court Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis might not have been as comfortable sitting on his ruling throughout the entire 1915 season if Walter Johnson had remained committed to pitching for the Chicago Whales.

The re-signing of Johnson capped a series of mounting frustrations for the Federals. Those frustrations, coupled with the passage of sterner federal antitrust legislation in late 1914, led to the Federals’ decision to sue Organized Baseball in the court of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis in January 1915. Landis famously delayed taking any action for the duration of the calendar year. While Landis dithered, purposefully, the Federal League withered.

Many of Johnson’s contemporaries also changed their minds and executed a reverse jump, and still others had their private decisions upended in a court of law. It can safely be said, however, that none of these other vacillators possessed as talented a right arm. Neither were they as roundly respected, nor as capable of drawing customers to the park. The final crucial aspect of Johnson’s change of heart was its timing.

Had Walter Johnson not committed his famous “double flop,” the potential for a vastly different outcome of the war comes into view. The Federals may have restrained their litigious instincts, preferring instead to fight on at the contract negotiating table rather than the plaintiff’s table in court. Even allowing that such a suit was inevitable, as the Seymours would have us believe, Judge Landis would have been hard-pressed to simply take no action in light of the prospect of Walter Johnson regularly taking to the mound before large crowds for Weeghman’s Chicago Whales.49

For his part, Johnson seemed genuinely distraught by the entire affair. In a lengthy piece appearing in Baseball Magazine under his name entitled “Why I Signed With The Federal League,” Johnson said he struggled with the choice between “doing an injury to the Federal League” and having “to injure Washington instead.” He conceded: “[i]t is a humiliating position to be in, and has no doubt hurt me with the public.”50 Johnson had been blasted even before his initial signing by the Federals under such headlines as “Almighty Dollar Johnson’s Ideal.”51 Then, upon his “double flop” The Sporting Life criticized him for his “very elastic conscience,” surmising that “his moral sense [was] not a mate to his wonderfully strong right arm.”52 Johnson was concerned enough about his future to attend the opening session in Landis’s court, inconspicuously clad in a sweater and cap.53

Even without the Big Train, the Chicago Whales prevailed in the final thrilling Federal League pennant race, edging St. Louis by less than a full percentage point.

When no ruling from Judge Landis was forthcoming, he reported, late, to Washington’s spring training camp, prompting one reporter to note that the “Big Train” that carried Johnson was arriving behind schedule. This was the first reported usage of the Hall of Famer’s most enduring nickname.54

How did Johnson’s reputation fare? The Big Train, it appears, need not have been so concerned. The public rapidly forgave him this transgression, a testament to both his overall character and his enormous talent. How forgiving was the public? Well, one recent book refers to Johnson as a “divine” hero, and one Johnson biography echoed a columnist’s conclusion (written at the time of Johnson’s death) that “the only man of the past to whom Walter Johnson could be compared was Abraham Lincoln.”55,56 Apparently, none of the former Federal League magnates were asked to comment.

ACT THREE: THE PIOUS MASTER BAKER PASSES

While many figures in Organized Baseball knew enough to respect the business acumen of Robert B. Ward, the owner of the Brooklyn “Tip Tops” Federal League franchise and the League’s vice-president, they did question one thing: “What the h--- does he know about baseball?” This complaint, expressed in Baseball Magazine by an unnamed American League magnate, raised the fundamental objection that Ward had made his fortune elsewhere, and not in baseball.

Ward had risen from humble beginnings to head the “Greatest Bread Manufacturing Company in the World.”57 He was a devout Methodist who steadfastly eschewed Sunday baseball, despite its promise of financial gain. While Ward would have deplored the language of the anonymous magnate he was completely unintimidated by the sentiments, stating in reply, “I never knew there was any black art about baseball. Judging from some of the men I have met in the profession and the success they have made, I would not say that intelligence of the first order was necessary to a rather complete mastery of the game.”58,59

Ward brought both his incisive analytical abilities and his bankroll to the aid of the Federal League cause. Even some of the most prominent figures in Organized Baseball were not shy about expressing admiration for what he brought to the table.

“I don’t know how he did it, but when [Federal League President James] Gilmore interested R.B. Ward in his schemes, he made a ten strike. He is the kind of man any league would go a long way to get,” remarked Charles Somers, a substantial financial backer of the American League at the time of its birth, and one who would be counted among the many financial casualties of the Federal League war. Even Ban Johnson, who was reported to have refused to discuss a possible peace proposal when Gilmore was in the same room, was willing to hold a “friendly conference” with the powerful master baker.60

Robert B. Ward of the Brooklyn franchise: magnate, baker and potential peacemaker?

Once President Gilmore had Ward and his brother George within the Federal camp, he proceeded to maximize the financial draws made upon the Ward fortune in support of the fledgling league. Ward, and Ward’s money, seemed to be everywhere. Not only did he support his own team financially, he made substantial loans to the league for the purpose of keeping other franchises afloat “including untold thousands that were never properly documented.”61 Ward also financed an entire minor league (the Colonial League) virtually singlehandedly for the benefit of the outlaws as a whole.62

By that time, Ward had already proven to be a steadying influence on the enterprise, particularly (in conjunction with St. Louis Terrier owner Phil Ball) in restraining the always rambunctious Charlie Weeghman of Chicago. When peace negotiations began after the 1914 season, the disparate interests of the Federal League’s ownership became readily apparent. Buffalo managing partner William Robertson spoke of a peace agreement which would “necessitate recognition of a third major league.”63 For their part, the backers of the Baltimore franchise were, from the beginning, determined to return that city to the ranks of the Major Leagues.64

Lucky Charlie was more parochial. He was major league material in his own mind. He certainly was not opposed to gaining admittance to Organized Baseball for the Federal League’s “big three” (himself included), but beyond that, he was less concerned. The bigger two of this threesome (Ball and Ward) “were not yet willing to abandon their fellow owners.”65 The 1914 peace talks collapsed, leaving Joe Vila, as we have seen, once again on the wrong side of accuracy in the media.

The peace negotiations resumed in earnest at the end of the Federal’s second season. With another season of financial losses behind them, the outlaws were more than willing to talk. All around them lay the carnage of the baseball war, exacerbated by the challenges of a fragile national economy. Most tellingly, the ranks of the minor leagues that had already been thinned from 40 at the start of 1914 down to 29 on opening day in 1915, seemed destined for another downsizing.66 Ban Johnson might have been resolute, but a number of National League owners were wavering, as were the minor league owners, some of whom were in danger of bleeding out. Still, the National Leaguers had not yet felt enough pain to accept the Federals’ proposal of October, which envisioned the major leagues expanding to ten teams each by adding the Federal franchises in Brooklyn, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and Buffalo or Kansas City, while also allowing Weeghman and Newark owner Harry Sinclair (later of Teapot Dome scandal fame) to purchase two franchises in the established leagues.67

With the proposal deadlocked, fate played its final card in favor of Organized Baseball. On October 18, 1915, Robert B. Ward, who had been diagnosed with pneumonia the week before, died at his Homewood estate in New Rochelle, New York from heart complications at age 63.68 Rational contemporaries were generous in observing the import of his passing. With Ward’s death, The Sporting Life noted, “the Federal League, is deprived of its most powerful and yet most loved individual factor….”69 Baseball Magazine said that “men like Mr. Ward are very, very few in baseball and their loss can hardly be replaced.”70 The New York Times observed: “The death of Robert B. Ward removes from the Federal League one of its staunch supporters. He was ever an active force in promoting the welfare of the league….”71

The best that Joe Vila at The Sporting News could manage, however, was more tweak than teary-eyed tribute. Under a headline reading in part: “Death of Outlaw’s Angel Stiffens BackBone of Certain O.B. Men Who Were Inclined to Wobble,” Vila could only manage to concede that: “the chief owner of the Brookfeds was a game sportsman, a big-hearted, good-natured citizen who went into baseball with a limited knowledge of the business end of the game.”72

Ban Johnson proved to be even more petty, acknowledging that “[Ward] was the backbone of the Federal League” but then going on to say that “the blow is likely to prove fatal to the organization.... I think it was the Federal League that put him under the sod, as he could not stand the strain of worries and losses.” Federal League President James Gilmore fumed in response: “Mr. Johnson has intruded his personality into every true sportsman’s hour of sorrow,” going on to charge that “by his selfish impulses” Johnson was “slowly but surely ruining the national sport.”73

Gilmore’s righteous indignation did not save the outlaws, however, and within two months time peace had been reached. The peace was “far from a total victory” for Organized Baseball, however the peace terms were substantially less generous than the Federals’ October proposal.74 Weeghman was allowed to purchase the Cubs and Phil Ball purchased the Browns. A large financial settlement ($600,000) was offered to many of the remaining franchises, but unlike both the ending of the American League war, as well as the resolution of more modern challenges in football, hockey, and basketball, there was no wholesale acceptance of an operating league, nor the migration of even a handful of rebel franchises into the established ranks.

The modern chroniclers agree that Ward’s untimely demise was pivotal to this ultimate result. Levitt noted that “there can be no exaggerating the impact of Ward’s death.”75 Wiggins concluded that when Ward passed, “much of the heart and fight of the Federal League died with him.”76

CONCLUSION

It would be foolhardy to argue that but for the three twists of fate described above, the Federal League would have survived and, much like the American League before it, been organically integrated into Organized Baseball and be instantly recognizable a century later. Yet, each of these wrenching events altered, in a substantial way, the events that followed. The waging of the “war” was thus impacted by chance to a non-trivial extent. Even the peace agreement was impacted.

In 1989, Marc Okkonen commented with admiration on the “fascinating gamble” that was the Federal League. That gamble is made all the more fascinating when one considers that it could have ended far differently had only the fates been a little kinder.

Notes

1. For the purposes of this article, the term “outlaw” or “outlaw league” is intended to refer to a baseball enterprise operating outside of the National Agreement that encompassed the American League, the National League and minor league operations, commonly known as “Organized Baseball.”

2. Jack Kavanaugh, Walter Johnson: A Life (South Bend: Diamond Communications, Inc., 1995), 106.

3. While Wrigley Field is certainly recognizable, its Federal League roots are not; indeed, if not for its upcoming centennial, the park’s original incarnation as “Weeghman Park” would, for non-Cubs fans, qualify as the answer to a moderately challenging trivia question.

4. Daniel R. Levitt, The Battle That Forged Modern Baseball (Lanham, Maryland: Ivan R. Dee, 2012).

5. Robert Peyton Wiggins, The Federal League of Base Ball Clubs (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2009).

6. Marc Okkonen, The Federal League of 1914–1915 (Garrett Park, MD: SABR, 1989).

7. Harold Seymour and Dorothy Seymour Mills, Baseball: The Golden Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 197–99.

8. Johnson’s gambit had been greatly aided by the National League’s own incompetence, particularly its dramatic contraction that left a number of rapidly growing cities hungering for a return to “major league” status.

9. Wiggins, The Federal League of Base Ball Clubs, 6; Levitt, The Battle That Forged Modern Baseball, 34–35.

10. Seymour and Mills, Baseball: The Golden Age, 199–200.

11. “Federals For A Fight,” The Sporting Life (August 9, 1913): 1.

12. The New York Times, February 10, 1914: 7.

13. Wiggins, The Federal League of Base Ball Clubs, 84.

14. J.G. Taylor Spink, Judge Landis and Twenty-Five Years of Baseball (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1947), 258 (the Spink book republishes in its entirety a June 20, 1942 Saturday Evening Post article by New York Post sportswriter Stanley Frank entitled “Bible of Baseball” from which this quote and other material in this article is derived).

15. Henry W. Thomas, Walter Johnson: Baseball’s Big Train (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 138.

16. Seymour and Mills, Baseball: The Golden Age, 216; Okkonen viewed The Sporting Life as “more objective and fair in its coverage.” Baseball Magazine was “neutral” and The Sporting News presented the Federals as “a bad joke.” Okkonen, The Federal League of 1914-1915, 7. Wiggins shares a generally similar assessment. Wiggins, The Federal League of Base Ball Clubs, 4–5.

17. The Sporting Life (November 8, 1913): 4.

18. Wm. A. Phelon, “Changing Styles in Baseball,” Baseball Magazine (October 1913): 37.

19. James A. Ross, “The Champion Club of the Federal League,” Baseball Magazine (May 1914): 21–22.

20. Baseball Magazine (June 1915): 63.

21. Baseball Magazine (April 1915): 25.

22. Steve Gietshier, “Famous Firsts,” The Sporting News (April 24, 1995): 8.

23. Wiggins, The Federal League of Base Ball Clubs, 4; Seymour and Mills, Baseball: The Golden Age, 216.

24. Spink, 261. Levitt, on the other hand, postulates that Charles Spink saw the war as an opportunity to “augment his status with Organized Baseball.” Levitt, The Battle That Forged Modern Baseball, 111.

25. The Sporting News (February 5, 1914): 4.

26. The Sporting News (April 16, 1914): 4.

27. The Sporting News (April 22, 1914): 4.

28. Steve Gietshier, The Sporting News, The Baseball Biography Project, http://bioproj.sabr.org.

29. Spink, 259.

30. The Sporting News (April 30, 1914): 1.

31. The Sporting News (November 13, 1913): 4.

32. The Sporting News (January 15, 1914): 4.

33. Howard B. Tyler, “The Federal League Race,” Baseball Magazine
(September 1915): 28.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., at 100.

36. www.baseball-reference.com/teams/SLB/1915.shtml (retrieved 9/7/13). Cardinals attendance dipped slightly by some 3,433 fans, dropping the team’s attendance ranking from third (of eight teams) to fifth. www.baseball-reference.com/teams/STL/attend.shtml (retrieved 9/7/13).

37. In the end, the Chicago Whales benefited from two rainouts that were not made up to win the pennant race by .00854 percentage points. Wiggins, Federal League of Base Ball Clubs, 274–5.

38. Levitt, The Battle That Forged Modern Baseball, 111.

39. Wiggins notes with some irony that Organized Baseball’s “voracious campaign” against the Federal League in the press (and the courts) “gave credibility to the newcomers.” Wiggins, The Federal League of Base Ball Clubs, 7. This author believes that, however much the level of curiosity among members of the general public may have increased initially because of such insults, the long-term effect of this press pounding was ultimately corrosive.

40. Wiggins also states that this was intended as an insult to the Ward brothers, owners of the Brooklyn Federal franchise. The Wards had made their fortune as bakers. Wiggins, The Federal League of Base Ball Clubs, 92.

41. The Sporting News (November 19, 1914): 1.

42. Levitt, The Battle That Forged Modern Baseball, 170–71.

43. Wiggins, The Federal League of Base Ball Clubs, 168.

44. Levitt, The Battle That Forged Modern Baseball, 171.

45. The Sporting Life (December 12, 1914): 9.

46. The Sporting Life (December 19, 1914): 12.

47. The New York Times, November 9, 1912: 11.

48. Thomas, Walter Johnson: Baseball’s Big Train, 108–9.

49. Seymour and Mills, Baseball: The Golden Age, 203. The Seymours relate that as early as the 1913 signing of Joe Tinker, Federal League attorney Edward E. Gates was proclaiming that an antitrust action would be brought against Organized Baseball.

50. Baseball Magazine (April 1915): 62.

51. Seymour and Mills, Baseball: The Golden Age, 207.

52. William G. Weart, “One More Hurt to Base Ball,” The Sporting Life (January 21, 1915): 9.

53. The New York Times, January 20, 1915: 10.

54. Ted Leavengood, Clark Griffith: The Old Fox of Washington Baseball (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2011), 110.

55. Ira Berkow, Beyond the Dream: Occasional Heroes of Sports (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 45.

56. Kavanaugh, Walter Johnson: A Life, 287.

57. Baseball Magazine devoted a truly disproportionate amount of its profile of the Ward brothers to the unique antiseptic bread manufacturing process they had developed. F.C. Lane, “Famous Magnates of the Federal League,” Baseball Magazine (July 1915): 24.

58. The unnamed American League magnate insisted on anonymity; however, it should be noted that due to a typographical error, the second page of the Ward profile contains the header “The Real Comiskey.” Comiskey had been profiled under that title in the February 1914 issue.

59. Lane, “Famous Magnates of the Federal League,” 110.

60. Ibid., at 26, 110.

61. Levitt, The Battle That Forged Modern Baseball, 221.

62. Wiggins, The Federal League of Base Ball Clubs, 228–31.

63. Levitt, The Battle That Forged Modern Baseball, 157.

64. Wiggins, The Federal League of Base Ball Clubs, 68.

65. Levitt, The Battle That Forged Modern Baseball, 159.

66. Ibid., at 157.

67. Wiggins, The Federal League of Base Ball Clubs, 277.

68. The Sporting Life (October 23, 1918): 8.

69. The Sporting Life (October 30, 1915): 4.

70. Baseball Magazine (December 1915): 15.

71. The New York Times, October 20, 1915: 13.

72. The Sporting News (October 28, 1915): 1.

73. The Sporting Life (October 30, 1915): 11.

74. Seymour and Mills, Baseball: The Golden Age, 233.

75. Levitt, The Battle That Forged Modern Baseball, 222

76. Wiggins, The Federal League of Base Ball Clubs, 277.

Clutch Hitting in the Major Leagues

A psychological perspective

Leonard S. Newman

In the 2011 postseason, David Freese made a name for himself with his spectacular and timely hitting and won both the National League Championship Series and World Series MVP awards. It cannot be denied: Freese hit well in the clutch that October. But would it have been reasonable to expect the same from him in the future? Is he in fact a “clutch hitter”? Do clutch hitters even exist?

Sabermetricians have been arguing about the reality of clutch hitting for quite some time now (see, for example, the special section of the 2008 issue of the Baseball Research Journal). At this point, an impressive group of sophisticated researchers has carefully analyzed large data sets using a variety of statistical methods to test the hypothesis that some players consistently outperform others in high-pressure situations. For example, Phil Birnbaum analyzed batting data from the years 1974 through 1990 to test for the consistency of players’ clutch hitting from one season to the next.1 A clutch hit was defined as one occurring in the “seventh inning or later, tied or down by three runs or less, unless the bases are loaded, in which case down by 4 runs.” For all players with at least 50 at bats in clutch situations, batting averages in clutch situations (corrected for batting averages in non-clutch situations) were calculated, and consistency across consecutive seasons was assessed with a simple linear regression analysis.

Needless to say, however one defines and measures clutch hitting, for any given season, some players will have higher scores than others. Those players can without argument be said to have hit better in the clutch during that baseball season. But if clutch hitting is not just subject to random variation, and if some individual players are truly more “clutch” than others, then those players should consistently perform well in the clutch relative to other players—just as extroverted people are consistently more extroverted than introverts, and honest people are consistently more honest than dishonest people. But Birnbaum found no evidence for that sort of consistency.

Although there is some disagreement about the correct interpretation of these and related findings, the following would arguably be a consensus statement: Clutch hitting either does not exist or is a marginal, difficult-to-detect phenomenon that accounts for only a tiny amount of the variance in batting performance.2 Birnbaum’s samples, for example, were large enough so that even correlations as low as approximately .17 would have reached conventional levels of statistical significance. Relationships of that magnitude are not very impressive, and are typically not “perceptible on the basis of casual observation.”3

Note that even if compelling evidence were presented for the existence of clutch hitting, that would not necessarily mean that what observers perceive to be clutch hitting is real, and not an illusion. The effects of being “clutch” on performance could be so tiny that they would not necessarily even correlate with people’s subjective assessments of individual players’ clutch hitting abilities. People’s intuitions about both the presence and meaning of patterns in athletic performance are often flawed. For example, ample research has demonstrated that the “hot hand” in basketball—the increased likelihood of players making a successful shot if their previous shot was successful—is more illusory than real.4

However, two aspects of the debate over the existence of clutch hitting, while they might seem to go without saying, arguably have important ramifications for the question “does clutch hitting exist?” first, the question “does clutch hitting exist?” can essentially be rephrased as “do some hitters have psychological characteristics that enhance their performance in high pressure situations?” second, published research on the topic has actually addressed the question “does clutch hitting exist at the major league level?” That might in fact be the question of most interest to researchers, but SABR (the Society for American Baseball Research) is not SAMLBR (the Society for American Major League Baseball Research).

In tandem, those two observations highlight the fact that existing research has, for all intents and purposes, been based on the assumption that major league ballplayers vary significantly in the psychological characteristics associated with clutch hitting. What might those characteristics be? And is it reasonable to expect major leaguers to represent different levels of those characteristics? If not, what are the implications for the search to find convincing and replicable evidence for clutch hitting?

The psychological characteristics of clutch performers

What traits (that is, stable dispositions) might be especially pronounced in players who perform exceptionally well in the clutch? The following is not meant to be an exhaustive list of all possible personal characteristics, but the three I focus on here represent three general ways in which clutch hitters might stand out from others—specifically, in terms of their affective, cognitive, and/or motivational qualities.

Trait anxiety. Anxiety, of course, is a state that certain experiences trigger in people. Everyone has encountered situations that are threatening, challenging, and unpredictable enough to at least temporarily trigger somatic effects like increased heart rate and perspiration, trembling, or even, in extreme cases, nausea. Situations in which a person’s social reputation and self-esteem are at stake are especially potent sources of anxiety—situations like those involving publicly observable athletic performances taking place when the outcome of a contest is at stake.

Some people, though, are less prone to experiencing anxiety than others; such people are said to be low in trait anxiety.5 These individuals have been found to be less susceptible than others to stress-induced deterioration of performance. Relative to athletes high in trait anxiety, those low in trait anxiety should thus consistently perform better in clutch situations. Although direct evidence involving baseball players is lacking, this hypothesis has been supported in the context of other sports, such as basketball.6,7

Self-consciousness. In high-pressure athletic situations, your attention should of course be focused on the task at hand (e.g., hitting the pitched ball). You could, though, attend to other things, such as whether or not other people are observing you, and what they might be thinking about you. In addition, you could carefully monitor your own internal states to determine how confident you are feeling or how you are reacting physiologically to the situation. You might also pay careful attention to the positions of your limbs (for example, focusing on your batting stance and how you are gripping the bat).

People high in self-consciousness are those who are most prone to let their attention drift to those other things and to become acutely self-aware in high-pressure situations. Unfortunately, becoming preoccupied with one’s physical, psychological, and/or social self can undermine one’s performance. Indeed, dispositional self-consciousness has been found to be negatively correlated with performance under pressure.8 Relative to baseball players high in self-consciousness, those low in self-consciousness should consistently perform better in clutch situations.

Jerry Adair’s pre-professional athletic exploits drew comparisons to fellow Oklahoman, Mickey Mantle.

Achievement motivation. Coming through in the clutch and playing a central role in your team’s victory is a major accomplishment, and ballplayers who hit walk-off home runs are more respected and celebrated than those who hit home runs in the ninth inning of a 13–1 blowout. When Yankees’ owner George Steinbrenner tagged Dave Winfield “Mister May” the nature of the criticism—by comparing him to “Mister October” Reggie Jackson—was clear to everyone. Similarly, most baseball fans remember Francisco Cabrera’s two-out pinch hit in the bottom of the ninth inning in Game Seven of the 1992 National League Championship Series; the two runs he knocked in won the game, the series, and the pennant. Fewer fans, it can be assumed, remember that that was his only hit of the series, and it is unlikely that many could identify the Braves’ leading hitter for the series: Mark Lemke, with a .333 batting average. He knocked in two runs also—but one was in the Braves’ 5–1 victory in Game One and the other in their 13–5 victory in Game Two.

But people differ in terms of how strongly they desire to overcome challenges, outperform others, and stand out from their peers. In other words, there are individual differences in achievement motivation.9 According to an influential definition of this personal characteristic, it is associated with "intense, prolonged and repeated efforts to accomplish something difficult,” having “the determination to win,” enjoying competition, and being “stimulated to excel by the presence of others.”10 Relative to baseball players low in achievement motivation, those high in achievement motivation should consistently perform better in clutch situations.

Major league baseball players: An extreme population

If clutch hitting is related to the personality traits described above (and related ones), and if major league ballplayers vary in terms of their consistent ability to hit in the clutch, then it follows that major league ballplayers must also vary in terms of those traits. Is that a reasonable expectation? Data from a battery of personality tests administered to major leaguers would answer that question. Such data, alas, do not exist. But an educated guess is still possible.

Consider, for example, what one can learn from SABR’s Biography Project (BioProject) website.11 There is, of course, no shortage of sources of information about Hall of Fame caliber ballplayers or other perennial All Stars. But the BioProject is notable for its exhaustively researched stories about players who might be memorable to passionate baseball fans, but who are far from household names. Consider, if you will, the following quartet: Ken Frailing, Duffy Dyer, Dalton Jones, and Jerry Adair (selected for, among other things, being prominent in the baseball card collections of my youth). Collectively, they represent 41 years of major league service—and also, a grand total of zero All Star Game appearances. None ever led the league in a significant batting or pitching category (although Adair grounded into the most double plays in the American League in 1965). With the exception of Adair, none ever received a single MVP Award vote.

Of course, all had one other distinguishing characteristic: they were extraordinarily talented athletes. Frailing, for example, had an eye-popping 13–0 record with an ERA of 0.17 during his senior year in high school. That same school later selected him as their “Athlete of the Century.” Dyer, when he was in high school in Arizona, was recognized “as one of the state’s top ballplayers,” and he led his team to a state championship in 1963. Dalton Jones also led his high school team to the state championship game (in Louisiana)—but scouts had already started “flocking around” him when he was 14 years old. As for Adair, “no athlete from Oklahoma had a more storied pre-professional career than Adair, not even Mickey Mantle.” A sportswriter in Oklahoma describes him as “the best athlete to come out of the Tulsa area in his lifetime.”12

In short, even unremarkable major league baseball players are elite performers. To reach the major leagues, players undergo an extremely rigorous selection process. In fact, given the number of people who would find a career in professional sports to be appealing, the reference group used to evaluate their aptitude for the game is essentially most of the male population of the United States (and increasingly, a number of other countries as well).

It could conceivably be the case that once a player reaches the majors, the level of pressure and the stakes involved rise to levels that players have not previously experienced, and so the threshold at which different psychological limitations and vulnerabilities might matter are reached for the first time. Nonetheless, anyone with characteristics that inhibit top-flight performance—either physical or psychological ones—will be weeded out well before the call-up to the majors. Although no direct evidence is available, high levels of trait anxiety and low levels of achievement motivation are unlikely to be found among men on major league rosters. The same is true of high levels of self-consciousness; indeed, the rare exceptions to that rule are notable enough to have become legendary, as in the “Steve Blass Disease,” or the “Steve Sax Syndrome.” Professional ballplayers who suddenly become incapable of completing routine plays report that their problems are associated with excruciating self-awareness. As Dale Murphy put it, “Your mind interferes, and you start thinking, Where am I throwing? What am I doing? instead of just throwing. Your mind starts working against you.”13

Statistical implications

To ask, “Do some hitters have psychological characteristics that enhance their performance in high pressure situations?” is to ask the question, “Is the relationship between game situation (high stakes, low stakes) and batting performance (hitting safely, knocking in runs) moderated by psychological variables?” Moderator variables are variables that affect the relationship between two other variables (in this case, game situation and performance); in other words, moderation is in evidence when the relationship between two variables depends on a third variable. But if that third variable hardly varies, it is not much of a variable, and it cannot be a moderator.

That point can probably be understood intuitively, but it can also be formalized in statistical terms. Moderation is typically assessed with a multiple regression analysis. Essentially, one tries to predict or estimate a dependent variable, Y (e.g., performance), on the basis of an independent variable or variables, X (e.g., game situation), a moderating variable, M (e.g., trait anxiety, self-consciousness, achievement motivation), and most crucially, the interaction of X and M (XM). One or more of the predictor variables might account for statistically significant variance in the dependent variable.

However, a variable that itself has little or no variance cannot account for variance in another one. Thus, if M does not vary across observations, it (and the interaction term, XM) drops out of the equation, and there can be no moderation effect. All that would be left in the statistical model would be a general estimate of how well batters in general perform in clutch versus non-clutch situations.

Looking for clutch hitting in the right places: A challenge and prediction

An implication of this analysis is that clutch hitting is unlikely to be detected in data from the major leagues; major league batters simply do not vary enough in terms of the personal qualities that would lead some to perform better and some to perform worse in the clutch. Unmotivated, highly self-conscious men with trouble controlling anxiety are unlikely to be found on the rosters of teams in the American and National Leagues.

There is, however, no reason clutch hitting should not exist in populations of baseball players for whom the relevant moderating variables are associated with a significant amount of variance. In other words, clutch hitting should be detectable at lower levels of competition, among players who have not undergone the rigorous selection process experienced by major leaguers. Among such players one could reasonably expect to find people with relatively high levels of anxiety and self-consciousness and low levels of achievement motivation.

Steve Blass (L) and Steve Sax (R) both infamously suffered from “throwing yips” during their big league careers.

Assembling an appropriate data set, however, could be quite a challenge. To assess consistency in clutch hitting at a particular level of competition in a manner consistent with past investigations of the phenomenon, one must find a reasonably large group of batters who (1) stay at that level for more than one year, and (2) accrue enough plate appearances during each of those years to provide a reliable and valid performance measure. Minor league rosters, however, are quite unstable from year to year. In addition, those players who stay mired at a particular level might differ in systematic ways from those who do not, and thus might not be a representative sample of ballplayers. Another possible source of data might be high school baseball, but high school teams do not play enough games in a given year to satisfy the second criterion.

More promising would be college baseball. Players in college have multi-year careers, and their teams play dozens of games—enough so that players end seasons with hundreds of at-bats. In addition, although most people would not have a realistic chance of making the cut for a college team, it is still the case that the physical skills and psychological attributes required at this level are not what they have to be at the major league level.

As a result, with a fair amount of confidence, I end this essay with the following prediction: if anyone can construct a data set involving a large number of college players who had substantial amounts of playing time across multiple seasons, and conducts a “Cramer test” of the kind conducted by Birnbaum, evidence for stable levels of clutch hitting will be detected.14 A failure to find such evidence would not, of course, provide definitive evidence that the phenomenon of clutch hitting is nonexistent. It could instead suggest that the standard criteria for distinguishing between high-pressure batting situations and less pressured ones do not correspond closely enough to how batters directly experience those situations. In other words, faced with null data (that is, a failure to detect the existence of consistent clutch hitting), one might choose to re-examine standard definitions of clutch hitting. But the odds of finding straightforward, unambiguous evidence for clutch hitting would seem to be much more favorable for almost any other sample of batters other than major leaguers.

Notes

1. Phil Birnbaum, “Clutch Hitting and the Cramer Test,” Baseball Research Journal 37 (2008): 71–75.

2. Bill James (2008), “Mapping the Fog,” Baseball Research Journal 37, 76–81; P. Birnbaum, “Response to ‘Mapping the Fog,’” Baseball Research Journal 37, 82–84.

3. Jacob Cohen (1977), Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences (79). New York: Academic Press.

4. Thomas Gilovich, Robert Vallone, and Amos Tversky (1985). “The Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of Random Sequences,” Cognitive Psychology 3, 295–314; Alan Reifman (2012), Hot Hand: The Statistics Behind Sports Greatest Streaks. Washington, DC: Potomac Books.

5. Michael W. Eysenck (1997), “Anxiety and Cognition: A Unified Theory,” East Sussex, UK: Psychology Press.

6. Sian L. Beilock & Rob Gray, “Why Do Athletes Choke Under Pressure?” In Gershon Tenenbaum and Robert C. Eklund (Eds.), Handbook of Sport Psychology (3rd Ed.) (Hoboken, NJ US: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2007), 425–44.

7. Guiying Hu, Baihua Xu, & QI Xu (2008). “An Experimental Study on the ‘Choking’ Psychological Mechanism of Adolescent Basketball Players,” Psychological Science (China), 31, 528–31; J. Wang, D. Marchant, T. Morris, & P. Gibbs, “Self-Consciousness and Trait Anxiety as Predictors of Choking in Sport,” Journal of Science and Medicine in Sport 7 (2004): 174–85.

8. Sian L. Beilock & Rob Gray, “Why Do Athletes Choke Under Pressure?” In Gershon Tenenbaum & Robert C. Eklund (Eds.), Handbook of Sport Psychology (3rd Ed.) (Hoboken, NJ US: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2007), 425–44; Georgia Panayiotou, “Chronic Self-Consciousness and Its Effects on Cognitive Performance, Physiology, and Self-Reported Anxiety,” Representative Research In Social Psychology 28 (2005): 21–34; J. Wang, D. Marchant, T. Morris, and P. Gibbs, “Self-consciousness and trait anxiety as predictors of choking in sport,” Journal of Science and Medicine in Sport 7 (2004): 174–185.

9. Joan L. Duda, “Motivation in Sport: The Relevance of Competence and Achievement Goals,” in Andrew J. Elliot and Carol S. Dweck (Eds.), Handbook of Competence and Motivation (New York, NY US: Guilford Publications, 2005), 318–35; Andrew J. Elliot & Holly A. McGregor, “A 2×2 achievement goal framework,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80 (2001): 501–19.

10. Henry A. Murray, Explorations in Personality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938), 164.

11. http://sabr.org/bioproject

12. All quotations and information about the players discussed in this paragraph were retrieved from the SABR Baseball Biography Project at http://sabr.org/bioproject

13.  Richard Demak (1991, April 8), “Mysterious Malady.” Sports Illustrated.

14. Richard D. Cramer (1977), “Do Clutch Hitters Exist?,” Baseball Research Journal, 6, 74–79.

Is a Major League Hitter Hot or Cold?

Megan Liedtke Tesar, Anne C. Marx, and David D. Marx

Introduction

The World Series is tied at three games apiece. Going into the decisive seventh game, which players would you prefer to have in the line-up? If it is the bottom of the ninth inning, the score is tied 2–2, and the bases are loaded, do you stick to the line-up or put in a pinch-hitter? This question had to be answered by Bob Brenly, the manager of the Arizona Diamondbacks, in the 2001 World Series against the New York Yankees. Brenly stuck to the lineup, and fortunately for the Diamondbacks, despite his 11 strikeouts and a .231 batting average (6 for 26) in the series, Luis Gonzalez came through with a single to center to win the series.

Many major league baseball games are decided in the final innings or outs of a game. For that reason, it would be beneficial for team managers to know which player on their team has the highest probability of getting on base or getting the game-winning hit. The probability, however, will differ depending on whether the player is hot or cold. Previous studies have addressed streakiness in hitting (Albert, 2004; Albright, 1993), yet data did not support a pattern of streakiness across all players. The goal of this study is to use hidden Markov models to determine when players are hot or cold and to determine how their batting averages differ between these two states.

Markov Chain

To understand the concept of a Markov chain, consider the following example. During a seven-day time period, the weather can be observed and classified as sunny, cloudy, or rainy. These three classifications are called the observable states, and the probabilities of moving from one state to another are known. These probabilities, called transition probabilities, are the only parameters in a regular Markov model because the state is directly visible to the observer. In addition, the probability of observing a certain weather condition today is based only on the previous day’s weather. In addition, the probability of observing a certain weather condition today is based only on the previous day’s weather rather than the observed weather state two, three, four, etc. days ago. When these conditions are satisfied, the process can be described as a Markov chain.

By definition, a Markov chain, denoted by {Xn}, is a process with a countable number of states and discrete units of time t = (0, 1, 2 …, n) such that at each time the system is in exactly one of the states. Furthermore, a Markov chain contains known transition probabilities. Following the notation used by Karlin (1969, pp. 27), the transition probability of being in state j at time period n+1 given that the process is in state i at time n is denoted by:

pij = P(Xn+1 = j | Xn = i)

As mentioned above, these transition probabilities rely exclusively on the current state of the process. Therefore, knowledge regarding its past behavior does not influence the probability of any future behavior. In more formal terms,

P(Xn+1 | X₁, X₂, ..., Xn) = P(Xn+1 | Xn)

where the value of Xn is the state at time t = n. In a Markov chain, the probability of the system beginning in each of the states must also be defined. Let p0i denote this transition probability from the beginning state (state 0) to state i or the probability of starting in state i.

Now any sequence from a Markov chain can be written as X₁, X₂,X₃, X₄, . . . Xn, and the probability of this sequence is as follows:

This proof is based on the definition of a conditional probability and by applying the property that probability of each state depends only on value of preceding state.

In this study, a Markov chain is used to model the hitting of major league baseball players over the course of a season. The Markov chain has two possible states (hot and cold), and the transition probabilities model the chance that a player will transition from one type of hitting to another.

Will this chain satisfy the Markov property? In other words, is the future hitting type dependent only on the current hitting type? It is clear that previous states might lend some information about the next transition. For example, if the previous few states are cold, the batter may be in a series against a team with a tough pitching staff, and it will be more likely for the next state to be a cold. However, this situation might be uncommon because of the large amount of variation in throwing style among pitchers. Although thinking about whether or not this chain satisfies the Markov property is important, a model can still be useful even if it is not exact.

Hidden Markov Model

According to Durbin, Eddy, Krogh, and Mitchison (1998), a hidden Markov model (HMM) is a “probabilistic model for sequences of symbols” (p. 46). Unlike a regular Markov model, the state is not directly visible. However, variables influenced by the state are visible, and the challenge is to determine the hidden states from an observable variable.

In major league baseball, the type of hitting is not directly visible. Thus, we will be using a hidden Markov model with the number of successful plate appearances per game as the visible variable.

The three main components of a HMM include an initial distribution, an emission matrix, and a transition matrix. The initial distribution defines the probability of the model being in each hidden state at time t = 0. The emission matrix contains the probabilities of each observable variable given that the model is in a particular hidden state, denoted

ei(b) = P(xk=b|Xk=i)

Lastly, the transition matrix contains the probabilities of being in each hidden state at time t = n given the hidden state at time t = n-1.

Data

This study is based on detailed information about each player’s plate appearances over the course of their career (Baseball-Reference.com, Forman, 2000). For this analysis, the 1978 season of Pete Rose will be contrasted to the 1997 season of Rey Ordonez. During the 1978 season, Rose had 731 plate appearances and at least one hit in 44 consecutive games. In 1997 Rey Ordonez had 391 plate appearances and went 37 consecutive plate appearances without a hit.

Using the outcome of each plate appearance, the number of successful plate appearances per game was calculated for each player. The criterion for a successful plate appearance was reaching base on a single, double, triple, home run, base on balls, intentional base on balls, or by being hit by pitch. Never reaching base and reaching base on an error or a fielder’s choice were considered unsuccessful plate appearances. Using the number of successful plate appearances in a game, three observable states were formed. The first state is defined as 0 successful plate appearances in a game, the second state is 1 successful plate appearance, and the third state is greater than or equal to 2 successful plate appearances in a game.

During the 1978 season, Pete Rose had 731 plate appearances and at least one hit in 44 consecutive games.

In 1997 Rey Ordonez had 391 plate appearances and went 37 consecutive plate appearances without a hit.

Example

During each major league baseball game, there is a certain chance that each player will have 0, 1, or “2 or more” successful plate appearances. The probability of each observable variable is determined exclusively by the type of hitting the player is in. The two types of hitting represent our hidden states and will be denoted by “HOT” for a hot and “COLD” for a cold. No definite information about the hitting type is known, but we will try to determine the type based on the number of successful plate appearances per game.

The initial transition matrix was created based on knowledge that one game of plate appearances does not constitute a hitting type. For that reason, a probability of .95 was chosen for staying within a state and .05 was chosen for the probability of changing states. The starting values for the emission matrices are based on the percentage of times each observable variable appears in the sequence. The average of the hot probability and cold probability for each observable outcome is approximately equal to the percentage of times it occurs in the sequence. The sequence of observable outcomes and the initial transition and emission matrices for Rose and Ordonez are given in Table 1.

Modeling Method

Three functions in the hmm.discnp package of R were utilized in this study (Turner, 2006). First, a hidden Markov model was fit to the sequence of successful plate appearances using the Expectation-Maximization algorithm. This algorithm finds the most likely set of transition and emission matrices based on the data and by using the initial values of the matrices as the starting point. The most probable hidden state (HOT and COLD) underlying each observation was then found based on the sequence and the resulting hidden Markov model. Finally, the Viterbi algorithm (Viterbi, 1967) was used to determine the most likely sequence of hidden states (HOT and COLD) that could have generated the sequence. It is important to realize that the sequence of most probable states will not in general be the most likely sequence of states. The results from these three functions are given in Table 2.

Interpretation of Results

There is a large difference between the hot and cold emission probabilities for Pete Rose. He had approximately a 4% chance of having 0 successful plate appearances during a game, a 43% chance of having 1 successful plate appearance, and a 53% chance of having 2 or more successful plate appearances given he was hot. However, he had approximately a 60% chance of having 0 successful plate appearances, a 0% chance of having 1 successful plate appearance, and a 40% chance of having 2 or more successful plate appearances given he was cold. Furthermore, the probability of staying in a hot is .9390 while the probability of staying in a cold is .6360.

Based on the resulting most probable states and most probable sequence of states, Rose was hot for the majority of the 1978 season. These results are not shocking because it was one of his most successful hitting seasons, although not one of his most successful total offensive seasons. The longest he was cold of the season lasted 13 games. In this 13 game stretch, there were 7 games when he had 0 successful plate appearances.

On the other hand, there is a small difference in the emission probabilities for Ordonez indicating that the model failed to find two different states. He had approximately a 40% chance of having 0 successful plate appearances during a game, a 35% chance of having 1 successful plate appearance, and a 26% chance of having 2 or more successful plate appearances given he was hot. In addition, he had approximately a 41% chance of having 0 successful plate appearances, a 34% chance of having 1 successful plate appearance, and a 25% chance of having 2 or more successful plate appearances given he was cold. Furthermore, the probability of staying in a hot is .8937 while the probability of staying in a cold is .8999.

Based on the most probable sequence of states, Ordonez was in a cold state for the entire 1997 season. However, the most probable was a hot state for 13 consecutive games. This occurred when Ordonez successfully reached base in 12 of the 13 games.

Conclusion

Going into Game Seven of the World Series, should the manager put Pete Rose or Rey Ordonez in the line-up? It depends! Based on the model, the probability that Rose will have 0 successful plate appearances given that he came into the game in a cold state is,

P(0n+1|COLDn) = 0.64(0.60) + 0.36(0.04) = 0.4.

Likewise, for Ordonez,

P(0n+1|COLDn) = 0.90(0.41) + 0.10(0.40) = 0.4.

Therefore, if both players come into the game in a cold state, they have the same probability of having an unsuccessful game.

However, based on the model, the probability that Rose will have 0 successful plate appearances given that he came into the game in a hot state is,

P(0n+1|HOTn) = 0.94(0.04) + 0.07(0.60) = 0.08.

Likewise, for Ordonez,

P(0n+1|HOTn) = 0.89(0.40) + 0.11(0.41) = 0.40.

Therefore, if Rose is in a hot state, he has a much lower probability of having an unsuccessful game and he is the player you want in the line-up.

References

Albert, J. (2008). Streaky hitting in baseball. Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, 4(1). Retrieved August, 2013 from www.stat.berkeley.edu/~aldous/157/Papers/albert_streaky.pdf.

Albright, S. (1993). A statistical analysis of hitting streaks in baseball. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 88, 1,175–83.

Durbin, R., Eddy, S., Krogh, A., & Mitchison, G. (1998). Biological Sequence Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Forman, S. L. (2000). Baseball-Reference.com–Major League Statistics and Information, Retrieved June, 2007 from www.baseball-reference.com.

Karlin, S. (1969). A First Course in Stochastic Processes, New York, NY: Academic Press, Inc.

Turner, R. (2006). The hmm.discnp Package, Retrieved June, 2007 from www.math.unb.ca/~rolf.

Viterbi, A. J. (1967). Error bounds for convolutional codes and an asymptotically optimum decoding algorithm. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 13 (2), 260–69

Preferences Between Baseball and Fastpitch Softball Amongst Female Baseball Players

Justine Siegal and Dr. Andy Li-An Ho

Abstract

Baseball is a male-dominated sport. Softball is often considered to be the “female counterpart” to baseball. Despite limited playing opportunities, girls and women are playing baseball. The purpose of the present study was to explore the preferences of female baseball players regarding the differences between baseball and fastpitch softball. Female baseball players (N=49) participating in an international baseball tournament for women completed a two-page questionnaire on their preferences between fastpitch and baseball. The results indicate the majority of baseball players preferred baseball to fastpitch and did not consider the two sports to be equivalent. Players preferred the following baseball traits to softball: ball size, overhand pitching, baserunning, distance of pitching mound/circle, bat, and field dimensions. Implications of the study and suggestions for future research are discussed.

The impetus for this study grew from one of the researchers’ personal experience. As a girl growing up playing baseball, Justine Siegal often wondered why other girls were not playing alongside her and it seemed that girls played softball and boys played baseball. While a Doctoral student at Springfield College (MA), Siegal decided to study female baseball players and quantify the differences between softball and baseball in terms of player perception and preference. Very little research has been done on the motivations of women playing baseball or softball. In the course of her research, Siegal did find work exploring the relationship between America, baseball, and gender, and this became the foundation of the study.

American culture claims softball as the female counterpart to baseball.1 Men often participate in baseball as players, coaches, and umpires, but the female experience in baseball is usually as spectators and consumers, wives and groupies, and parents of male players.2,3,4,5,6 The auxiliary roles that women are often confined to in baseball serve to emphasize the power of the male baseball player.7

In the United States women have been playing baseball longer than they have had the right to vote. Women played regulation baseball until the 1890s when softball and baseball were distinguished into two sports and categorized as “exclusively male” and “co-ed.”8 Historically, baseball is a proving ground for masculine prowess.9 Disapproval of women playing baseball is an ongoing theme in American culture.

As Jennifer Ring explains in her book Stolen Bases: Why American Girls Don’t Play Baseball, “...because women have shown that they can play baseball, and want to play, a culture of exclusion must be enforced institutionally to ensure that the national game remains a man’s game.”10 Baseball has had more lawsuits on whether or not girls can play than any other sport in America.11 In 1973, Little League was forced by law to allow girls to play. In 1974, instead of creating baseball leagues for girls, Little League formed a softball division for girls.

Prior to girls being siphoned into softball programs, interest in baseball leagues was apparent. Before the law forced gender integration within Little League, the mothers of three banned girls formed a girls’ baseball program in Wallkill, New York, for 45 interested girls. In Hoboken, New Jersey, 50 girls tried out to play with the boys. Girls were interested in playing baseball but the leaders of Little League chose not to grow baseball opportunities for both boys and girls but instead to separate the two sexes, and make baseball for boys and softball for girls.12 Legally girls are allowed to play Little League baseball but culturally girls are told to play softball.

Today girls can argue the right to play baseball in schools and public youth leagues under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment resolves that, “no state shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”13 Female baseball players who allege gender discrimination may challenge foes on three grounds: 1) violation of Title IX (if in an educational setting); 2) breach of equal rights under the 14th amendment; and 3) violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983.14

In Israel v. West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission (1989), a high school female baseball player brought a sex discrimination case against the school commission after she was denied an opportunity to play on the boy’s baseball team. School policy was that softball and baseball were comparable sports, and therefore a girl was to play softball and not baseball with the boys. However the court ruled that softball and baseball are not equivalent sports as they use different equipment and rules. In addition the court felt that more skill was required in baseball than in softball.15

Women now play baseball worldwide. The International Baseball Federation has held a Women’s Baseball World Cup every two years since 2004. The International Baseball Federation now has a Women’s Commission that is charged with developing baseball for girls and women around the world.16 Some of the countries where baseball leagues for women exist include the following: Australia, Canada, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States. While baseball for women is growing worldwide, the sport is still struggling for legitimacy and stability.17

The purpose of the present study was to explore the preferences of female baseball players on the differences between baseball and fastpitch softball. The hypotheses in the present study were twofold: 1) Baseball players will consider fastpitch a distinct sport from baseball; and 2) Baseball players will prefer playing baseball to fastpitch. The struggle of the twenty-first century female ball player, caught between the legal right to play and the cultural fight against it, is not well documented. Examining the motivations and the perceptions of baseball players will help better understand participation patterns between baseball and fastpitch and explore at large why women play baseball when society pushes them towards fastpitch.

Method

The present study explored how the perception of baseball and fastpitch softball relates to participation amongst female baseball players. A self-administered questionnaire was the testing instrument.

Participants

Participants (N=49) were players from an international women’s baseball tournament; study participants represented players from: United States, Canada, Taiwan, Japan, and Australia. The average age of the participants (N=49) was 25.14 years (SD=7.23). Not all tournament players participated. Participants were asked to fill out the questionnaire while waiting for transportation to the tournament gala. All participants signed an informed consent with regards to procedures approved by the Institutional Review Board. Underage players had their parents sign a consent form in addition to signing the form themselves. (See page 55 for the questionnaire.) The tournament organizers approved the study.

Testing Instrument

The testing instrument is a self-administered, Likert scale-based questionnaire. The questions were designed by the author, and reviewed by several professors. The questionnaire has three main themes: (1) background information, including demographics and player information, (2) questions regarding perceptions of fastpitch softball and baseball; and (3) player preferences on the physical differences in fastpitch softball and baseball. The physical differences of fastpitch softball and baseball were derived from a list of differences between the two sports that the court determined in their ruling of the legal case Israel v. West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission. The questionnaire was available only in English. (The researcher did observe a handful of players, fewer than 10, have the questionnaire translated to them by teammates.)

Results

The average age of the participants (N=49) was 25.14 years (SD=7.23). Participants represented five countries: Australia (n=13); Canada (n=4); Japan (n=11); Taiwan (n=11); and United States (n=4). Significant difference was found on whether participants felt baseball and fastpitch were “equivalent” sports; 12 participants reported “not at all,” 13 reported “a little bit,” 19 reported “somewhat,” 3 reported “a lot,” and 2 reported “very much,” X₂(4)=2.03, p<.05. Significant difference was found on whether participants preferred baseball or fastpitch; 45 participants reported “baseball,” 1 reported “fastpitch,” and 3 reported “the same,” X₂(2)=.684, p<.05. Just over half the players had never played fastpitch (n=26). The findings support both hypotheses: 1) Baseball players did not consider fastpitch and baseball equivalent sports; and 2) Baseball players preferred baseball to fastpitch.

Participants marked what traits they preferred between baseball and softball. Players preferred the size of a baseball over a softball, X₂(1)=.230, p<.05. Players preferred overhand pitching to underhand pitching, X₂(2)=.684, p<.05. Players preferred baserunning in baseball (i.e. leadoffs) to baserunning in fastpitch, X₂(2)=.720, p<.05. Players preferred the longer distance of the pitching mound in baseball to the shorter pitching distance in fastpitch, X₂(2)=.758, p<.05. Players preferred using a baseball bat more than a softball bat, X₂(2)=3.19, p<.05. Players preferred the larger baseball field to the smaller fastpitch field, X₂(2)=.599, p<.05. The majority of the participants felt baseball and fastpitch required the same amount of skills while 20 players felt baseball was more difficult, X₂(2)=.488, p<.05.

Discussion

Baseball players participating in the present study overall preferred baseball to fastpitch and did not consider the sports to be equivalent. Players preferred the following baseball traits to softball: ball size, overhand pitching, baserunning, distance of pitching mound, bat, and field dimensions. Just over half of the participants had some fastpitch experience.

The results of the present study support the decision reached in Israel v. West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission. The Israel court ruled that softball and baseball are not equivalent sports because they use different equipment and rules. The court also claimed baseball required more skill than softball.18 A major difference between the Israel case and the context of the present study is the Israel case was about slow pitch softball not fastpitch. Softball includes a slow looping pitch while fastpitch has a quick underhand pitch. The differences between softball and fastpitch are meaningful when comparing skill level but less so when comparing the differences between softball and fastpitch to the differences between fastpitch and baseball; size of ball, field, bat, stealing, and pitching are all still different. Culturally the terms “softball” and “fastpitch” are often used interchangeably.

The present study has limitations and is best used as a primer for future research on girls and women playing baseball or fastpitch. Due to a low sample size the results cannot be generalized to the general public. The questionnaire is successful in gaining data on sport preferences but does not provide an outlet to explain why participants preferred one sport trait to another. For full representation the survey should also be given to softball players.

While women have been playing baseball for over 150 years in America, female baseball players still receive various forms of disapproval from administrators, coaches, and the law.19 Despite the challenges of playing baseball and the push to instead play softball, the majority of the participants in the present study had never played fastpitch. Future research could question what sport baseball players played if it is not fastpitch and if it was baseball, what struggles, if any, did they have trying to play the game. A qualitative analysis on motivation of softball and baseball players would provide a fuller look into the topic.

Many female baseball players play alongside the men because it is their only playing option. Ila Borders played college baseball and received verbal assaults from opponents and physical abuse from teammates. Borders had baseball shaped welts on her back from “accidental” throws that disgruntled teammates threw at her, as they stood behind her.20 Players from the current study were participating in one of the few international club tournaments for women in the world. Future research could examine how female baseball players perceive playing baseball with other women. Does the stigma of being “struck out by a girl” still exist when women compete against women or is there an emotional or physical relief to play alongside other females? Further exploration would provide greater insight into the dynamics of playing mixed-sex sports and same-sex sports.

A phenomenological examination into the experiences of girls and women playing baseball would provide greater depth to future research. The significance of researching women and girls playing baseball is that gender stereotypes hurt both males and females. Without access to all sports, girls and boys learn that they are not equal, and that discrimination is acceptable. Participants in the present study preferred baseball to fastpitch yet society tells them that fastpitch is for girls and baseball is for boys; thus baseball opportunities for girls are limited and opportunities for boys abound. The understanding of the unique relationship between males, females, and baseball will enhance knowledge of opportunities in baseball and positions in society.

In conclusion, the majority of baseball players participating in the present study preferred baseball to fastpitch. Most of the participants did not consider fastpitch and baseball to be equivalent sports. Baseball is America’s national pastime and a global game both men and women deserve the chance to participate. The significance of the present study can be simplified to one thought: If you tell a girl she can not play baseball, what else will she believe she can not do; but if you give her a chance to play baseball what else will she believe she can do?

Notes

1. Merrie A Fidler, “The establishment of softball as a sport for American women, 1900–1940,” In Howell, R. (Ed.), Her Story on Sport: A Historical Anthology of Women in Sports. West Point: Leisure Press, 1982, 527–40.

2. Ron Briley, Class at Bat, Gender on Deck and Race in the Hole. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2003.

3. Karlene Ferrante, “Baseball and the social construction of gender,” In Creedon, P. J. (Ed.), Women, Media and Sport: Challenging Gender Values, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994, 238–56.

4. Jean Ardell, “Baseball Annies, Jack Johnson, and Kenesaw Mountain Landis: How groupies influenced the lengthy ban on blacks in organized baseball,” Nine: A Journal of Baseball History & Culture, 13(2), 2005, 103–9.

5. George Gmelch & Patricia M. San Antonio, “Groupies and American baseball,” Journal of Sport & Social Issues, 22(1), 1988, 32–45.

6. J.S. Chafetz & J.A. Kotarba, “Son worshippers: The role of Little League mothers in recreating gender,” Studies in Symbolic Interaction, 18, 1995, 217–41.

7. Gmelch & San Antonio.

8. Jennifer Ring, Stolen Bases: Why American Girls Don’t Play Baseball, Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2009.

9. Michael S. Kimmel, “Baseball and the reconstitution of American masculinity, 1880–1920,” Sport, Men, and the Gender Order, Messner, M.A. and Sabo, D.F. (Eds.) Human Kinetics Publishers, Champaign, IL, 1989.

10. Ring, 383.

11. Sarah K. Fields, “Cultural identity, law, and baseball,” Culture, Sport, Society, 4(2), 2001, 23–42.

12. Ring, 2009.

13. Fields, 2001, 27.

14. Matthew J. McPhillips, “‘Girls of summer’: A comprehensive analysis of the past, present, and future of women in baseball and roadmap to litigating a successful gender discrimination case,” Seton Hall Journal of Sport Law, 6, 1996, 301–39.

15. McPhillips, 1996, 324.

16. Justine Siegal is the Chair of this Commission.

17. Ring, 2009.

18. McPhillips, 1996.

19. Ardell, 2005a; Fields, 2001; Reaves, 2001; Ring, 2009.

20. Ardell, Breaking Into Baseball.

Survey of Baseball & Fastpitch Experience

This survey is about your baseball and fastpitch softball participation.

Your answers will remain confidential. Thank you for your honest responses.

Age? _______ 

Country of origin? ___________________________ 

Years playing baseball? __________

1. Please circle your primary position: Pitcher Catcher Infield Outfield Other

2. Please circle your secondary position: Pitcher Catcher Infield Outfield Other

3. What levels of baseball have you played (Please check all that apply)?

__Youth League

__Middle School

__High School

__Women’s Club

__National Team

__Other: ____________________________

4. Do you consider baseball and fastpitch softball equivalent sports?

Not at all 

A little bit 

Somewhat 

A lot 

Very much

5. Which do you prefer to play: baseball or fastpitch softball? 

__Baseball 

__Fastpitch softball

__Like the Same Amount

6. Have you ever played on a fastpitch softball team? __Yes __No

If yes, What levels of fastpitch softball have you played (Please check all that apply)?

__Youth League

__Middle School

__High School

__Women’s Club

__National Team

__Other: ____________________________

7. Between baseball and fastpitch softball, which sport do you think requires a higher skill level to play?

__Baseball __Fastpitch softball __Neither. They require the same amount.

Baseball and fastpitch softball do have some observable differences. Please mark below, which sport differences do you PREFER?

8. Size of the ball (baseball is smaller than a softball and made of a different material)

__Baseball __Fastpitch softball __Like the Same Amount

9. Pitching (baseball is overhand and fastpitch is underhand)

__Baseball __Fastpitch softball __Like the Same Amount

10. Baserunning (baseball has leadoffs and fastpitch does not)

__Baseball __Fastpitch softball __Like the Same Amount

11. Distance of pitching mound to home plate (baseball distance is longer)

__Baseball __Fastpitch softball __Like the Same Amount

12. Bat (baseball bat is shorter and thicker then fastpitch bats)

__Baseball __Fastpitch softball __Like the Same Amount

13. Field dimensions (baseball has longer basepaths and a larger outfield then fastpitch)

__Baseball __Fastpitch softball __Like the Same Amount

Thank you for your time!

When Did Frank Baker Become “Home Run” Baker?

Steven A. King

The story of how Frank Baker, the Philadelphia Athletics star third baseman, earned the nickname of “Home Run” is well known to even casual fans of baseball. As his Hall of Fame plaque states, he “won two World Series games from [the] Giants in 1911 with home-runs thus getting name ‘Home Run’ Baker.” Baker’s two home runs would understandably gain attention. In the seven World Series beginning in 1903, there had been a combined total of nine home runs hit in 41 games and the highest total in any single series had occurred in 1909 when there were four.1 Only two players, Patsy Dougherty of Boston against Pittsburgh in 1903 and Fred Clarke for Pittsburgh against Detroit in 1909, had hit more than one home run in a twentieth-century series.2

Baker’s home runs would also be important in the outcome of the two games in which they occurred. His first home run, off Rube Marquard in the sixth inning of a 1–1 tie, supplied the two-run margin of victory in the second game of the series. His homer the next day would be even more dramatic, coming off Christy Mathewson in the ninth inning to tie the score at 1–1 in a game the Athletics went on to win 3–2 in 11 innings. Baker might have even added to his home run total in the rest of the Series if not for his being severely spiked in the arm and leg by Fred Snodgrass in the tenth inning of that game. Although Baker did stay in that game and play in the rest of the games in the Series one can only wonder if the injury might have reduced some of his power.3

Although this story of how Baker’s famous nickname came about has become a well accepted piece of baseball lore, it isn't quite accurate. In fact, Baker was tagged with his famous sobriquet even before he had hit his first regular season major league home run and at least as early as spring training of his rookie year with the Athletics.

On March 28, 1909, an article on the Athletics appeared in the Philadelphia North American describing how Connie Mack was going to split his team, then in spring training, into two squads. One, consisting primarily of rookie players called in the parlance of the time the “Yannigans” or the “Colts,” would be led by Mack on a barnstorming tour and arrive in Philadelphia just before the opening of the regular season. The second team, made up mostly of veteran players and led by team captain Harry Davis, would go to Philadelphia to begin a series of exhibition games against their National League cross-town rivals, the Phillies.

Frank Baker had already earned the nickname “Home Run” before he starred in the 1911 World Series.

Lest fans feel they would be deprived of seeing any of the Athletics' new talent, the article noted that the split “does not mean that Philadelphians will not have a chance to see at least some of his [Mack's] new men in the series. Confident in their ability to make good, Mack assigned [Heinie] Heitmuller, the big California outfielder, “Home-run” Baker, his sensational third sacker, and catcher [Jack] Lapp, who has shown ability, to the veteran combination.”4

What had earned Baker his nickname? The North American article continued, “All of these men have played impressively in the South [the Athletics had trained in New Orleans]. Baker's work has possibly been the most spectacular. On three occasions he has won close games with home runs, while his fielding inspires the belief that Mack will have the best man at the corner since the days when Lave Cross was good.”

In 1909, Fred Clarke became the second man to hit two home runs in a twentieth-century World Series.

Baker had already displayed his power during his first full season in professional baseball when he played for the Reading Pretzels of the Class B Tri-State League in 1908. According to Baseball-Reference.com, he hit six home runs—leading his team in that category while Charlie Johnson of the Johnstown Johnnies led the league with nine. One player hit eight, three hit seven, and two others besides Baker hit six that season.

Although Baker had failed to homer during his brief initial appearance with the Athletics at the end of the 1908 season, he quickly displayed his power in spring training, hitting a home run in the Athletics’ first practice session in New Orleans on March 11. Heitmuller matched his feat that day but from then on no one on the team, with one exception, came close to Baker with regard to power.

Demonstrating that his practice achievement was no fluke, Baker homered in the Athletics’ first exhibition game on March 17 versus New Orleans of the Southern League. He would do it again on March 23 and March 25 against Mobile. Three home runs during so few games would be an impressive display for any rookie even now but was especially extraordinary in the deadball era. That it wasn't simply a case of major leaguers taking advantage of minor league pitchers is demonstrated by the fact that through March 28 when Baker was given his nickname, no other Athletics player hit a home run during either of the five exhibition games the team played against minor league teams or the four intrasquad games of regulars versus the “Yannigans” and the one played by former collegians on the team versus those who lacked higher education. For the rest of spring training, only one other member of the Athletics regulars team would hit a home run; on April 4 Topsy Hartsel did so against Newark.

The only other Athletics player besides Baker who demonstrated home run hitting ability was a member of the Yannigan team, a promising young outfielder who would far exceed Baker's talents as an all around hitter and, while never winning a home run title, become one of the top sluggers in the American League: Joe Jackson. In a game against Louisville on March 29, Jackson hit the ball over the right field fence which also scored a man who would prove to be the second greatest hitter then on the Yannigans, Eddie Collins. The ball Jackson hit was reported to be one of the longest ever recorded in Louisville history, sailing over the right field fence and striking the roof of a street car before landing on a house.5

Baker had no problem staying with the Athletics but his chance to prove that he deserved his recently given nickname was delayed at the beginning of the season. He suffered a knee sprain resulting from a collision at third base with Sherry Magee of the Phillies in an exhibition game on April 7, forcing him to miss the Athletics first five games before making his debut on April 21. However, he quickly made up for lost time, hitting a grand slam in Boston on April 24, the Athletics’ first home run of the season, accounting for all the team’s runs in their victory.6

The next month, Baker would do something even more impressive that would solidify his reputation as a slugger. It had been predicted that due to the vast dimensions of the new Shibe Park it was “improbable that any batsman, even a stalwart hitter like [Ty] Cobb, [Sam] Crawford or [Harry] Davis will be able to drive the ball over the fence.”7 Baker would quickly give lie to this prediction when, on May 29, he hit a ball over the right field wall, the first regular season home run in the history of the park.8 The ball, which traveled an estimated 350 feet before landing on the porch of a house on 20th Street just beyond the right field wall, was described by Connie Mack as the longest and hardest he had ever seen hit.9 For good measure, Baker repeated his feat of hitting a ball out of Shibe Park once again that season on August 9.10

Baker would hit only two more home runs the rest of the season but his total of four was still good enough for sixth place in the American League.11 This tied Harry Davis for second place on the Athletics behind Danny Murphy's five. Baker's homer output would fall off the next season to only two before rebounding in 1911 to begin a streak of four straight years when he would lead the league in homers, the second man to accomplish this after Davis.12

And, of course, he did hit those two famous home runs in the 1911 World Series.

Patsy Dougherty hit two home runs for victorious Boston in the World Series in 1903.

Notes

1. In comparison, in the seven World Series from 2006 to 2012, there were 76 home runs hit in 36 games.

2. No player would hit more than two home runs in a single World Series until Babe Ruth did it for the Yankees in 1923 against the Giants.

3. Baker would homer again against Marquard in the first game of the 1913 series, his only other World Series home run in the six series in which he played.

4. Unlike Baker, Heitmuller and Lapp would never make a significant impact. Heitmuller would play a total of 95 games for the Athletics in 1909 and 1910 before falling back into the minor leagues and dying at the age of 29 in 1912. Lapp would be back in the minors for part of 1909 before finally sticking with the Athletics for six seasons and the White Sox for one as a back-up catcher. Mack did take with him one player who, having played the full 1908 season with the Athletics, was somewhat out of place with the Yannigans, Eddie Collins. Although Collins’ ability as a major leaguer hitter was already apparent, Mack was unsure if his fielding was at a level for him to be the Athletics regular second baseman and wanted the opportunity to observe him more closely. In contrast, Mack was already certain that Baker would be his third baseman.

5. Philadelphia Inquirer, March 30, 1909; Charlotte Observer, April 1, 1909.

6. According to his biographer, this first home run of his major league career was the only grand slam Baker would ever hit in the majors. Barry Sparks, Frank “Home Run” Baker (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2006), 27.

7. Philadelphia North American, February 22, 1909.

8. David W. Vincent, Home Runs in the Old Ballparks (SABR, Cleveland, 1995), 37.

9. Philadelphia North American, May 30, 1909. Curiously, Connie Mack in a 1946 interview would similarly describe the home run hit by Joe Jackson in Louisville for the Yannigan team as “the longest hit I ever saw in my life.”Jackson's hit may have grown in Mack's memory as he recalled it as going over the center field fence instead of the right field fence as reported in contemporary accounts. The New York Times, March 11, 1946.

10. Philadelphia North American, August 10, 1909.

11. Ty Cobb would win the American League home run title in 1909, the only time in his career he would do so. Baker did lead the American League with 19 triples, an impressive five more than the second place finishers, Cobb’s Detroit teammate Sam Crawford and Baker’s teammate Danny Murphy who had been moved to the outfield after losing out to Eddie Collins in the competition to be the Athletics second baseman.

12. Since Baker did it, only Babe Ruth and Ralph Kiner have joined him and Davis in leading their leagues in home runs for four or more straight years. Baker would miss his chance to extend his streak to five straight seasons when he sat out the 1915 season due to a salary dispute with Connie Mack. He did come back to finish second in the league in 1916 after he’d been traded to the Yankees.

The Way the Game Is Supposed to Be Played

George Kell, Ted Williams, and the battle for the 1949 batting title

Mark Randall

It was the last game of the 1949 baseball season and George Kell was locked in a close race for the AL batting title. The Detroit Tigers were playing the Cleveland Indians in a game that meant little to either team since neither was destined for the World Series. Ted Williams, who had sat atop the league’s hitters for most of the season, had been held hitless earlier in the day by Vic Raschi, while his arch-rivals the Yankees clinched the American League pennant. The “Splendid Splinter” had started the month of September with a 12-point lead and seemed certain to win his fifth batting championship.1 Kell, who had been hampered by injuries in September and was down seven points in late September, had been on a hitting tear that brought him within three points of Williams on the season’s final day. Word filtered down from the press box to the Detroit dugout that Kell was now ahead of Williams in the race. If his lead held he would be the first third sacker ever to win the American League batting championship. (Debs Garms led the NL in hitting in 1940 with a .355 average but split time at third and the outfield.)

The slick-fielding third baseman knew in the eighth inning that he was leading Williams by a threadlike margin. He had already banged out two hits on the day against the tough Bob Lemon, a double his first time up and a line-drive single to left on his second trip to the plate. Lemon walked Kell to lead off the sixth, coughed up three runs, and was replaced by the Indians' other fireballer, Bob Feller. Kell flied out to left in the seventh against Feller. With the score tied 4–4, there was a chance that Kell would bat again. He didn’t want to, but he also didn’t want to come out of the game and win the batting crown by sitting on a stool in the clubhouse.2 Another hit would secure his edge over Williams. A base-on-balls would leave things unchanged. If Feller retired him, then Kell would drop behind Williams.3 When the home half of the ninth inning opened, the Tigers were leading 8–4, and three batters were ahead of Kell. Johnny Lipon, batting for Neil Berry, grounded out. Dick Wakefield, batting for Hal White, smashed a single to first off Mickey Vernon’s glove. Next to bat was Eddie Lake. Lake ended up hitting a two-hopper to Ray Boone at short, for a game-ending double play. An elated Kell threw the three bats he was holding in his hand “as high into the air as I could.”4 He had won the batting title by a couple of decimal points. It was one of the closest batting races in baseball history. The Tigers star had thwarted a bid by Williams for his fifth batting crown by two ten-thousandths of a point—.34291 to .34276. If Williams had managed one more hit or one fewer at-bat, he would have his third Triple Crown—a feat never achieved in the game.5

George Kell was already one of the American League’s best players when the 1949 season began, a rare accomplishment in an era when the men who played his position were known primarily for their glovework.6 Establishing himself as a star, though, did not come easily. The sandy-haired third baseman from Swifton, Arkansas, got his start in baseball in 1940 with Newport, a Class D team affiliated with the Brooklyn Dodgers, only eighteen miles from Kell’s hometown. When the team found itself in need of a shortstop late in the season, the local postmaster in Swifton, who attended almost all of Newport’s games, talked the general manager into giving Kell a try. Kell had demonstrated his skills locally in American Legion ball, but found playing in the minors harder than he expected. He batted a mere .160 in 48 games and wasn’t much better in the field. He was invited back to Newport the next year and led the league with 143 hits. His .310 average was third in the league and he was the top fielder at his position.7 At the end of 1941, Newport sold his contract to Durham, a Class B club in the Dodgers organization. The team had plenty of third basemen, so when the manager asked if anyone could play short, Kell volunteered. Kell recalled in his autobiography that he got half a dozen hits, but committed the same number of errors. Brooklyn general manager Larry MacPhail saw Kell play and demanded the club get rid of him, saying, “He’ll never be a ballplayer.”8

Kell was heartbroken when he was released and came within a “rabbit’s hair” of quitting baseball.9 But he caught a break with Lancaster, which needed a second baseman. Kell found manager Tom Oliver and talked his way on to the team. He batted .299 for Lancaster and was voted the team’s most valuable player. Kell returned for the 1943 season and opened the eyes of Connie Mack by hitting a phenomenal .396 in 138 games for Lancaster, which was the highest average in all of baseball. His 220 hits were also tops in the league and Kell was again voted MVP. Lancaster had an agreement with Mack and the Athletics, giving the A's their pick of any three players, and an eager Mack made a special trip to scout him. Kell recalled: “He had watched us play a double-header. And in the clubhouse afterwards he came over to me and asked, ‘Young man, how would you like to come to Philadelphia?’ That’s all there was to it.”10

The A’s brought Kell up at the end of the 1943 season to play one game at third base. He hit a triple his first at-bat on September 28, 1943, to drive in a run. “I tried to act very calmly, like it was just another time at-bat for me,” Kell wrote in his autobiography, Hello Everybody, I’m George Kell. “But I was dying to pinch myself to make sure this was really happening.”11

Kell became the team’s regular third baseman in 1944, batting a respectable .268 in 139 games, and helped the Athletics post their second-best record in ten years with a fifth-place showing and a 72–82 win-loss record. Mack exercised patience while the rookie worked out his rough spots. Kell improved on those numbers in 1945, batting .272 and more than doubled his output of extra base hits including 30 doubles and four home runs. Kell also established himself as the league’s top defensive third baseman, leading the league in assists, putouts, and fielding average, and along with Dick Siebert at first and Ed Busch at shortstop gave the Athletics a solid and consistent infield.12

Although the same infield performed admirably in 1945, the Athletics fell to 52–98. Kell banged out 154 hits and had 56 runs batted in. But with the war over, Mack knew that veterans would be returning to their former teams. His war-years players would be unknown quantities against returning pitchers like Bob Feller.13 (Kell was rejected for military service because of bad knees.) Kell worked hard in 1946 to prove he could play at the All-Star level, but in early 1946 Mack made a move. Kell was batting .299 when he unexpectedly found himself traded to the Detroit Tigers. The A’s were in desperate need of an outfielder who could hit, while the Tigers were looking to replace their aging third baseman, Pinky Higgins, who had not played in 1945 and was 37, older than they would have liked. Third base was a weak spot for the Tigers, who had no promising recruit coming up.14 Kell led the American League third basemen in fielding that season. Several American League clubs were interested in trading for Kell. Tigers Manager Steve O’Neill had tried to make a deal to acquire Kell the year before, but Connie Mack had refused every offer. This time, O’Neill offered Mack his choice of eight players. Mack chose Barney McCosky, a proven veteran and solid hitter. It was a straight trade with no cash involved.

Kell had just finished breakfast in the Book-Cadillac Hotel in Detroit where the A’s were staying when Mack got on the elevator with him and told him that he had been traded to the Tigers. Kell was shocked and didn’t want to go. He was playing every day. He hustled. And Mack seemed to like him. He felt like an orphan, like nobody in the world wanted him to play baseball for them. “It was such a shock and felt like a rejection,” Kell recalled. “But Mr. Mack told me, ‘George, you’re going to be a good ballplayer, and I’m sending you to a team that will pay you the kind of money that I can’t.’ As it turns out, it was the greatest day in my life.”15

George Kell went to the Detroit Tigers in 1946 for fan favorite Barney McCosky in a surprise trade, but later thrived with his new team

Kell figured the Tigers must have wanted him to trade away an established star like McCosky. The 29-year-old McCosky was a fan favorite who had helped the Tigers win the pennant in 1940. From 1939 through 1942, McCosky had hit .311, .340, .324, and .293. He joined the Navy in 1943 and rejoined the Tigers in 1946, but at the time of the trade was in a bad batting slump, batting only .198, and had been benched recently with a leg ailment that had bothered him for weeks.16 Kell was batting right around .300 and in 16 times at the plate against Detroit pitching had hit safely seven times (.438).17 Weeks before the trade while the Tigers were playing in Philadelphia, O’Neill told sportswriters that “Kell is the best third baseman in the majors.”18

Kell led American League third basemen in fielding average in 1946, 1950, and 1951.

Fans at the time were left wondering if the Tigers knew what they were doing by trading one of their favorite players for a third baseman they had never heard of. “I felt like Cinderella being traded for the Queen of the Ball,” Kell wrote in his autobiography.19 H.G. Salsinger, a sports writer for The Detroit News, urged the fans to relax. “Kell, at the age of 23, faces a future that should establish him as one of the game’s best third basemen,” Salsinger wrote in his column. “He is fast, quick, alert, aggressive. He has an excellent throwing arm. He is intelligent. In a day when good shortstops are plentiful and good third basemen a rarity, Kell stands out. He may stand out even more with added experience.”20 And the way he figured it, the Tigers picked up Kell just in time. According to his sources, the Red Sox had been on the verge of getting Kell before the Tigers completed the deal. Boston had offered Mack his choice of any outfielder with the exception of Ted Williams.21

Kell didn’t let the talk affect his play. In his first appearance with his new team, he got a hit in both games of a doubleheader against Boston and contributed at least two spectacular fielding plays. After the initial nervousness wore off, Kell came to love playing in Detroit and hit .327 the rest of the year as a Tiger. “It was an excellent place to play ball,” Kell wrote. “And the city was a beautiful place in which to live. There wasn’t a day I didn’t enjoy playing in Detroit.”22 The fans, too, soon warmed to Kell and it was the beginning of a great romance. By August, Kell found his groove and made Detroit fans forget McCosky. It didn’t hurt that there were a lot of fans in the stands from Arkansas—including what seemed to Kell like half the population of Jackson County, where Swifton was located—who had come to work in the automobile factories following the great migration from the South after the war. He finished the year with a .322 average and would go on to hit over .300 in each of the next five seasons as a Tiger. Kell was also an All-Star in every one of those seasons and led American League third basemen in fielding average in 1946, 1950, and 1951.

The trade to the Tigers had been the best thing to happen to his career. “Every time I would see Mr. Mack after that I would thank him for what he had done for my career. Mr. Mack had done me a favor,” Kell recalled.23 The Tigers had found the man they so desperately needed to shore up the hot corner. Tigers center fielder Doc Cramer once pointed to Kell and told a reporter who was looking for a story, “Nobody seems to know it, but he’s the best third baseman in the American League. Look up his record.” Coach Frank Shellenback, who overheard the conversation, agreed. “You’re right about that, Doc,” Shellenback added. “I’ll tell you one thing about Kell; he has a great pair of hands and a fine arm. Why, I have yet to see him make a real bad throw across the diamond, either to first base or second. And he’s getting to be a real good hitter too.”24

In 1947, Kell hit .320 with 93 RBIs, which he said “was pretty good for a second place hitter.” Despite being a .300 hitter, Kell developed a reputation as a “bad ball” hitter. He sprayed hits all over the field and, according to writers Mark Stewart and Mike Kennedy, “changed his stance and swing depending on the pitcher and situation. He inside-outed pitches to the opposite field, but could also turn on inside deliveries and pull them down the left-field line” and was a good drag bunter.25 “I don’t have a particular pitch I like,” Kell said in a 1950 profile. “I just go up to the plate and the first good one I see I swing at it. It doesn’t have to be in the strike zone to hit.”26 Tigers manager Red Rolfe said Kell was all brains at the plate. He studied pitchers’ tendencies, often outguessing them and setting them up to throw the pitch he was looking for. “He hits all kinds of pitching—fast or slow,” Rolfe said. “He’s the steady kind that managers like.”27 Four-time batting champ Harry Heilmann praised his hitting style, saying, “instead of swinging blindly at the ball, [Kell] is always looking for weak spots in the defense and punching a hit through them.”28

Kell entered the 1949 season with something to prove, after 1948 had turned out to be what he considered the worst season of his career. While he kept his string of .300 alive with a .304 mark, Kell was limited to only 92 games that year because of two major injuries—both suffered at the hands of the New York Yankees. Kell broke his wrist in early May on a fastball by Vic Raschi and was out of the line-up for nearly four weeks. Then, any hope of salvaging the season ended in late August when a grounder from Joe DiMaggio took a high bounce and struck Kell in the face, breaking his jaw. Kell instinctively scrambled for the ball and forced the runner at third then passed out. “I had to prove I could bounce back from a few bad breaks and still be the same player I had worked so hard to become,” Kell wrote in his autobiography.29

Although already an established major league hitter, Kell picked up “one of the greatest batting tips I ever learned in my life” while on his way to spring training in 1949. In March Kell and his wife and kids spent the night at the Tuscaloosa Hotel in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. In those days, players drove down to Florida for spring training. Tuscaloosa was the halfway point to Lakeland from Kell’s home in Swifton and he liked to stop there for a night before finishing the journey to camp. Also staying at the hotel was Boston Braves star pitcher Johnny Sain, who was from Walnut Ridge, Arkansas, not too far from Swifton. Kell had told Sain about the hotel and he began to stop there as well. After spending the night, Kell decided to run downstairs for a quick cup of coffee and some toast before hitting the road. When he got to the coffee shop, Sain was sitting at a table with St. Louis Cardinals’ stars Red Schoendienst and Stan Musial, who were on their way to the Cardinals camp in St. Petersburg. Kell was delighted when they motioned him over to join them.30 After some small talk about what they did over the winter and what they hoped to accomplish during the season, Musial began talking about hitting. He told Kell that he went into spring training every year knowing that he was going to hit somewhere between .320 and .340 for the season. Musial was at a point in his career where his confidence in himself would not let him fall short of his goals. Kell went back up to his room thinking that Musial’s advice “was the most amazing thing about hitting that I had ever heard in my life. He was talking about confidence. A player simply cannot become a good hitter without it.”31 Kell made up his mind that from them on that he would hit somewhere between .310 and .325 every year. While he realized he would never be a great hitter like Musial, Williams, or Joe DiMaggio, Kell figured that if he concentrated hard enough he knew he could post solid numbers at the plate and make the All-Star team every year. It wasn’t until after the season was over and he realized that he had won the batting championship that he fully appreciated what Musial had said.

In 1949, Ted Williams was having one of the most dominant offensive seasons in baseball history. Williams had already won four batting titles, including the last two, and Kell had said all along that Williams would be the man to beat for the batting crown. Kell was fairly consistent through the 1949 season, but never gave much thought to winning the batting title because Williams always looked like he was on the verge of piling up ten hits in his next 15 at-bats to make a joke out of the batting race. It wasn’t until the All-Star break that anybody mentioned Kell’s name in the same breath as the batting title. Kell hit .348 in April, .330 in May, and .392 for the month of June and his overall batting average hovered in the low .350s. Williams, by comparison, hit .306 in April, .343 in May, and .304 in June and was batting around .320.

With a .341 average and a league-high 63 hits in 185 times at the plate, Kell took over the AL batting lead from Gus Zernial after the hard-charging Chicago rookie was sidelined by an injury. Zernial was hitting .355 in 138 times at bat when he injured his right shoulder in a game in Cleveland on May 28 while diving to catch a sinking line drive hit by Thurman Tucker. He landed on his shoulder and cracked a bone in five places. Williams was batting .317 and leading the league with 14 home runs and 48 runs batted in. Kell would also lose time to an injury when he broke his right foot on June 21 in a 7–1 loss to the Red Sox in Boston, and wouldn’t return to the Tigers lineup until July 2. Kell was batting .353 to Williams’s .315 at the time of the injury. Williams garnered 88 hits in July and August, hitting a torrid .387 and .405. and took over the batting lead from Bob Dillinger on August 2 with a .348 average. By the end of August, Kell trailed Williams .344 to .356. Williams cooled off though in September, hitting only .279 for the month. From September 1 to September 13, Kell had 12 hits, but missed the next seven games as a result of a broken thumb. “In the last couple of weeks of the season, I got hot and piled up a carload of hits to make the race tight,” Kell recalled.32

On September 18, Williams smacked two home runs and drove in six—and held a ten-point lead over Kell with ten games left in the season. Kell returned on September 23 and went 2-for-3 to raise his average to .342. That same weekend against the Yankees in Fenway Park, Williams belted two home runs and remained ahead of Kell at .349 as Boston and New York battled for the pennant. Kell’s Tigers had four days off leading up to the final weekend of the season while Williams and the Red Sox played three games in Washington and two games in New York. Williams went 1-for-10 in Washington and 1-for-3 in the first game in New York to drop his average to .346. Kell then went 1-for-5 in the next two games against Cleveland, while Williams went 1-for-6 with one game to play. Going into the final day of the season, Kell trailed Williams .341 to .344.

The pennant would be decided by the final game of the season. At Yankee Stadium, Williams walked twice and was held hitless in two official at-bats that day by 20-game winner Vic Raschi, as the Yankees beat the Red Sox 5–3 to capture the pennant. The Tigers, meanwhile, were playing Cleveland where Indians starter Bob Lemon squared off against Detroit’s Virgil Trucks. Kell recalled in his autobiography that he got a call that Sunday from his wife, Charlene, who was already back at their Swifton home, with some words of encouragement. “You’re going to lead the league in hitting,” she said. “I know you can.” Kell told teammate Hoot Evers what his wife had said. “She’s right,” Evers replied.33 Evers told Kell that if he got two hits that day that he would win the title. Kell, however, was skeptical that he could beat out Williams. He figured that Williams would likely get a couple of hits on the day. “I remember answering that Williams would probably get it,” Kell recalled.34 Getting two hits off Bob Lemon wouldn’t be easy. Evers told Kell to go out there and get them his first times up. In his first at-bat, Kell rifled a double to center. His next time up, Kell lined a single to left.

Cleveland held a 4–0 lead in the sixth, but the real drama was focused on Kell. Lemon walked Kell, then gave up three runs before being relieved by Feller. Cleveland was trying to finish in third place which was worth another $1,200 to $1,500 per player. Feller was the last guy Kell wanted to see. “I always felt that Bob Feller was the toughest pitcher I ever faced. Lemon was a close second. Together, they were a one-two knockout punch that floored almost every American League hitter,” Kell recalled. Facing Feller was “always as much fun as getting a tooth pulled without any pain killer.”35 Kell flied out to left against Feller in the seventh, but there was still a possibility that he would have to face Feller again. Kell was scheduled to bat fourth in the ninth inning. Lynn Smith, a baseball writer for the Detroit Free Press, had called New York and found out that Ted Williams had gone hitless against the Yankees. He called down to the dugout to let manager Red Rolfe know that Kell was ahead of Williams in the batting race and that if he didn’t bat again, he would win the batting title. Lipon grounded out to third and was followed by Wakefield, who singled to bring up Eddie Lake. As Lake settled into the batter’s box, Kell heard catcher Joe Ginsberg yelling to him from the dugout. Rolfe wanted to put Ginsberg in to bat for Kell to make sure he would win the batting title, and was trying to let him know that he was going to hit for him. Kell had no idea what Williams had done on the day, but remembered that Williams had not sat out the last day of the 1941 season when he was hitting at .400, and insisted on batting. In 1941 Williams had a .399955 batting average which would have been rounded up to .400 if he had chosen to sit out a season-ending doubleheader. Williams ended up banging out six hits in the two games.

Kell trailed Williams by three points in the batting race—.341 to .344—going into the last game of the season.

Kell was sitting on a 2-for-3 day. He decided he was going to win it or lose it right there. “I said, ‘I’m not going to sit on a stool and win the batting title,’” Kell recalled. “I didn’t want to bat again. I felt I had to. I wasn’t about to back into a batting title against him.”36 With Kell kneeling in the on-deck circle, Eddie Lake hit the first pitch up the middle to shortstop Ray Boone, grounding into a double play and ending the game. Kell celebrated by throwing his bats in the air. The batting title was his, with honor. “I don’t think I could have faced Williams or anybody else walking into the clubhouse and saying, ‘No, I’m not going to hit,’” Kell remembered.37 Feller told Kell at the 2005 Baseball Hall of Fame ceremony in Cooperstown, New York, that he was aware that Kell was on the cusp of winning the batting crown. “I knew what was going on,” Feller said. “I would have walked you or hit you.”38

The race was so close that in order to decide who won the batting title it was necessary to figure their averages down to the ten-thousandths of a point. Baseball had seen close batting titles before. In 1945, Snuffy Stirnweiss of the New York Yankees beat Tony Cuccinello of the White Sox by .00009. The 1949 title marked the third time that a batting championship ended in a virtual tie. The other one was in 1931 when three players, Chick Hafey (.3489), Bill Terry (.3486), and Jim Bottomley (.3482) finished less than a point apart in the National League. Kell was declared the winner by virtue of outhitting Williams .3429 to .3428 and was the first third baseman to win the batting crown since Heinie Zimmerman in the NL in 1912.

Kell joined his one-time batting rival Williams in Boston when he was traded to the Red Sox in 1952.

Kell not only edged out Williams, but his 13 strikeouts that year was the lowest total for a batting champion since Willie Keeler in 1898, who had struck out only four times. Kell was also second in the AL in doubles (38), fourth in triples (9), and ranked in the top ten in twelve other categories, including on-base percentage and slugging, and came in eighth in MVP voting. Kell had achieved something he had dreamed about for seven years. It was also the twentieth time that a Tigers player had led the league in hitting. Ty Cobb won 11 titles between 1907 and 1919. Harry Heilmann won it four times in the 1920s. Sam Dungan (1899 Class A Western League), Heinie Manush (1926) and Charlie Gehringer (1937) each won a single batting title.

“I’ve had my eye on that title ever since I broke into the majors,” Kell said, when notified he had officially been certified as the American League batting champion for 1949. “And I don’t think anything could make me happier.”39 Kell reflected in his autobiography: “I can’t express how I felt when the news finally sunk in. Winning the American League batting title is one thing. Beating out Ted Williams to do it made it even more special.”40 He now felt that he had earned his place among the league’s best. Actually, the league’s top hitter might have been neither Kell nor Williams, but Joe DiMaggio. The “Yankee Clipper” finished with a .346 average but illness and injuries limited his play to 76 games and only 272 times at bat, far shy of the 400 at-bats then required to be eligible for the batting title.

For Williams, losing the batting title and Triple Crown was a disappointment. However, while he missed winning his fifth title by less than a point, the slugger still led the league with 43 home runs and tied for the lead in RBIs with 159. Williams also led the league in on-base percentage (.490), slugging (.650), plate appearances (730), runs scored (150), total bases (368), doubles (39), and walks (162). He was also voted the American League’s Most Valuable Player. The following season Williams walked across the field when the Tigers and Red Sox met for the first time and shook Kell’s hand. “You won the batting title,” Williams said. “So I’m coming to your dugout.”41

Kell set out next season to prove that 1949 was no fluke. “One thing I really want to do is lead the league again in hitting,” Kell said. “So many people criticized me and called me a cheese champion last year. I want to prove I can do it again.”42 He would go on to have an even better season at the plate in 1950, almost winning a second batting title, finishing second to Billy Goodman of the Boston Red Sox. Goodman was a part-time player who filled in for Williams when he ran into the left-field fence and broke his elbow in the All-Star game. Goodman proceeded to belt the ball at a good clip.43 The 24-year-old Goodman finished with a .354 average and 150 hits in 424 at bats in 110 games. Kell batted .340, but led the league with 218 hits and 56 doubles and a career high 114 runs and 101 RBIs. In a 1950 profile, sportswriter Ted Smits commented that Kell had gone from being a “brilliant fielder, but no great shakes as a major league hitter,” to a player who “all he does is field flawlessly and hit any kind of pitch.”44 Manager Red Rolfe added, “He came up the hard way. A lot of supposedly good judges of talent thought he would never make the grade. But Kell has proved that major league baseball takes just average ability plus a lot of determination and ambition.”45

Although Kell would go on to hit .319 in 1951 and again lead the league in hits (191) and doubles (36), he was surprised when he found himself traded to the Red Sox in 1952 in one of baseball’s biggest post-war trades. The deal was a whopper—baseball’s first million-dollar swap.46 The Tigers shipped Kell and outfielder Hoot Evers, along with regular shortstop Johnny Lipon, and relief pitcher Dizzy Trout, to Boston for slugging first baseman Walt Dropo, outfielder Don Lenhardt, infielder Johnny Pesky, Bill Wight, and Fred Hatfield. The biggest surprise was Kell’s departure. Tigers General Manager Charlie Gehringer didn’t want to trade Kell, but Boston insisted he be part of any deal. “There is no way we wanted to move you,” Gehringer told Kell. “But every time we got close to a trade [Boston General Manager Joe] Cronin said there’s no deal if Kell isn’t a part of it.”47 The Tigers were in last place and headed nowhere. Gehringer wanted to do something to shake up the club. “He hadn’t been helping us enough while we were in the cellar, so we gave him up to get some long ball punch in Dropo and Lenhardt,” Gehringer explained to the press. Detroit had offered the star third baseman to Boston in 1951 in exchange for Ted Williams, but the Red Sox turned the deal down.48

Kell was just as shocked by the news as the rest of the baseball world. He loved playing in Detroit and the trade had left him more confused than the one that had sent him there six years earlier. “I wasn’t angry,” Kell wrote in his autobiography. “By this time I realized that anything was possible in baseball. I just couldn’t figure out why it happened. I was in the line-up every day. I hit .300 and made the All-Star team every year. What does a player have to do to make himself secure in this city?”49

But if he had to be traded, he was glad it was to Boston. Boston was in the thick of a pennant race. In his nine years in the majors, Kell had never played on a pennant winner and he was going to make the most of it. He characterized the swap as a “record climb,” telling reporters, “I jumped from a last place club to one in first place. In a single day I made a gain of 10¹⁄2 games in the standings. That’s hard to beat.”50 While he never wanted to leave Detroit, he was getting the Green Monster, Ted Williams, and all the charms of New England. “I sure didn’t want to leave Detroit,” Kell said. “But the only thing that made it better was going to Boston because that’s the other great baseball town in the American League.”51

The ex-Tigers made an immediate impact, helping to lead Boston to a 13–11 victory over Cleveland. Kell and Evers each hit home runs and drove in three runs apiece. Kell reached base 18 times in his first 30 plate appearances with the Red Sox, and finished the year with a .311 batting average.

Kell had hoped to finish his career in Detroit, but at least the trade to Boston gave him the chance to play alongside Ted Williams, the best hitter he had ever seen. “There was nothing Ted Williams could not do with a bat,” Kell wrote in his autobiography. “He had the most beautiful swing that God ever gave one man. Every time he went to the plate he put on a clinic for hitting. He was always thinking hitting. He knew exactly what a pitcher was going to throw in every situation. He was never intimidated. He was the intimidator.”52

Kell was a little concerned that Williams might be upset with him for costing him the Triple Crown in 1949, but Williams welcomed him. “You’re going to love this park,” Williams said. “It’s a great place to play and you should have been here all the time.”53 Kell said in 2005, “we were primarily a young ball club and he was an elder and I was past 30, so we hit it off real good.”54 Williams was a tough man on the outside, but according to Kell, was a gentleman and “was always quick to give credit to players. If he was your friend, he was behind you all the way.”55 In fact, Williams admired Kell. When asked in 1951 who he thought the most dangerous batter was as a rival for the batting title and as a threat to pitchers, Williams, without a pause answered: “Kell, of course. He just goes along hitting steadily all the time. Take a look at his averages. There may be players getting more publicity for their hitting, like Gus Zernial, but Kell always is up there right near the top, and he’ll stay there. He’s a good hitter for he moves around in the box, pulling and punching the ball.”56

At the National Baseball Hall of Fame ceremony in 1997, Williams joked with Kell about their batting race 48 years earlier. “Here’s the man who beat me out of the Triple Crown in 1949,” Williams said to their fellow Hall of Famers.57 Kell told Williams that for a long time he didn’t realize that he had cost Williams the Triple Crown. Williams reassured him that, far from being upset, he admired the way Kell battled with him the whole season. “Hell no,” Williams said. “You beat me fair and square, the way you’re supposed to. It was a great race. I loved it. That’s the way the game is supposed to be played. I’m glad I got a chance to play with you.”58

Notes

1. Salsinger, H. G. “First A.L. Batting King at Third Base.” Detroit News, December 23, 1949.

2. Hammer, David. “Cooperstown Brings Back Memories For Hall of Famer Kell.” Associated Press, August 3, 2005.

3. Greene, Sam. “Kell King By .0002.” Detroit News, October 3, 1949.

4. Gagne, Tom. “Quick Question & Answer with Hall of Famer George Kell,” Baseball Digest, September 2001, 54.

5. Friend, Harold. “If Ted Williams Had Only Gotten One More Hit.” Bleacher Report. June 2, 2010. http://bleacherreport.com/articles/400159-if-ted-williams-had-only-gotten-one-more-hit.

6. “George Kell: Man with a Plan.”www.jockbio.com/Classic/Kell/ Kell_bio.html.

7. Jockbio.com.

8. Ibid.

9. Kell, 22.

10. Rumill, Ed. “AL Best 3rd Baseman? K-E-Double L. And Here’s Y.” Baseball Digest, October 6, 1946, 48.

11. Kell, George, and Dan Ewald. Hello Everybody, I’m George Kell. Champaign, IL: Sports Pub., 1998. 42.

12. Smith, Dale. “George Kell: A Tiger in A’s Clothing.” Philadelphia Athletics Historical Society. July 10, 2004. http://philadelphiaathletics.org/george-kell-a-tiger-in-as-clothing/.

13. Ibid.

14. Salsinger, H. G. “Makes Debut Today.” Detroit News, May 19, 1946.

15. Dow, Bill. “Hall of Famer George Kell a Fan Favorite in Detroit.” Baseball Digest, July 2006, 65.

16. “A’s Swap Kell for McCosky.” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 19, 1946.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Kell, 43.

20. Salsinger, H. G. “With Youthful Kell at Third, There’s No Room for Pinky.” Detroit News, May 20, 1946.

21. Kell, 46.

22. Ibid., 50.

23. Ibid., 47.

24. Rumill, 46.

25. Jockbio.com.

26. Smits, Ted. “Heilmann calls Kell ‘Quarterback’ at the Plate.” Associated Press, September 12, 1950.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Kell, 55.

30. Ibid., 68.

31. Ibid., 68.

32. Ibid., 69.

33. Ibid., 70.

34. Gagne, 54.

35. Kell, 70.

36. Hammer, David. “Cooperstown Brings Back Memories For Hall of Famer Kell.” Associated Press, August 3, 2005.

37. King, Harry. “Kell Back Home After Fire, Remembering Hall of Fame Career.” Associated Press, June 3, 2002.

38. Ibid.

39. “Kell Batting Champ of American League.” Associated Press, December 23, 1949.

40. Kell, 72.

41. Jockbio.com,

42. Smits, Ted. “Shot at Series Kell’s Big Goal.” Associated Press, September 14, 1950.

43. Associated Press. “Kell-Hatton Trade Puts Goodman In Infield Lineup.” June 4, 1952

44. Smits, Ted. “George Kell determined to be a ballplayer.” Associated Press, September 11, 1950.

45. Smits, Ted. September 14.

46. “May Go down as Baseball’s First Million Dollar Deal.” Associated Press, June 4, 1952.

47. Kell, 76.

48. “Sox Reject Kell Trade For Ted.” Associated Press, October 10, 1951.

49. Kell, 76.

50. Devine, Tommy. “Switch to Red Sox Delights Kell: ‘I Expect to Hit Plenty Off It’” Boston Globe, June 4, 1952.

51. Dow, Bill. “Hall of Famer George Kell A Fan Favorite in Detroit.” Baseball Digest, July 2006, 65.

52. Kell, 79.

53. Ibid., 80.

54. Baseball History Podcast. http://baseballhistorypodcast.com/2011/11/29/baseball-hp-1147-george-kell/.

55. Kell, 80.

56. “Ted Williams Believes Kell Is Most Feared Batsman.” Associated Press, May 28, 1951.

57. Kell, 80.

58. Ibid., 80.

The Mystery of Jack Smith’s Runs

Dr. John D. Eigenauer

One would guess that several factors influence a player’s ability to score runs, including speed, his position in the lineup, the batting ability of other players in his lineup, and his own power. Players who combine these factors could be expected to score a high percentage of the times that they reach base. Rare players like Eric Davis, who had extraordinary speed, great power, and hit third in a lineup that produced a decent number of runs would be expected to score a high percent of the times they reached base. For example, in 1987 Davis scored 120 runs on only 139 hits and 84 walks. His 37 home runs gave him some easy runs, his 50 stolen bases (and only six times caught stealing) put him in scoring position often, and his great speed would have allowed him to advance extra bases on hits and reach base when others might ground into double plays.

While there have not been many players in history like Davis, a few come to mind: Mickey Mantle, Barry Bonds, Ken Williams, and Alfonso Soriano. Soriano in particular resembled Davis and had the advantage of batting leadoff on a very powerful team (2002). One might expect all of them to rank high on the list of runs scored per time reaching base in a season; none of them are in the top 50. In fact, the list of players ranking highest in runs scored per time on base is peppered with players one would never expect. It is scattered with fast and slow players, leadoff hitters and middle of the order hitters, 1930s singles hitters and 1930s power hitters, modern players and players from the 1900s, and players one would simply never expect for any reason (Rex Hudler, Jose Valentin, Bob Brower, David Hulse, and Billy Zitzmann).

Table 1 lists the 50 highest percentages of runs scored per time on base (including reaching via an error) since 1900. This list will serve to give some idea of the variety of player types that score frequently in a season.

The interesting thing about this list is that as one attempts to explain a player’s presence on the list, that explanation invariably fails to jibe with other explanations. Jake Wood (14th) was fast, but the 1962 Tigers were not a great hitting team—one might have expected Wood to score more frequently on the 1961 Tigers hitting in front of Norm Cash (.361, 41, 132). Curtis Granderson seems like a logical choice because of his unusual combination of power and speed, but Doc Casey (33rd) played in the deadball era on an average team (the 1901 Tigers) whose best hitter hit .308 with 76 RBI.

More interestingly, Al Simmons appears on the list twice, Joe DiMaggio twice, and no one else appears more than once except Jack Smith, who appears five times. And not just five times—five times in the top 21! Virtually every player on this list is here apparently by chance—how else does one explain Curtis Granderson and Robin Yount once each, the same as Thurman Tucker, Ethan Allen, Otis Clymer, Bob Brower, and Jose Valentin? And yet Jack Smith is here five consecutive seasons.

Explanations are hard to come by. Smith did not hit many home runs—26 in the five seasons in question—so he had to score on the base paths. He averaged only 21 stolen bases and eight caught stealing—hardly numbers that put him in scoring position often. He didn’t even have a lot of doubles, averaging fewer than 20 per season 1921–25. However, he did hit in front of Rogers Hornsby during Hornsby’s amazing five-year stretch in which he hit .402.

It is difficult to fathom that Hornsby could be responsible for placing Smith on this list five consecutive seasons—after all, Earle Combs hit at the top of some of the best hitting teams ever from 1927 until 1932 and he didn’t make the top 50 even once. Even though it’s hard to imagine, we must consider the possibility that Hornsby was responsible. We must also look at the possibility that there was something about the way that the Cardinals played that assisted Smith in scoring, such as an unusual number of sacrifice hits to advance him. If those environmental factors don’t explain Smith’s prowess, we need to look at Smith’s base running to see if there was something unusual about the way that he advanced on hits that could account for his ability to score frequently.

For the seasons in question, we have only limited play-by-play data. In 1921, Retrosheet publishes play-by-play for 47 of Smith’s 116 games; in 1922, we have 74 of 143 games with play-by-play descriptions. We currently have no play-by-play data for 1923–25. These limited accounts (121 of 259 possible games) allow us to see some details that help answer the questions posed in the previous paragraph regarding possible explanations for Smith’s high percent of runs scored per times on base during these seasons.

In 1921–22, Jack Smith scored 203 runs; we have play-by-play accounts of 89 of these runs. He scored eight of these 89 runs by hitting home runs. Of the remaining 81 runs, Rogers Hornsby scored Smith 22 times (27.1%); Jack Fournier drove in Smith 19 times (23.5%). During the 1921 season, Hornsby drove home Smith seven times, Fournier did it 10 times, and Milt Stock drove Smith home 12 times. These data indicate that, while Hornsby drove in Smith more than his teammates did, his RBIs were not unusual since others topped Hornsby in 1921 and Fournier had only three fewer RBI of Smith. We should, therefore, reject the hypothesis that Hornsby’s exceptionally high batting average over the five seasons in question was responsible for Smith’s high run percentage.

Regarding the possibility that St. Louis opted to use the sacrifice bunt to advance Smith frequently, this does not appear to have been a strategy that was deployed unusually frequently. Of the 89 times in question that Smith scored, he was bunted to second on three occasions and to third on three others. In fact, the play-by-play files show that Smith reached base 197 times (not counting home runs) over these two seasons (again, only in the records we have PBP files for) and was advanced via a sacrifice only eight times. Four of these instances occurred within the first six records that we have (April 30–May 27, 1921), suggesting the possibility that manager Branch Rickey began to use the outdated strategy less as he realized how well his team hit.

Since it does not seem from this limited sample that we can attribute Smith’s high scoring rate solely to Hornsby’s batting or to a particular strategy to advance Smith, we must look elsewhere for explanations. The most obvious is his speed. Judging from his base-stealing numbers and his triples totals, one would not guess that Smith was exceptionally fast. However, a careful look at his base running numbers tells a different story.

Because of the PBP files that we have for the 1921–22 seasons, we can look at every opportunity that Smith had to advance extra bases on the base paths. I count “opportunities” as any situation in which Smith was on first or second when a batter singled and a runner in front of him did not stop at the base in front of Smith or when Smith was on first when a batter doubled. We can discount infield singles as opportunities for obvious reasons. I do not count sacrifice flies as opportunities for extra bases; however, being thrown out attempting to advance on a hit counts as a failed attempt, just like stopping at a base without advancing.

Jack Smith (back row, center).

In 1921, Smith had 14 opportunities to advance an extra base and did so 12 times, for an 85.7% success rate. This is a rather limited sample, but luckily we have more data from 1922. In 1922, Smith had 29 opportunities to advance an extra base and did so 26 times for an 89.6% success rate. His total for the two seasons was 38 successes out of 43 opportunities for an 88.4% success rate.

These opportunities come over 121 games, which include pinch-hitting and pinch-running duties. Extrapolated to 162 games, Smith would have 51 successes in 58 attempts. Because we are unaccustomed to speaking of base-running statistics, we need some point of comparison to judge whether this is a large number of attempts and whether this is a good success rate.

As a point of comparison, we can look at data that began to be published in 2007 in The Bill James Handbook. The data presented there show opportunities for base-running advances and successes. In 2006, a number of players had more opportunities than Smith:

Table 2.

Opportunities - Player

84 - Melvin Mora

77 - Kevin Youkilis

72 - Brian Giles

72 - Ichiro Suzuki

71 - Miguel Tejada

67 - Jim Thome

66 - David Eckstein

66 - Rafael Furcal

66 - Derek Jeter

62 - Curtis Granderson

And there are, of course, many others. This shows that Smith’s projected 58 opportunities is not an unusually high number.

However, the percentage of times that he advanced on hits is very unusual by comparison with modern standards. Using the same data, here are some players who, like Smith, are fast and batted high in the batting order:

Table 3.

Successes Attempts Percent Player

42 58 72.4 Willy Taveras

27 41 65.9 Mike Cameron

28 43 65.1 Brian Roberts

41 68 60.3 Chase Utley

36 60 60.0 Chone Figgins

30 51 58.8 Rickie Weeks

28 50 56.0 Juan Pierre

33 60 55.0 Luis Castillo

23 44 52.3 Carl Crawford

25 48 52.1 Carlos Beltran

26 53 49.1 Hanley Ramirez

27 72 37.5 Ichiro Suzuki

366 648 56.5 Total

The average among these players, some of whom are exceptionally fast, indicates one of several things: that Jack Smith was extraordinarily fast (unlikely), that he was a very daring base runner (probable), or that it was more common in his era to advance extra bases on hits (possible). To test the last hypothesis, we need to look at data from players with profiles similar to Smith’s.

George Burns, the center fielder for the New York Giants, makes for a good comparison because, like Smith, he batted leadoff for a good hitting team and was fairly fast. We also have a significant percentage of the play-by-play files for Burns for the 1921 season: 133 of the 149 games he played in 1921. This compares nicely with Smith’s 121 games over two seasons.

During those 131 games, Burns had 63 opportunities to advance an extra base on a hit; he took an extra base only 30 times for a 47.6% success rate, about 40 percentage points below Smith’s 1921–22 base advance rate. This indicates that not everyone was advancing at the rate that Smith advanced on hits. However, Burns’s low base advance rate cannot lead us to reject the hypothesis that it was more common in the early 1920s to advance extra bases than it is today. To better test that hypothesis, we need data from more players.

The Giants sent Burns to Cincinnati before the 1922 season and placed Dave Bancroft in the leadoff position. Since we have 135 of Bancroft’s games from 1922 and since Bancroft played in the same park as Burns with essentially the same lineup behind him, Bancroft’s 1922 season makes for another interesting comparison. Bancroft had 61 chances to advance extra bases on hits. He was not, however, much better than Burns at taking the extra base. In his 62 opportunities to take an extra base on a hit, he succeeded only 33 times (53.2%). Interestingly, Bancroft had six chances to score from first base on a double in 1922 and did so only once.

Another interesting player is Max Carey, one of the fastest players of his age. Carey led his league in stolen bases 10 times, and from reading the play-by-play accounts, it is obvious that he was a very aggressive base runner. The sense one gets from these accounts is that Carey constantly sought opportunities to advance bases; we find him advancing from second to third on ground balls to third base, taking second base on throws home and to third, and being picked off too many times—a sign that he was trying to get a good jump on a pitch or batted ball. And yet, despite his speed and daring, he does not approach Jack Smith’s success in advancing extra bases. We have 140 play-by-play accounts for Carey during the 1921 season; he had 53 opportunities to advance an extra base on a hit and he did so 36 times for a success rate of 67.9%. We have 154 play-by-play accounts for Carey’s 1922 season; he had 76 opportunities to advance an extra base on a hit and he did so 51 times for a success rate of 67.1%. These percentages rank favorably with the best modern players, but still remain about 20 percentage points behind Jack Smith.

From this small amount of data, it is not unreasonable to make a few conclusions. First, it does not appear that players in the early 1920s were generally more aggressive on the base paths than are players today; season totals from these few players seem to align with data from contemporary players. Second, Jack Smith seems to have been truly extraordinary in his ability to advance extra bases on hits—we may some day find out that he was the best ever. Third, it is likely that few base runners of this era were more aggressive than Max Carey; he was, after all, renowned for his speed and used it well and often. This being so, it is unlikely that we will turn up many instances from the 1920s that have a chance of reaching Jack Smith’s standard of nearly 90% of base opportunities taken. Finally, these data suggest that Jack Smith’s ability to score runs comes to some degree from his extraordinary ability to take the extra base on hits. Certainly, this ability does not entirely explain his high ratio of runs scored to times on base—every runner needs to be driven in. But it is likely that the unusual coincidence of outstanding batters like Rogers Hornsby and Jim Bottomley (.402 and .350 batting averages 1921–25) hitting behind Smith with his speed and base running skill goes a long way toward explaining how he scored such a high percentage of the times that he reached base. However, even if we attribute a portion of Smith’s “ability” to score runs to hitting in front of Hornsby and Bottomley, we must admit that Smith’s unusual base running ability contributed significantly to his ability to score.

Debs Garms, the Bioproject, and I

Greg Erion

In keeping with one of SABR’s objectives—“To encourage further research and literary efforts to establish and maintain the accurate historical record of baseball”—the Society has promoted numerous research initiatives. One such effort, the BioProject (archived online at sabr.org/bioproject), has generated large amounts of information in its mission to publish biographical articles about everyone who ever played or influenced baseball. The BioProject’s stated goal is to create “comprehensive biographical articles on any person who ever played or managed in the major leagues, as well as other persons who touched baseball in a significant way.” Over 400 contributors have generated more than 2,000 biographies. Some have provided a single entry, others over 100 pieces. The original scope of this project has expanded to include team biographies, essays on ballparks, and significant executives of the game. Biographies range from the obscure (Fred Bratschi) to the famous (Jackie Robinson). The BioProject is not only a boon to readers, but to the researchers who create the articles. The research has fulfilled curiosity and generated enjoyment for countless SABR members seeking to learn more about the lives of childhood heroes or members of a favorite team.

My own involvement in the BioProject began a few years ago and resulted in opportunities to meet former players and their families and to discover aspects of the game that were not readily apparent to me, creating that “greater understanding of the game” we seek. Participation is open to all SABR members and it is for those interested individuals that I write this article.1

My involvement in the BioProject had its genesis in articles published over 50 years ago by The Sporting News (TSN), in the days before sources like Retrosheet or Baseball-Reference.com. As a young follower of the game, I had scant access to records of the game’s history. Thus, when TSN periodically offered a listing of past batting champions, I avidly devoured and memorized them.2

Names from the 1930s and 1940s lists such as Stan Musial, Jackie Robinson, and Paul Waner were easily recognized. One name, however, proved an enigma: Debs Garms, the 1940 batting champion. His odd first name drew my immediate interest, as well as the fact he played in only 103 games, abnormally low for a batting leader. He was an enigma shrouded in mystery. While perusing various baseball publications over the years, I would occasionally see Garms’s name pop up. Most references were to the odd circumstances under which he won the title. Decades passed and little more information surfaced describing his career—until a few years ago when I noticed the SABR BioProject.

I saw new biographies appearing every few weeks on the SABR website. Virtually every article came with footnotes referencing sources available to even a casual historian. This encouraged my interest in the project.

Almost simultaneously, while involved in the history program at San Francisco State University, I chanced upon a class by the late Dr. Jules Tygiel. The course involved acquainting budding historians with modern technological research tools to aid them in research. Analyzing dusty manuscripts in vaulted archives did not have to be a researcher’s lot in life. Microfilm, publications through interlibrary loans, and a host of online sources offered a wide range of readily available information on which to draw.

Tygiel introduced sites for exploring census reports and search engines to find individuals. Access to historical archives, catalogs, and newspapers became easy. Occasionally Tygiel described reference sites dealing with baseball. I had read Tygiel’s Baseball’s Great Experiment: Jackie Robinson and His Legacy many years before and missed the connection between the self-effacing professor and his literary classic.3 Only when he delved into things “baseball” did I make the connection. Tygiel’s knowledge of baseball, research techniques, and personal encouragement inspired me to tackle a biography.4 And who better to write about than the mysterious 1940 batting champion whose name had intrigued me for decades?

As I prepared to delve into Garms’s career, SABR’s library of resources immediately came into play. How to Do Baseball Research, a SABR publication edited by Gerald Tomlinson, proved a literal blueprint on the task.5 Advice was relevant from page one. “Write about something original” it noted; Garms certainly filled that bill. “Learn all you can about your subject,” the booklet further advised. It also identified numerous informational resources. Among these was baseball’s classic weekly newspaper, The Sporting News. Accessed online free of charge as a SABR member perk, digitized images of each issue were available and searchable.

Initially, the task of exploring Garms’s life and career seemed overwhelming to me. His playing days had ended over 60 years earlier. There were no books or major pieces about him. However, there were numerous articles in TSN’s digitized archives that provided a rich background on his career, often commenting on his style of play, successes, and setbacks. Additional sites such as Mid-Continent Public Library generated entrée to additional newspaper coverage.6 While not as extensive as TSN, The New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle, and Washington Post each contained pertinent items.

Then there were published materials on Garms’s teams and teammates. Biographies of Danny Litwhiler, Pepper Martin, and several on Stan Musial contained useful nuggets.7 Books on the St. Louis Browns and Cardinals, as well as the American League referenced him.8 Biographies of his managers—Frankie Frisch, Rogers Hornsby, and Casey Stengel—while occasionally referencing Garms, offered insight on the greater perspective of managerial styles he experienced and how these teams functioned—for better or worse.9

I sent correspondence to fellow SABR members such as Bill Borst, Bill James, and Bill Mead, each of whom had mentioned Garms in their works. While often these correspondents had little in the way of new information, their replies frequently suggested other avenues I might pursue.

The National Baseball Hall of Fame in Cooperstown has a file, thick or thin, on every major league player. By simply writing to the Hall one can get, often at nominal cost, copies of what is available. Since I began writing biographies, I send the Hall all of the research material that I have generated on individuals, including information about contact sources, for inclusion in those files. Those materials become available for the next researcher who inquires about those players.

While reviewing TSN articles, one caught my attention. In December 1940, after winning the batting title, Garms gave an interview at his ranch in Sunset, Texas. The article mentioned Garms’s wife Hampton and son David.10

Garms takes fielding practice with college player Jack Zeluff. On their way back to Pittsburgh from spring training, the Pirates played an exhibition game versus the University of Arizona.

Was David still alive, I wondered, and if so, could he be located? The online telephone directory listings revealed a David Garms living in Texas. At this point, I felt keen appreciation that I was researching Garms, and not a Brown, Jones, or Smith. I composed a respectful letter to David, apologized for intruding on his privacy, describing my background and SABR’s, and what I was hoping to achieve under SABR’s auspices. The letter ended with a request for assistance with the biography.

Several weeks later David Garms called. Having read my letter and made inquiries about SABR, he decided to respond. Not expecting a phone call, I initially felt unprepared, but here again Tomlinson’s booklet aided my efforts: “Know your subject.” My research had created a working knowledge of Garms’s career for me, and during our discussion this became evident to David. He felt my endeavor to write about his father was clearly a serious and sincere effort. That awareness seemed to generate confidence in the project. At the conclusion of our talk Garms offered to cooperate, be it via mail, phone, or in person.

David’s description of materials available to him suggested the best way to advance the work was for me to visit him. I arranged an appointment a few weeks later. In the interim, my research continued. Dr. Tygiel, always generous with his time, agreed to meet once I had told him the nature of my work. Interviewing was my weakest area. Tygiel had met with countless individuals in writing about Robinson. My question was, how did he approach interviews?

While Tygiel underscored the need to be well prepared for the interview, he also gave a key piece of advice: “You may hear a lot of stories, some of which are not true—for they are just that: stories. The temptation to interrupt and correct is great. But don’t do it. Almost invariably, a wall comes between you and the interviewee if you do so. Time enough in the subsequent editing of your work to correct misstatements. Do not interrupt after asking a question. Just listen. You may learn something about the subject previously unknown to you.” Prophetic words.

I had drawn up dozens of questions anticipating the interview. Almost without exception they were too detailed or restricting—“What was it like to play alongside Stan Musial?” etc. Tygiel suggested following more open-ended lines of inquiry. Allowing David to reminisce would increase the possibility I would learn things I hadn’t even known to ask about. The old adage “You don’t know what you don’t know” proved true throughout our conversation. When David and I met, my first question was along the lines of, “Tell me about your father’s experiences as a young boy.” Payoff was immediate.

Several articles from TSN and others suggested Garms’s first name was in honor of Eugene Debs, an early twentieth century Socialist leader. Was this true or just a figment of some baseball scribe’s imagination? Merely because something finds its way into print does not make it accurate. Primary sources trump the written word—a point also noted in Tomlinson’s publication.11 While recollecting his father’s early life, David not only confirmed this was how the name Debs came about, but also revealed that a younger brother had been named Berger after another prominent Socialist of the time, Victor Berger, and that Berger had subsequently changed his name to Kinnie. This was not of major significance, but was something I might not have learned if I had merely asked, “Is it true your father was named after Eugene Debs?” Conversation continued that day and the next in the same vein. David acquainted me with many facets of his father’s career and life, most of which ended up being included in his biography.

The discussion flowed well. It was obvious that David took our meeting seriously; he was prepared with an album of his father’s playing days. While writing subsequent biographies it became clear to me that often players or their families have folders, scrapbooks, or clippings about their careers. Having access to such materials proved invaluable in creating several biographies.

These personal collections often contain interviews with local sportswriters done after the player retired. Garms’s insight into the managerial style of Rogers Hornsby—something that he would never have shared while he was still playing—was an important addition in my understanding of Garms’s time with the St. Louis Browns. Several articles referenced his passing in 1984. One quoted retired baseball executive and manager Bobby Bragan, who, as a Philadelphia Phillie, had played against Garms in 1940. Through use of The Baseball Autograph Collector’s Handbook, I was able to find Bragan’s address and wrote him, asking if he could provide any insight into Garms’s career.12 Bragan, then 90, called soon thereafter. During our conversation, I kept in mind that asking him to speak of a player from nearly 70 years past was problematic. While remembering Garms, his initial recollections were generic (“great competitor,” “good man,” etc.). Here I recalled Tygiel’s caution to be patient. Then Bragan, in passing, noted that Garms had punished Phillies pitching that year. He was right, a check of data confirmed Garms hitting .431 against Philadelphia. Another piece of information that might not have come to light had I been impatient. Not every former player responds to queries, but Bragan’s was rewarding. Frank Sullivan and Bob Turley, among others, also offered unique perspectives only a player can share.

Time with David proved fruitful. The interviews could have been completed in a single day, but spread over two days as our meetings were proved to be a boon. This allowed me to consolidate my notes and insure that pertinent points were covered and to determine which still needed clarification.

David also revealed a side of players’ lives seldom discussed. The career of a major leaguer is extremely tenuous. One is under unrelenting pressure to perform and a career is in constant jeopardy. Twice Garms went to the minors; a third demotion was narrowly averted. While he enjoyed playing, it was never far from his mind that his ability to play well allowed him to support his family. That family is a major factor in the lives of ballplayers became apparent. When asked why his father turned down a chance to be a manager, David recalled that his father decided traveling and being away from his family for long stretches of time was not worth continuing in the game. Discussion of Garms’s life with his son reminded me that baseball involves more than key games, pennant races, and statistical achievements.

It also became evident that factors beyond a player’s performance often help or hinder a career. Garms’s last demotion to the minors came in December 1941. World War II’s drain of available baseball talent brought him back to the majors.13 (Later while researching a biography of St. Louis Browns outfielder Jim Dyck, I found the opposite: his career took a major setback because of service during the war.)

Though David provided a great deal of information about his father, much of it needed verification. For instance, he noted that in a game critical to Garms’s career, he made three of the team’s four hits against a knuckleball pitcher he had played with in the minors. Was that true or just a story? Research of Baseball-Reference.com revealed that on May 14, 1938, Garms had indeed collected three hits against a Brooklyn Dodger named Forest “Tot” Pressnell, whose biography confirmed he was a knuckleballer. A check of his and Garms’s minor league careers showed their paths had crossed while in the Texas and Western Leagues.

Although David Garms’s comments were mostly correct, he had little to offer in the way of anecdotes concerning his father’s quest for the batting title. The story behind that achievement would have to come from other sources.

Through interlibrary loan I gained access to microfilm of the Pittsburgh Sun-Telegraph, which covered Garms’s play in 1940. It became increasingly clear as I delved further that I also needed complete records of his day-to-day performance. At the time, Retrosheet did not cover most of the seasons Garms played. I emailed David Smith, founder of Retrosheet, who supplied copies of ledger sheets of hand-written records of batting performances, as was the 1940 practice. Coming from an age of instantaneous access to data, I found viewing hand-entered statistical data fascinating. From these sheets, I accurately determined Garms’s performance.

Frankie Frisch (top) managed Garms and Pepper Martin (below) played with him. Biographies of both men yielded useful nuggets on Garms.

The Sun-Telegraph chronicled that Garms missed numerous games, not because he was a “secondary” player as has often been characterized, but because of injuries.14 Articles in TSN, Washington Post, and San Francisco Chronicle contrasted Garms’s hot hitting with nominal batting leaders posting low averages.15 By mid-September, the leading hitters were near or below .320, subpar for batting leaders during that era.16 At the same time, data supplied by Smith reflected that a surge in hitting through August and early September had lifted Garms’s average into the .380s.

At the time, the two leagues used different criteria for determining their batting champions and the National League’s guidelines were murky at best. The factors that led to the decision to give Garms the title helped me to understand what occurred in 1940. The potential for someone to win a batting title with the lowest average in league history and Garms’s performance combined to cause the National League to choose him.17 His selection and others’ would eventually lead to codification of these guidelines into the rules in play today. One outgrowth of the clearer guidelines is the so-called “phantom at-bat” rule—a determining factor in the 2012 National League batting championship.18

My interview with David Garms also touched upon what seemed to be an unbelievable feat. David had noted his father was quite a pinch-hitter and claimed that he had made seven straight pinch-hits, made an out, then three more pinch-hits.

The original Baseball Encyclopedia carried pinch-hitting records. I had already made a note that Garms had led the league in pinch hits in 1941; the Encyclopedia noted his having made ten. That they were nearly all strung together as David suggested seemed highly unlikely. Another query to David Smith brought forth day-by-day records of Garms’s 1941 season. They revealed that he made three consecutive pinch hits, an out and then six straight pinch hits. An impressive feat, but not quite in agreement with David’s recollection. Which was correct? I continued to delve.

In the first season I became interested in baseball, 1958, there was much ado about Dave Philley breaking the record for seven straight pinch hits held by Peanuts Lowrey in 1952. Whose record had Lowrey had broken? TSN, in covering Lowrey’s feat, noted he had surpassed Rogers Hornsby’s record of five, set in 1933.19 Where did that put Garms? Another inter-library loan request was made, this time for the Sun-Telegraph covering 1941. Box scores and descriptions of the games agreed with Smith’s data—up to a point. Smith’s information showed Garms’s six straight pinch hits before entering the lineup at third base. Several weeks later he came into a game as a pinch hitter and made an out, seemingly stopping his streak at six. Yet David’s claim was for seven straight pinch hits. I examined the records again.

Where interest in Garms began: TSN’s listing of National League Batting Champions (February 1, 1961).

One of Garms’s appearances at third base seemed odd. July 26 game statistics showed him with just one at bat, hitting a two-run home run in the eighth inning. Here, access to the Sun Telegram’s account of the game proved critical. Garms had entered the game in the eighth inning as a pinch hitter and hit the home run. He remained in the game at third for the ninth. Checking other accounts of the game not only confirmed Garms pinch-hitting a home run, but also that it represented his seventh straight pinch hit. Garms, not Lowrey, had broken Hornsby’s record. Lowrey had tied Garms and Philley had broken their jointly held record. A few years later, when Retrosheet issued data on the 1941 season, their records reflected Garms as having played third that day. I contacted David Smith with my findings, Retrosheet independently verified them, and a subsequent change was made in the records to show Garms entered the game as a pinch hitter.

My research began with a quest to tell the story of a player. That process served to generate a change in official records of the game, albeit a minor one. In the scheme of baseball’s history this finding is of little importance—numerous changes are being made to the record books all the time as new data are uncovered. That said, verification of David’s recollections proved rewarding to him and was a satisfying and unexpected bonus for me while generating original research for the BioProject.

Subsequent articles I have worked on have provided their own satisfaction. I learned about Leo Kiely, a journeyman pitcher for the Red Sox, whose accomplishment in winning 20 games as a relief pitcher while with the minor league San Francisco Seals was unique in baseball history—and then I learned that it was not.20 I listened to Bill Slayback describe throwing a no-hitter into the eighth inning of his first game in the majors and everyone in the ballpark knowing of this development—except Slayback.

These discoveries, and the opportunities to meet and/or correspond with players, their families, and fellow SABR members have proved rewarding to me. In keeping with SABR’s goal “To encourage further research and literary efforts to establish and maintain the accurate historical record of baseball,” I will continue seeking those rewards.

Notes

1. Although creating a biography may seem a daunting task, the path is well marked. SABR offers access to numerous resources for prospective contributors, including guidelines on how to conduct research and prepare articles, as well as lists of resources for historic and statistical data. One need not undertake the path alone. Whether through collective or direct inquiries, other SABR members are available to add their expertise, sharing advice, perspectives, information, or if need be, criticism. A biographer’s draft effort also passes through the hands of an editor who reviews it for accuracy and style, which invariably improves the final product.

2. See for example The Sporting News issue of February 1, 1961, page 15.

3. Jules Tygiel, Baseball’s Great Experiment: Jackie Robinson and His Legacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

4. Tygiel was posthumously awarded SABR’s Henry Chadwick Award in 2010.

5. Gerald Tomlinson, ed., How to Do Baseball Research (Cleveland, OH: SABR, 2000).

6.  http://www.mymcpl.org

7.  See for example: Litwhiler, Danny, Danny Litwhiler, Living the Baseball Dream, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006, 176, Barthel, Thomas, Pepper Martin, A Baseball Biography, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2003), 183-184 and Stan Musial including, Musial, Stan as told to Bob Broeg, Stan Musial: "The Man's" Own Story, (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1964) 272. 

8.  Borst, Bill, The Best of Seasons: The 1944 St. Louis Cardinals and St. Louis Browns, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1995) 277 and Mead, William B., Even The Browns: The Zany, True Story of Baseball in the Early Forties (Chicago: Contemporary Books, Inc., 1978), 206 were two of several books on teams Garms played with.

9.  Goldman, Steven, Forging Genius: The Making of Casey Stengel, (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005).

10.  Charles J. Doyle, "Rancher Debs Hardens Himself and His Bats With Outdoor Life," The Sporting News, December 26, 1940. 

11.  Tomlinson, 93-94.

12.  Smalling Jack, The Baseball Autograph Collector’s Handbook, USA, Jack Smalling, 2007. 

13.  Garms at 34, married, with a son and a bad knee was ineligible for the draft.

14.  See for instance, Mehno, John, The Chronicle of Baseball: A Century of Major League Action, (London: Carlton Books Limited, 2000) 131

15.  See for example John Lardner, "Who's N.L.'s best hitter? Read on and be surprised." San Francisco Chronicle, September 11, 1940 and "Just a Joke,' Says Diz Dean of N.L.," Washington Post, September 18, 1940.

16.  On September 14, 1940 The New York Times showed Johnny Cooney at .319, one point ahead of Johnny Mize.

17.  Up to that point the lowest average to lead the NL was Larry Doyle’s .320 in 1915. After Garms final .355 average the next highest among “full time” players belonged to the Chicago Cubs’ Stan Hack at .317.

18.  See Baseball Rule 120:22

19.  "Peanuts Sets Major Mark -- Seven Pinch Hits in Row," The Sporting News, June 18, 1952.

20.  The same year (1957) Kiely won 20 games in relief with the Seals; a career minor leaguer named Don Nichols won 22 games in relief for the Peoria Chiefs in the Class B Three-I League.

The 20/30 Game Winner

An Endangered/Extinct Species

John E. Daniels and Steve Kuehl

Introduction

This paper has two parts. Part I: The Demise of the 20-Game Winner is a statistical analysis on the history of 20-game winners and possible factors contributing to their decline. Part II: A Tale of Two Pitchers is a qualitative analysis comparing two historic pitching seasons—Denny McLain’s 31 wins in 1968 and Justin Verlander’s 24 wins in 2011—in an attempt to better understand pitching success from two different baseball periods.

Part I (The Demise of the 20-game winner)

In the so-called modern baseball era (1901–2012), becoming a 20-game winner was regarded as a threshold to All-Star status. Consistent winners of 20 or more games were regarded as staff aces, were usually paid more, and often won postseason pitching awards. Like hitting .300, winning 20 games was the plateau that separated the good from the elite.

Twenty or more wins have been reached 814 times from 1901 through 2012. Considering only the top five pitchers in terms of Games Started (GS) for each staff, 20 wins for this defined group of regular starters has occurred 6.86 percent of the time (814 of 11,867). As shown in Figure 1, the number of 20-game winners divided by the number of qualifying starting pitchers (top five starters for each team), has been in steady decline.

Although there appear to be some upper anomalies in this trend (1920, 1951), note in 2006 and 2009 we see the first two non-strike seasons that have no 20-game winners at all. Recall the increase from 1960 to 1962 in team games played from 154 to 162—an increase in potential wins for a starter. More games are being played, but fewer pitchers are winning 20 games. Why? Clearly, this drastic drop-off in 20-game winners indicates some systemic change, either from a strategic standpoint, quality of pitching, or some fundamental modification to the game itself. A roundtable discussion of knowledgeable baseball fans will yield multiple opinions on this topic. But opinion should be backed up with empirical evidence. We should not confuse symptoms (results) with the underlying causes. This paper will attempt to distinguish between them. The reasons, certainly not an exhaustive list, to be examined in this paper include:

1. Change in Games Started (specifically 4- to 5-man rotations)

2. Change in Number of Innings Pitched for a Starter.

3. Change in the Number of Decisions for a Starter

4. The Designated Hitter

Each of these issues will be examined for their significance as an influence on 20-game winners and then, if determined to be a symptom, will be further analyzed for the root cause. Finally, to make sure nothing important was missed, a qualitative assessment of two famous Detroit Tigers pitchers will be done. We will examine Denny McLain’s 1968 and Justin Verlander’s 2011 seasons start by start. How was Denny McLain able to become the first 30-game winner since Dizzy Dean (1934) when other, more accomplished pitchers, failed? Although Justin Verlander “only” won 24 games in 2011, what kept him from winning 30?

Figure 1: Percentage of 20-game winners for #1 through #5 Starters (1901–2012)

To begin, let’s look at the four reasons proposed.

1. Change in games started (specifically 4- to 5-man rotations).

To ignore spot starts, temporary minor league call-ups, and the additional pitching demands caused by doubleheaders, rain-outs, make-up games, etc. only the pitchers with the top five Games Started (GS) totals for each team’s pitching staff were analyzed. Figure 2 plots the percentage of team games started 1901–2012 by the #1 through #5 starting pitchers (#1 had the most GS, #2 second most, etc.).

First, overlooking the labor disputes of 1981, 1994, and 1995, note the overall trends in these plots as indicated by the trend lines. The mean number of starts for the #1 starting pitchers has shown a slight decrease over time (about one fewer start every 78 years and NOT statistically significant) while starters #2, #3, #4 and #5 have shown slight increases (again, not statistically significant).

Further, when examining the micro trends for starters #1, #2, and #3, as opposed to the overall trend, there is generally a decreasing trend in the games started from 1901 to 1945. There could be a variety of reasons for this, possibly a manager’s attempt to prolong a good pitcher’s season or career or perhaps the evolution of the major league pitching staff, but those are simply educated guesses and beyond the scope of this paper. Perhaps a baseball historian could provide more insight into this situation.

Figure 2: Mean Games Started by #1 through #5 Starting Pitchers (1901–2012)

Returning to Figure 2, an upward trend for #1, #2, and #3 begins around 1946 and continues until about 1974. After 1974 the downward trend begins again. Mean GS, at least for the #1 starter, is now back where it was in the 1930s and 1940s.

In terms of starter #4, we can also faintly observe these micro trends, although there is an increase in GS variability due to perhaps different pitchers sharing this particular role for a team. Unlike #1, #2 and perhaps #3, the #4 starter wasn’t always the same person. This is certainly true by the time the #5 starter is reached.

Another interesting result is that 1901–60 (154 game schedule), #1 starters averaged 33.5 GS per season. From 1961 through 2012 (162 game schedule), #1 starters averaged 33.3 games. So although—in theory at least—a #1 starter would have perhaps two additional starts resulting from the longer schedule, it hasn’t shown up in the results. Note that 154 games with a 4-man staff yields 38.5 starts per pitcher whereas 162 games with five starters yields only 32.4 starts per pitcher. If a pitcher gets six fewer average starts per season, could that be the reason 20 or 30 wins is not being realized as often? Unfortunately, the data just don’t support this supposition. Average GS in 1901–60 is almost the same as average GS in 1961–2012. Yet in the former era 10.6 percent of starters were 20-game winners, while in the latter only 4 percent were.

Although the trend for #1 Starters appears to be slightly decreasing, there really isn’t much difference in percentage of GS between the pre-1975 time (1975 arbitrarily selected for the beginning of “formal” 5-man rotations) and post-1975. Table 1 shows this result.

Table 1. Comparison of Percentage of Team Games Started (Pre-1975 versus Post-1975)

Starter - % of Starts 1901–74 -  % of Starts 1975–2012

#1 - 20.7 - 21.9

#2 - 18.9 - 19.2

#3 - 16.6 - 16.6

#4 - 13.8 - 13.3

#5 - 10.3 -   9.9

As seen in Table 1, the percentage of team games started for #1 and #2 starters is actually slightly higher in the 5-man rotation “era”, while the percentages for #4 and #5 starters have slightly decreased. One might conclude that since the percentages for all starters has not changed significantly, teams were already using 4+ starting rotations before such a practice became the norm in the 1970s. Certainly, it appears that the movement to a regular 5-man starting rotation is NOT a significant factor in the decrease in 20-game winners. #1 starters are still getting the same number of GS.

2. Change in Number of Innings Pitched for a Starter

Figure 3: Mean IP for #1 through #5 Starting Pitchers (1901–2012)

To paraphrase Section 10.17 of the Official Rules of Major League Baseball; If a starting pitcher pitches at least five innings, and leaves the game with his team in the lead, or his team takes the lead in their half of the inning, he gets credited for the win if his team continues to keep the lead and wins the game. Frank Williams (1982) correctly points out that in the early years, these rules did not exist and the selection of the winning pitcher was at the discretion of the Official Scorer. Perhaps this might alter the pitching statistics by a win or two and this fact should be mentioned here for the sake of credibility. Obviously, a starter who pitches all nine innings and wins is in complete control of his pitching destiny. Otherwise, earning the win depends in part on the bullpen as well as other factors outside the starting pitcher’s control. Figure 3 shows the change in IP for Starters #1 through #5 over the last 112 years.￼

Omitting the labor dispute years of 1981, 1994, and 1995, mean IP has been steadily decreasing for all starting pitchers. Although there appears to be an interesting period of increasing IP from around 1969–74, at least for #1 starters, overall the trend is down. So, although GS has remained relatively constant, IP has been on the decline. How these results actually affect the number of 20-game winners will be discussed in the next section.

3. Change in the Number of Decisions for a Starter

Decisions are simply defined as Wins + Losses. By leaving before the ninth inning, the starting pitcher might lose his status as the pitcher of record and not get either a win or a loss. A good bullpen can at best preserve a Win or turn a loss into a No Decision. A bad bullpen can turn a Win into a No Decision or perhaps even a loss for the starter if inherited runners are allowed to score.

Figure 4: Some Statistics for #1 Starting Pitchers (1901–2012)

Figure 4, although a bit crowded with information, has some fascinating results regarding the influence of IP on Decisions. This in turn will affect the number of 20-game winners.

First, note the Decisions/IP line at the very bottom using the vertical axis on the right as the scale. This line is remarkably consistent for the last 112 years. Decisions/IP remains relatively constant (10.8% to 12.1% with a mean of 11.5%). Then it becomes obvious that if IP decreases (see Figure 2) then the number of decisions a pitcher gets will also proportionally decrease. This certainly makes intuitive sense. If a starting pitcher leaves the game earlier for strategic reasons (meaning fewer IP), the number of Decisions (Wins + Losses) he has will also decrease. For example, in 1968 the mean IP for a #1 starter was 262.78. Using the average Decisions/IP of 11.5%, we might expect around 30 decisions (the mean was actually 29.3 Decisions for that year). In 2011 the mean IP for a #1 starter was 211.19. Again, we might expect only 24 decisions (the mean was in fact 24).

Looking above the Decisions/IP line, in the middle of the graph, is the percent of 20-game winners for #1 starters only. Again, using the vertical axis on the right as our scale, we see this percentage is decreasing. This is the same result as Figure 1 and the reason this paper was written in the first place.

Now, the top line examines the trend as to how deep a #1 starter gets into a game. This line shows IP/GS using the vertical axis on the left as a reference. Since it has already been shown that GP has remained constant while IP has decreased, we would expect this statistic to show a decreasing trend, and of course it does.

In 1901 the average IP per GS for #1 starters was 8.76 or almost a complete game. By 1975, this had dropped to 7.03. In 2012 the average IP per GS was 6.31 or barely into the seventh inning. This statistic does not account for a #1 starter acting in a relief role, which was more common in the early part of the century and may perhaps inflate these values slightly. But the point here is that starting pitchers, certainly #1 starters, aren’t around when the outcome of a game can change.

It would be interesting to investigate, especially on excellent teams, how often a starter would leave early with his team losing or tied that eventually resulted in a win for the bullpen. Starters from earlier eras would have been around long enough to get credit for the win. Not so much today. Today the starter gets a No Decision instead of a win. Perhaps this spawned the metric Quality Starts.

The reasons for the decline in IP/GS are perhaps numerous, but two possible circumstantial causes are suggested:

1. The development of the situational bullpen as an effective managerial strategy.

2. Escalating pitcher salaries along with long term contracts, which place a premium on protecting a starter’s health and career. Most, if not all, starters are now on strict pitch counts and this number is certainly tracked throughout a game.

Although it is no secret baseball salaries have continuously increased, Figure 5 is a graph that shows average #1 Starting Pitcher salaries at least from 1985. Reliable data were not available prior to this time, although one would expect salaries to be lower than they are today.

Certainly, there are other possibilities but these two explanations immediately come to mind. It is simply common sense that if a pitcher leaves the game in the sixth or seventh inning, with his team leading at the time, that the win is not guaranteed nor in his direct control. The quality of the bullpen, team fielding, clutch hitting, the bench, and occasionally the weather can all influence the final outcome of the game.

4. The Designated Hitter

Intuitively, one would believe that the American League would have starting pitchers in the game longer since pinch hitting in the late innings would not be necessary. Although IP has drastically decreased overall, does the DH (introduced in 1973) have any positive effect on a pitcher staying in the game longer? Or do pitch counts and the bullpen trump everything? Let’s examine the differences between the AL and NL 1974–2012. Dividing some of the information from Figure 3 into the AL and NL, for the 1974–2012 period, we can see in Table 2 (next page) that DH might contribute to an average of about five more innings pitched and one additional decision over an entire season, but has no real influence on the difference in average length of a start (less than one-third of an inning for IP/GS).

Figure 5: Average Salaries for #1 Starting Pitchers 1985-2012.

Given the detectable, but small influence the DH has, it still appears that perhaps other factors (situational bullpen, pitch count) have more influence than the DH does.

Part 2: A Tale of Two Pitchers

On September 14, 1968, in front of 33,688 fans on a Saturday in Detroit, Dennis McLain stuck-out 10 batters in a 5–4 win over the Oakland Athletics to become the first 30-game winner since Jay “Dizzy” Dean (St. Louis Cardinals) in 1934. He is also the last pitcher in Major League Baseball to win 30 games in one season.

To summarize, Table 3 is McLain’s list of select statistics for 1968.

It appeared that Denny McLain pitched deep into his games (28 CG) and as will be seen, benefitted by playing on the 1968 World Series winner. The 1968 Tigers, like most championship teams, were legendary in their ability to come from behind. Not only during the regular season; they also fell behind three games to one to Bob Gibson and the St. Louis Cardinals, but eventually won the World Series.

After going through the game logs for each game that McLain started in 1968, it was found that six of his 31 wins could be considered “lucky” wins. By “lucky” it means the team came from behind in the late innings to make McLain the winning pitcher. Those six wins, which could have also ended up as No Decisions or Losses if McLain pitched today, are described as follows:

• May 20, 1968: McLain pitched 10 innings and gave up 3 earned runs. In the top of the 9th inning, Willie Horton hit a home run to tie the game which Detroit won in the 10th.

• June 5, 1968: McLain pitched 6 innings and gave up 3 earned runs. At the time that McLain was pulled from the game, after pitching in the bottom of the 6th inning, the Tigers were losing 4 – 1. In the top of the 7th inning the Tigers scored 4 runs, thus making McLain eligible for the win. The Tigers won the game, giving McLain the win.

• June 16, 1968: McLain pitched 7 innings and gave up 1 earned run. At the time that McLain was pulled from the game, after pitching in the bottom of the 7th inning, the Tigers were losing 1 – 0. In the top of the 8th inning the Tigers scored 5 runs, thus making McLain eligible for the win. The Tigers won the game, giving McLain the win.

• July 7, 1968: McLain pitched a complete game and gave up 4 earned runs. McLain had blown the lead in the top of the 6th inning and could have been relieved. He continued to pitch and Willie Horton hit a walk-off home run in the bottom of the 9th, giving the win to McLain.

• July 23, 1968: McLain pitched 7 innings and gave up 4 earned runs. After pitching his 7th inning, the Tigers were losing. In the top of the 8th inning the Tigers tied the game, pinch-hit for McLain, and then took the lead. This made McLain eligible for the win and the Tigers went on to win the game, again giving McLain the win.

• September 14, 1968: McLain pitched a complete game and gave up 4 earned runs. The Tigers were losing 4–3 in the 9th inning and scored 2 runs to win on a walk-off single in the bottom of the 9th, giving McLain his 30th win of the season.

If the Tigers hadn’t come from behind in these games, McLain would have won only 25 games in 1968. He pitched in 336 innings, unheard of today, so he naturally had more decisions. He played on a championship team that came from behind and got him six additional wins.

For comparison, look at the season that Justin Verlander had in 2011. On September 18, 2011, Verlander won his 24th game of the season. This was the most games won by a starting pitcher in the American League since Bob Welch in 1990 for the Oakland Athletics. By the end of the season, Verlander had won the Triple Crown for pitching in the American League, meaning a particular pitcher leads their league in wins, strikeouts, and earned run average.

Throughout the season, Verlander never had an outing in which he pitched fewer than six innings or 100 pitches (note in 2011 we are counting pitches). Through the 2011 season, Verlander had the best career strikeouts-per-9-innings-pitched average in Tigers’ history (8.3), and the second-best career win-loss average (.652).

This was the first time since Roger Clemens (1986) that the American League Most Valuable Player award was given to a starting pitcher, and the fourth time in Tigers’ history (Dennis McLain once and Hal Newhouser twice); Verlander edged out Jacoby Ellsbury of the Boston Red Sox 280 votes to 242. In addition, Verlander was unanimously named the American League Cy Young award winner.

Table 4 contains a list of some select pitching statistics for Verlander in 2011.

Relative to his peers, Table 5 notes the following comparisons to AL #1 Starters and Denny McLain in 1968.

Denny McLain on his way to 31 wins.

In examining Table 5, we can see McLain was (41–35.58)/2.66=2.04 standard deviations above the mean for GS, while Verlander is 1.18. Clearly, even by 1968 standards, McLain was a workhorse; it appears he never missed a start. For IP however, Verlander was (251–211.19)/18.59=2.14 standard deviations above the 2011 mean, versus 2.10 above the 1968 mean for McLain. McLain had more GS, relative to his peers, than Verlander but did not necessarily pitch more innings relative to his peers than Verlander. McLain was a product of conventional baseball wisdom in 1968. He did what was expected of a #1 starter: finish the game. He was not restricted by pitch counts nor set-up men nor closers. For his 31 wins, McLain was paid a salary of less than $90,000 (his 1970 Tigers salary before being traded). Verlander made $12,850,000—more than 142 times McLain’s 1970 baseball salary. One must also consider McLain’s World Series performance. He lost Game One and Game Four to Bob Gibson and beat Ray Washburn in Game Six. Could his arm have been tired out by the time October rolled around? Perhaps pitch counts and situational bullpens show some wisdom.

Going through the game logs for each game that Verlander started in 2011, unlike with McLain, I found none of his wins could be considered “lucky wins”. Verlander had a solid outing in each of the starts that he won; he pitched deep into games, for his time, and gave up very few earned runs. His team made no miraculous comebacks after he was pulled, had no walk-off hits, etc. while Jose Valverde was 49/49 in save opportunities.

A major difference between McLain in 1968 and Verlander in 2011 was the fact that McLain usually pitched every fourth day, whereas Verlander pitched every fifth day. This could give McLain up to eight more starts (162/4 versus 162/5). In fact, McLain started seven more games than Verlander. So although the figures demonstrate that average GS has not changed much over the years, there can be notable exceptions at the extremes. McLain had more starts, pitched deeper into games, and belong to a team that got him six wins that he wouldn’t have probably earned in 2011 because the bullpen would have earned those comeback decisions. Judging from Verlander’s win-loss percentage in 2011, starting seven more games he would have won six of them. Thus, one may assume that Verlander might have also won 30 games in McLain’s era. This is how close the seasons that McLain and Verlander had. If a few things had happened differently, McLain might have won only 25 games in 1968.

Conclusion

After examining these two pitchers, and what happened during their seasons, it is possible to conclude that a pitcher will never win 30 games in a season again. It would take not only a dominating season, but an incredible amount of luck to even get close to winning 30 games.

So, to summarize our findings, we review the following:

1. Mean Games Started has remained relative constant. In spite of the increase to 162 games and the formally defined 5-man starting rotation, GS has had no real effect on the percentage of 20-game winners. At the extremes, it might have given us our last 30-game winner.

2. Mean Total Innings Pitched has been in decline. Pitch counts and situational bullpens result in earlier exits for starting pitchers. This has certainly affected the percentage of 20-game winners, but is actually a symptom of the underlying causes.

3. No Decisions: Decisions/IP has remained constant. If IP decreases, decisions decrease also. This has affected the percentage of 20-game winners, but is also a symptom of the underlying causes.

4. The Designated Hitter has had very little effect on how long a starter pitches into a game and has had no real effect on 20-game winners.

Note “underlying causes” have been mentioned but not yet identified. What are these causes? One could argue pitch counts and situational bullpens, but are these symptoms of yet another cause? Could the real cause be protecting the health of expensive pitchers? Economics is a powerful motivating factor. Could the cause be protecting pitching arms for the postseason? A World Series trophy could also be such a factor. Is there another cause that hasn’t been considered? I would invite baseball researchers to ponder these ideas and consider others.

These findings show that the 30-game winner, although not extinct, would be an unlikely occurrence today. Pitchers are not in enough games to garner the needed wins. Justin Verlander could have won 30 games in 2011—if he had won every single start. Not likely, but certainly possible. After seeing Miguel Cabrera win the first Triple Crown in 45 years, perhaps the impossible is possible.

References

Lahman, S. Lahman’s Baseball Database (version 5.5). www/baseball1.com (2007).

Williams, Frank J. “All the Record Books are Wrong.” The National Pastime, Vol. 1 (Fall 1982).

More Whimpers Than Bangs

How Batters Perform When “It’s the World Series and

they’re down to their final out”

Steven P. Gietschier

How did the 2012 World Series end? It was Game Four in Detroit. The San Francisco Giants, up three games to none, scored a run in the top of the tenth on a single by Marco Scutaro to take a 4–3 lead. In the bottom of the tenth, closer Sergio Romo entered the game to face the Tigers. Austin Jackson struck out, pinch-hitter Don Kelly struck out, and then Miguel Cabrera came to the plate: strike one, ball one, strike two, ball two, foul, and then strike three looking. It was over. Cabrera, arguably the best player in the American League last year, made the final out.

Now, go back to the beginning. How did the World Series in 1903 end? It was Game Eight in Boston. Remember, this Series was best-of-nine. The Americans led the Pittsburgh Pirates, four games to three, and 3–0 after eight innings. In the top of the ninth, Bill Dinneen was on the mound. Fred Clarke flied to left, Tommy Leach flied to right, and then Honus Wagner struck out, swinging or looking, we do not know. (Sources disagree.) It, too, was over. The best player in the National League had made the final out.

We all know that baseball games lack an arbitrary end. No clock means that the participants determine not only when the game will end but also when it will not end. Sabermetrics recognizes this: “Don’t squander outs.” Kids know it, too: “Save me a time at bat.” Roger Angell perhaps put it best in The Summer Game, “Since baseball is measured in outs, all you have to do is succeed utterly; keep hitting, keep the rally alive, and you have defeated time. You remain forever young.”

We all remember that some of baseball’s greatest moments have come with one swing of the bat. Indeed, the term “walk-off” has fast become a cliché, having been applied not only to homers but also to singles, sacrifice flies, and even walks. Conversely, there are obviously thousands of instances when the offense fails and the game ends, maybe dramatically and maybe not, with a strikeout, a fly ball, a line drive, or a mesmerizing fielder’s choice at second.

But what about those times when the game doesn’t end, when the guy in the on-deck circle yells “Save me a lick,” and the batter does just that, when the announcer says, “They’re down to their final out,” and yet the game goes on? What about those at-bats that might end the entire World Series, but don’t? Cabrera could have tied Game Seven last year with one swing of the bat. Wagner’s task was more prosaic—keep the game going—and that’s what we’re studying here, those at-bats when one more out would be the final out of the World Series. Just how often have batters succeeded when failure would usher in the start of the off-season?

Honus Wagner, star for the Louisville Colonels (1897–99) and the Pittsburgh Pirates (1900–17), won eight National League batting titles, but in the first twentieth-century World Series (1903), he made the final out.

This essay was inspired not by the quick and surprising triumph of the Giants last fall—the only time that the final half-inning of the World Series included three straight strikeouts—but by the performance of the St. Louis Cardinals in 2011. They were down to their final out three times over two innings in Game Six against the Texas Rangers, and yet they survived and ultimately prevailed. In the ninth, they were down two runs with two on and two out when David Freese tripled to tie the score, 7–7. In the tenth, again down two runs, there were two on and two out before Texas walked Albert Pujols intentionally, and Lance Berkman singled to tie the score again. And, then, of course, Freese led off the eleventh with a walk-off home run. In fact, the Cards were not only down to their final out three times; they were down to their final strike three times, once in the ninth and twice in the tenth. And then they went on to win Game Seven, 6–2, making it look comparatively easy.

The 2011 Series was so dramatic that fans were forced to look back to 1986 when the New York Mets were also down to their final out three times in Game Six against the Boston Red Sox and to their final strike once. And they won, too. In that fateful Game Six, the Red Sox scored twice in the top of the tenth to take a 5–3 lead. In the bottom half of the inning, Wally Backman and Keith Hernandez made out before Gary Carter staved off elimination with a single. Kevin Mitchell, pinch-hitting for Rick Aguilera, also singled. Ray Knight singled, too, scoring Carter and sending Mitchell to third. Bob Stanley then threw a wild pitch that scored Mitchell and sent Knight to second. And then Mookie Wilson’s grounder got past Bill Buckner, and Knight scampered home with the winning run.

Mookie Wilson’s ground ball past Bill Buckner of the Boston Red Sox won Game Six of the 1986 World Series for the New York Mets.

No other team has matched this brinkmanship. In fact, only four other teams have been three outs from elimination and come back to win the Series, but none went down to the final out. In Game Eight of the 1912 Series (Game Two was a 6–6 tie), the Red Sox scored two runs in the bottom of the tenth to defeat the New York Giants. In 1985 (the infamous Denkinger game), the Kansas City Royals scored twice in the bottom of the ninth against the Cardinals to win Game Six, 3–2, and went on to win Game Seven, 11–0. In 1997, the Florida Marlins tied the Cleveland Indians in the bottom of the ninth of Game Seven and won the Series with a run in the bottom of the eleventh. And in Game Seven in 2001, the Arizona Diamondbacks scored the tying run and the winning run in the bottom of the ninth against the New York Yankees. (See Table 1 for details.)

Those are the heroics, the “bangs,” if you will. Much more prevalent, naturally, are the “whimpers.” The composite batting average for all players in all World Series is .242, but faced with elimination, batters have hit only .211. Yogi Berra, fount of wisdom that he is, is a bit off: when a World Series elimination game reaches the ninth inning, it is almost always over before it’s over.

GAME FOUR

The first chance a batter has to confront the possibility that he might make the final out in the World Series is, of course, in Game Four when his team has already lost the first three games. There have been 24 Game Fours that have been elimination games. In three of them, the team on the short end managed to extend the Series just one more game before losing, but none of these three (the 1910 Chicago Cubs, the 1937 Giants, and the 1970 Cincinnati Reds) went down to the final out. (See Table 2.) The other outlier is 1927 when Game Four was tied, 3–3, after eight. The Pirates were scoreless in the top of the ninth, and the Yankees won the game and the Series in the bottom of the ninth. This was Murderers’ Row, so how did they win? A walk, a bunt single, a wild pitch, an intentional walk, and a second wild pitch that scored Earle Combs.

In the other 20 Series that started with three victories for one team, a sweep was the result every time. So in these 20 Game Fours, how many times did a batter facing the prospect of making the last out extend the game for even one more batter? Five times in only three Series. Ernie Orsatti and Andy High both singled for the 1928 Cardinals. Andy Seminick reached on an error, and Mike Goliat singled for the 1950 Philadelphia Phillies. Elston Howard reached on an error for the 1963 Yankees. Five at-bats extended the game, two errors, just three hits.

Every other time, the guy who came up with two out, desperate to keep the game going, made the third out. In all, 25 plate appearances, 25 at-bats, three hits, no walks, three strikeouts, for a batting average of .120. (See Table 3.)

Points of interest. None of these Game Fours ended with a double play and none with a fielder’s choice. Only three ended with a strikeout, 1950, 2007, and 2012. And only one of these ninth innings featured a sacrifice as a way to prolong the game. In 2005, the Chicago White Sox led the Houston Astros, 1–0, going into the ninth inning. Jason Lane singled, Brad Ausmus was out on a sacrifice bunt that moved Lane to second, and the next two batters, both pinch hitters, made out. One may ask if giving up the twenty-fifth out to gain one base was worth it.

Perhaps the most interesting game-ending at-bat occurred in 1963 with Sandy Koufax on the mound for the Los Angeles Dodgers. Bobby Richardson of the Yankees singled. Tom Tresh struck out. Mickey Mantle struck out. Elston Howard hit a ground ball to Maury Wills who flipped to second baseman Dick Tracewski to force Richardson, but Tracewski dropped the ball. Hector Lopez then also grounded to Wills, who this time threw to first to end it.

Ernie Orsatti of the St. Louis Cardinals singled to prolong Game Four of the 1928 Series.

Gene Hermanski walked for the Brooklyn Dodgers to extend the 1949 Series.

Andy High followed Ernie Orsatti’s single with a single of his own to keep the St. Louis Cardinals alive in Game Four of the 1928 Series.

GAME FIVE

There have been 42 Series that stood at three-games-to-one and thus 42 elimination Game Fives. Eighteen times, the team trailing three-to-one won Game Five and pushed the Series to either six or seven games. But in only one of these 18 Game Fives did the team on the verge of elimination go down to its final out before winning. That happened in 1911. The Giants were down, 3–1, to the Philadelphia Athletics with two out in the ninth. Doc Crandall, a pitcher batting for himself, doubled to score a run, and Josh Devore singled to score Crandall. Devore was then caught stealing. The Giants won the game in the tenth on Fred Merkle’s sacrifice fly, only to lose Game Six the next day, 13–2.

In the other 24 Series that had one team ahead three-games-to-one, that team won Game Five and ended the Series. That gives us 25 Game Fives to look at. But there is one outlier here, too. In 1929, the Athletics led the Cubs, three games to one, but the Cubs led in Game Five, 2–0, going to the bottom of the ninth. Philadelphia scored three times to win the game and the Series.

So again we ask the basic question: how many times in these 24 Game Fives did the batter facing elimination prolong the Series? Eight times in six Series. The year before Crandall and Devore, Jimmy Archer singled. Joe Cronin singled, and Fred Schulte walked in 1933. Gene Hermanski walked in 1949. Carney Lansford singled in 1988, and Placido Polanco walked in 2006.

All in all in these 24 Game Fives, there were 31 plate appearances, 28 at-bats, three walks, five hits. That’s .179. Six Series ended with strikeouts, and there was one game-ending fielder’s choice. (See Table 4.)

Points of interest. Charles (Boss) Schmidt, the Tigers catcher, played in three World Series and made the final out in two of them, 1907 and 1908.

Bill Killefer ended the 1915 Series as a pinch hitter. He grounded to short. It was his only Series at-bat.

The 1949 Series provided the closest parallel to 2012. Duke Snider and Jackie Robinson struck out before Hermanski walked. Gil Hodges then struck out.

GAME SIX

There have been 59 Game Sixes, each of them, of course, an elimination game. Thirty-six have seen the team down three games to two win Game Six, but only twice, in 1986 and 2011, did the team that won go down to its final out.

In the other 23 Series that stood at three games to two, the team with three wins won Game Six and ended the Series. That would give us 25 games to look at. But there are three outliers here. The 1935 Tigers, the 1953 Yankees, and the 1993 Toronto Blue Jays all won Game Six in the bottom of the ninth.

Fred Merkle’s sacrifice fly won Game Five for the 1911 New York Giants.

Vic Davalillo of the Los Angeles Dodgers bunted for a single in Game Six of the

So we have 22 Game Sixes. How many times did the batter keep the Series going? Fifteen times in only eight Series. There were three walks, ten hits, and two batters reaching on errors. Who walked? Besides Pujols in 2011, it was Jim Bottomley in 1930 and pinch-hitter Doc Gessler for the Cubs in 1906. He was followed by Solly Hofman, who singled. Jimmy Sheckard then reached on an error—he was 0-for-21 in the Series—before Wildfire Schulte grounded to first to end it all.

Who got the ten hits? Well, Hofman was one. Carter, Mitchell, and Knight all singled for the ’86 Mets. Freese tripled and Berkman singled in 2011. Besides these, Chick Hafey got a two-out double before Bottomley’s walk in 1930, Vic Davalillo singled in 1977, Otis Nixon singled in 1992, and Marquis Grissom singled in 1996.

In all, these 22 Game Sixes produced 35 plate appearances, 32 at-bats, three walks and 10 hits for a batting average of .313. (See Table 5.)

Points of interest. The weirdest single? It happened in 1977. With runners on first and third and two out, Dodgers pinch hitter Vic Davalillo bunted down the third base line. Graig Nettles of the Yankees came home with the throw, too late to nip Steve Garvey at the plate. Davalillo was credited with single. That made the score 8–4, New York, and then Lee Lacy, also a pinch hitter, popped up a bunt to pitcher Mike Torrez.

The 1992 Atlanta Braves staved off elimination with two out in the bottom of the ninth when Otis Nixon drove in Jeff Blauser to tie the score against Toronto. The Blue Jays scored a pair in the top of the eleventh, but the Braves answered with only one in the bottom of the eleventh, and Nixon made the final out with the tying run on third.

GAME SEVEN

Thirty-six Series have gone the distance. Each one had the potential to create a crucial last at-bat, but six of them did not arrive at this point. Two were decided in the ninth and four were decided in extra innings, all with the home team winning and none with the team in jeopardy reaching its final out.

That leaves us with 30 Game Sevens in which a batter on the losing team faced an elimination at-bat. So how many times did these batters succeed? Thirteen times in 10 Series. Nine hits, two walks, one hit batter, and Ed Kranepool reached on an error in 1973.

Who walked? Babe Ruth in 1926 before he was thrown out stealing and Jimmy Dykes in 1931. Darrell Chaney was hit by a pitch in 1972.

Who got the nine hits? There were six singles: Dib Williams and Doc Cramer in 1931, Duke Snider in 1956—before Jackie Robinson struck out in his final at-bat—Jerry Coleman and Tommy Byrne, another pitcher batting for himself, in 1957, and Joe Adcock in 1958. Willie Mays doubled in 1962, and then there were, incredibly, two homers, by Phil Linz in 1964 and Mike Shannon in 1968.

In all, forty-two plate appearances, 39 at-bats, nine hits, six strikeouts, one double play, and four fielder’s choices, all of which ended the game. 9-for-39, that’s .231. (See Table 6.)

Points of interest. The four extra-inning Game Sevens occurred in 1912, the Red Sox over the Giants; 1924, the Washington Nationals over the Giants; 1991, the Minnesota Twins over the Braves; and 1997, the Marlins over the Indians.

The other two games decided in the ninth were played in 1960, the Pirates beating the Yankees, and 2001, Arizona also beating the Yankees.

BEST-OF-NINE

Four Series have been played as best-of-nine: 1903, 1919, 1920, and 1921. There were six elimination games in these Series, but only four games with an elimination at-bat. Four at-bats, one fielder’s choice, one groundout, one double play, and Wagner’s strikeout. Batting average? .000. (See Table 7.)

FINAL THOUGHTS

Since 1903, there have been 108 Series and 167 elimination games. Faced with the chance to make the final out, batters have reached base 42 times, including eight walks and one hit-by-pitch. In 128 at-bats, batters have gotten only 27 hits and have struck out 18 times. But only one batter, for sure, besides Cabrera has been called out on strikes. That was Goose Goslin, Washington, 1925. So Cabrera was not “Beltraned,” as some said at the time, in honor of Adam Wainwright, who struck out Carlos Beltran to end the 2006 National League Championship Series. He was “Goosed.”

 Game Score vs. Starter Score

J. T. Grossmith

As an editor for most of my 38 years as a journalist, predominantly in daily newspapers, I became accustomed over time to looking for anomalies, errors or omissions in story lines and reasoning. It’s from that perspective that I began to question the methodology used in the Game Score (GS) metric for starting pitchers developed by Bill James. I have the greatest admiration and respect for James, who almost singlehandedly changed the way baseball is understood today, but admiration shouldn’t prevent one from questioning.

My recollection is that James began trying to measure the performance of starters after Roger Clemens’s 20-strikeout, three-hit, one-run performance versus the Seattle Mariners in 1986, a record for strikeouts in nine innings which has subsequently been tied but not surpassed.

In a blog entry from Baseball Beat, January 4, 2005, “Abstracts from the Abstract,” Rich Lederer attributes the following quote from the 1988 Abstract about Games Scores to Bill: “(It’s) a kind of garbage stat that I present not because it helps us understand anything in particular but because it is fun to play around with.”

At the very least, it’s a curious admission about a stat which has gained such credence over the years. Still, the idea of developing a measurement for starters certainly seemed worthwhile at the time and remains so today. Ten years later, Clemens struck out 20 a second time in the course of pitching a five-hit shutout. Interestingly, both games scored a 97 using the Game Score metric despite one being a five-hit shutout and the other a three-hit one-run game. The common elements were the 20 strikeouts, zero walks, and the complete game. In 1998, Kerry Wood of the Cubs matched Clemens’s 20-K effort—and surpassed him by posting an eye-popping 105 Game Score in the one-hit shutout.

Because of the importance Game Score gives to strikeouts, that 105 score is better than any achieved by pitchers who have thrown perfect games. The highest in that regard, 101, was posted by Sandy Koufax who struck out only 14 batters in his masterpiece against the Cubs on September 9, 1965, duplicated 47 years later by Matt Cain against Houston on June 13, 2012. As much as Wood’s outing in 1998 is impressive, a one-hitter should not outshine a perfect game. The same holds true for the two-walk one-hitter thrown by Brandon Morrow of the Blue Jays in 2010, which graded out at 100 in Game Score, surpassing the perfect game thrown by Roy Halladay earlier that season. Halladay’s performance only warranted a 98 by Game Score standards. Dallas Braden, who also pitched a perfect game in 2010, gets even shorter shrift under the Game Score metric because he fanned only six batters, resulting in a score of 93.

The deficiencies in Game Score wouldn’t be such a big deal if it had remained a fun stat, as I believe it was intended, but in recent years it has been elevated in status to that of the authoritative method for measuring a starter’s performance. GS is included in each box score on ESPN’s website and in the box scores on the otherwise superb Baseball-Reference.com site. As recently as during the 2010 postseason, Sports Illustrated ran a piece in which baseball writer Joe Posnanski waxed poetic about Game Score, calling it an “elegant little formula,” adding that while it was never supposed to be “little more than a bit of shorthand fun… I think it has turned out to be one of Bill’s more delightful inventions. The numbers just feel right.”

And that’s the problem. The more accepted Game Score becomes as part of the official record, the more difficult it will be to have it expunged. And when you see how it puts more emphasis on strikeouts than pitching a perfect game, much less a complete game, well that just doesn’t feel right.

Leon Cadore pitched 26 innings on May 1, 1920, good for a 112 game score. (His opponent, Joe Oeschger, also pitched all 26, but allowed fewer hits, netting an outsized 125 game score.)

James’s approach to evaluating players and their performance is to never set out to prove certain assumptions but rather to conduct a comprehensive search for objective knowledge. Admittedly, my approach to measuring performances of starting pitchers is less scholarly since I start from the position that a perfect game is the standard by which all pitching starts should be measured.

Game Score begins by awarding each starter 50 points; one point is added for every out during the nine innings; two points for each inning completed after the fourth and one point for each strikeout. From my perspective, several of the values are simply duplication. The two points for each inning after four in part duplicates the one point for each out, and the extra point for each strikeout also duplicates the point for each out. In effect, strikeouts are worth a minimum of two points and even more, albeit less than one full additional point, if they occur after the fourth inning.

On the other hand, the deductions he uses are spot on. They include two points for each hit allowed, four points for each earned run allowed, two points for each unearned run allowed, and one point for each walk. My complaint with the deduction element of the formula is that it does not go far enough, neglecting to take into account Hit Batters—one point deduction, the same as a Base on Balls would seem reasonable— while at the same time unfairly penalizing pitchers who are called upon to issue an Intentional Base on Balls, which is a managerial decision, not a performance issue.

For me, the starting point should reflect a score based on reaching the ultimate objective for each starting pitcher—aside from winning the game—and that is to face the minimum number of batters. Facing the absolute minimum of 27 and getting each man out is of course a perfect game and such an achievement deserves a perfect score: 100. That is the basis of my metric which I call Starter Score. As much as striking out 20 batters is exciting stuff—and, admittedly, there have been fewer 20-K performances than perfect games—the perfect game remains the gold standard for pitching and deserves more recognition and, accordingly, a better score.

From the perfect-game benchmark, it’s a matter of determining the score for those who don’t accomplish that objective. The most significant difference between Game Score (GS) and Starter Score (SS) is the emphasis put on the deduction for not pitching a complete game. You could argue that Game Score produces a similar result because more points are given for making outs after the fourth inning and for strikeouts. But the extra points for strikeouts are optional, whereas reducing the score of a starter who fails to pitch a complete game is what makes the most difference in Starter Score.

In a span of 50 years, the drop in the number of complete games pitched highlights the importance I have placed on pitching a complete game. According to online data in Baseball-Reference.com, more than one in four starts in the 1972 season resulted in a complete game by the pitcher (3,718 starts, 1,009 complete games, 27.1%), whereas in 2012, the number had dropped to less than one in every 38 starts (4,860 starts, 128 complete games, 2.6%).

So, let’s go back to the Clemens performance against the Tigers in 1996. His Game Score is an impressive 97, largely because of the 20 Ks. Using the Starter Score metric, Clemens gets a 90, which is not exactly chopped liver but he loses 10 of the 100 points for giving up five hits. Clemens’s second 20-K performance also rates a 90, while Roy Halladay’s perfect game in 2010 nets the full 100 Starter Score (only 98 using Game Score).

Sandy Koufax merited only a 101 game score for his perfect game on September 9, 1965, because he “only” struck out 14 batters.

It should be noted that Game Score and Starter Score have one objective in common and that is to provide a more valid definition of a Quality Start (QS). Presently, a QS is simply defined as completing six innings or more and allowing three earned runs or less, a yardstick that produces some less-than-desirable anomalies. Consider the following examples. In 1997, Randy Johnson struck out 19 in a complete game but allowed four earned runs. That, according to QS, is not a quality start even though four earned runs in nine innings produces a lower ERA than three earned runs in six innings: 4.00 vs 4.50. (By the way, using the GS methodology, Johnson’s performance grades out at 68 whereas in SS it is merely a 62. Six points might not seem like such a big deal, but given that Johnson did allow four earned runs, the lower score seems more appropriate, despite the 19 Ks.) Mark Mulder was credited with a quality start in July 2000 despite giving up 15 hits and nine runs—only two of which were earned. Game Score appropriately credits him with a miserable outing with a score of 26. Starter Score lowers the rating slightly to 25. As both examples illustrate, the Quality Start concept is fatally flawed, even more so than Game Score.

Both use factors that can misrepresent the quality of the performance. That is not possible in Starter Score because it does not have false values which add to a score. Instead, it simply deducts points using accepted and understood variables.

The difference between Game Score and Starter Score becomes more apparent when you look at another 1997 performance by Randy Johnson. In that game Johnson pitched six innings and allowed three earned runs—effectively, a quality start. (The rest of the line score is five strikeouts, five hits, and five walks). It is also a QS using the Game Score metric, receiving a rating of 50, in part due to the double counting of strikeouts and outs after the fourth inning.

(By the way, I don’t know why James picked four innings as his benchmark for GS, when four innings pitched doesn’t even qualify a starter for a win, regardless of how well he pitched.) Nonetheless, the six-inning Johnson outing only receives a 44 under SS, a score which more accurately reflects the quality of the start. The five hits and five walks that Johnson surrendered in six innings amounts to 1.67 walks plus hits per inning (WHIP), a less-thanstellar performance. It’s only six points but those six less points put the outing in proper perspective.

The one shortcoming of Starter Score is that it does not take into account games where a starter pitches more than nine innings, but from a contemporary perspective, that occurrence is so rare to the point of almost being irrelevant. There have only been five starters since the turn of the twenty-first century to pitch more than nine innings, the most recent being Cliff Lee’s 10-inning outing versus the Giants in April 2012. Prior to Lee, Aaron Harang exceeded nine innings on July 23, 2007, Roy Halladay did it twice, and Bartolo Colon and Mark Mulder once.

The appropriate methodology would be to add a point for each out recorded past nine innings. That produces the possibility of a pitcher recording a score of more than 100 if he pitches enough innings, superbly. For example, take the classic Harvey Haddix-Lew Burdette matchup on May 26, 1959. Haddix took a perfect game into the 13th inning before it was shattered by an error by third baseman Don Hoak. Burdette pitched a masterful game in his own right, scattering 12 hits over 13 innings without surrendering a run or a walk. Using SS, Burdette graded out at 88 while Haddix, despite giving up one run, scores 107. I don’t have a problem with giving a score of more than 100 to anyone who can pitch 12 perfect innings before eventually faltering after a teammate committed an error.

There are other instances where hurlers would garner more than 100 points using SS despite not throwing a perfect game, the most notable being the matchup on May 1, 1920, when Leon Cadore of the Brooklyn Robins and Joe Oeschger of the Boston Braves locked horns in a 26-inning standoff. Both pitchers surrendered one run in the course of the marathon. Oeschger merits the higher grading of the pair, 125, based on allowing nine hits, four walks, and one earned run over the course of almost three complete games. Cadore was not quite as dominating, allowing 15 hits and five walks as well as an earned run to post a 112 score. These are aberrations we are not likely to see in the future, but they serve the purpose of illustrating that extraordinary pitching performances, which these were, deserve extraordinary scores. That, to me, feels right.

Harvey Haddix gets a 107 game score for his classic 13-inning performance of May 26, 1959, against Lew Burdette.

The Team with the Most On-Base Percentage Titles

Bill Nowlin

Following up on my 2008 article “The OBP Triple Crown” (Baseball Research Journal, Vol. 37), it struck me recently that there is one team in baseball which has a disproportionate number of OBP champions to its credit: the Boston Red Sox. In the 112 seasons of American League baseball from 1901 through 2012, a Red Sox player has been the leader in On-Base Percentage 36 times. Almost a third of the time, a Red Sox player won the OBP title: 32.14 percent.

Of course, I knew Ted Williams ranked first 12 times. His success alone gave the Red Sox more than 10 percent. During the three years Williams served in the military during World War II, two Red Sox filled the top spot: Bob Johnson in 1944 and Eddie Lake in 1945. That caught my eye. I realized it might be worth looking into the annual results a little more. I knew that both Wade Boggs and Carl Yastrzemski had won a few on-base percentage titles, too.

The table speaks for itself. In major-league history, the player who won the OBP title most often was indeed Ted Williams, with 12. He remains the all-time leader in On-Base Percentage with a career 48.2 mark—incredibly, reaching base almost 50 percent of the time over a career which ran from 1939 through 1960. Two players are tied for second place with ten titles each: Babe Ruth and Barry Bonds. One can legitimately question what might have been behind Bonds’s accomplishment in the early twenty-first century, but unless the figures were to be expunged a la Lance Armstrong’s Tour de France titles (and which seems very unlikely), he’s there and tied with The Babe. Rogers Hornsby had nine titles, Ty Cobb seven, and Stan Musial and Boggs six. No other player has more than five. Presented by league, the rank order of those with four or more OBP titles to their credit are

as follows:

Table 1. Individual OBP Winners by Number of Seasons

National League    American League

Barry Bonds 10       Ted Williams 12

Rogers Hornsby 9   Babe Ruth 10

Stan Musial 6           Ty Cobb 7

Billy Hamilton 5        Wade Boggs 6

Richie Ashburn 4     Lou Gehrig 5

Joe Morgan 4          Carl Yastrzemski 5

Mel Ott 4                   Rod Carew 4

Honus Wagner 4     Frank Thomas 4

Tris Speaker 4

Incidentally, nine of Ruth’s ten OBP titles are credited to the New York Yankees; only his 1919 win helps bolster Boston’s winning percentage. It is parenthetically interesting to note that three years in which Ruth led in OBP (1923, 1924, and 1927), he also led the league in strikeouts. Williams struck out less than 11 percent of the time over the course of his career; neither Williams nor Bonds ever led their league in strikeouts.

Even with the National League starting in 1876, and thus offering 25 more possible titles to any given team, no single team approaches the Red Sox in the sheer number of OBP titles. The Red Sox hold 36. The top NL team is the Phillies with 22 titles. The Phils owe their many titles in large part to Billy Hamilton with five OBP crowns and Richie Ashburn and Mike Schmidt with three apiece.

Ted Williams led the American League in OBP 12 times.

Looking at which teams had a player winning the OBP title, the list comes out this way:

Table 2. Ballclubs Represented by OBP Champions by Number of Seasons

National League 

Philadelphia Phillies 22 (16.1%) 

Giants (incl. NY) 21 (15.3%) 

St. Louis Cardinals 20 (14.6%) 

Chicago Cubs 16 

Pittsburgh Pirates 14 

Cincinnati Reds 13 

Braves 9 Chicago 

Dodgers 7

American League

Boston Red Sox 36 (32.14%)

New York Yankees 20 (17.9%)

Detroit Tigers 13 (11.6%)

Athletics 10

Minnesota Twins 8

Cleveland Indians 7

White Sox 6

The rest of the teams have four or fewer titles to their credit. The Buffalo Bisons have two (1882 and 1883) and the Providence Grays have one (1879). The only cities in either league to have not yet had an OBP winner are Anaheim, Houston, Phoenix, and Tampa.

We are not counting the National Association, the American Association, the Federal League, or any other league in this article. Had we done so, we might wish to note that Dan Brouthers won five titles spread over three leagues. The NL’s 1887 Detroit Wolverines are not counted toward the AL figures, nor is the title won by Cupid Childs of the NL’s 1892 Cleveland Spiders.

And, considering the names of the winners, we do see a Cuckoo as well as a Cupid, and 1926 NL winner Cuckoo Christensen has to be one of the least likely winners. He won it with a 42.6 mark in his rookie season and played in only 57 more majorleague games, though he played in the minors through the 1934 season.

Acknowlegments

Thanks to Lyle Spatz and Cliff Blau.

Additional Corrections in the Official Record (1920–44) of Runs Scored for Detroit Tigers Players

Herm Krabbenhoft

In a previous article I provided the corrections of the run-scored errors I discovered in the official records for Detroit Tigers players during the 1920–44 seasons.1 A total of 35 games involving 37 players—including Hall of Famers Ty Cobb, Heinie Manush, Charlie Gehringer, and Hank Greenberg—had run-scored errors. Each of the changes I suggested to correct the run-scored errors was approved by the Elias Sports Bureau, the official statistician for Major League Baseball.

The research procedure I employed at that time consisted of comparing the run-scored information provided in the box scores in The New York Times with the run-scored information provided in the official Day-By-Day (DBD) records, then resolving any discrepancies by reviewing the text accounts of the games in all of the relevant newspapers. I used the three major daily newspapers published in Detroit (Free Press, News, and Times) as well as at least one newspaper published in the city of the team opposing the Tigers. That method left one type of error that would not be caught, as I wrote, “If there is a run-scored error in both the newspaper box score and the official DBD record.”

In my subsequent R/RBI research, I have followed a more rigorous research procedure—first ascertaining the complete details for each and every run scored in a game during a season and then comparing these R/RBI results with the R/RBI stats in baseball‘s official DBD records.2,3,4,5 In the course of ascertaining the accurate RBI record of Hank Greenberg I have discovered—and corrected—three additional games with run-scored errors for Detroit Tigers players during the 1931–46 seasons.

The corrections of these additional run-scored errors in the official baseball records are presented in this Addendum—See Table 1.

Table 1 shows that the three additional run-scored error games involve five players, including Hall of Famers Greenberg and Goose Goslin. Implementation of these single-game corrections results in changes to the runs scored totals the players achieved in the given seasons as well as in their Detroit Tigers careers—See Table 2.

The most significant consequence of implementing the corrections to the run-scored errors described here is that Greenberg’s 1938 AL-leading total is now 143 runs (not 144).

The full appendix of my documentation for this paper is available for examination on the SABR website (http://sabr.org/node/29043). The documentation was also provided to the Elias Sports Bureau (Seymour Siwoff and Steve Hirdt), Pete Palmer (whose statistical database is utilized in the SABR Encyclopedia), and Retrosheet (Dave Smith and Tom Ruane) for their review. Hirdt stated that he “would take a look at the evidence.”6 Palmer wrote, “Herm has gone far beyond my work in verifying baseball stats. I have no reason to doubt his research, which is thorough and accurate.”7 And, for each of the three games (Table 1), Ruane wrote, “I agree with your findings.”8

Goose Goslin is one Hall of Famer whose career totals need adjustment.

Rudy York’s season totals in runs scored for both 1938 and 1944 are in need of updating.

References

1. Herm Krabbenhoft, “The Authorized Correction of Errors in Runs Scored in the Official Records (1920-44) for Detroit Tigers Players,” Baseball Research Journal (Spring, 2011):66.

2. Herm Krabbenhoft, “Lou Gehrig’s RBI Record,” Baseball Research Journal (Fall, 2011):12.

3. Herm Krabbenhoft, “Hank Greenberg’s American League RBI Record,” Baseball Research Journal (Spring, 2012): 20.

4. Herm Krabbenhoft, “Lou Gehrig’s RBI Record: 1923-1939,” Baseball Research Journal (Fall, 2012): 10.

5. Herm Krabbenhoft, “The Accurate RBI Record of Babe Ruth,” Baseball Research Journal (Spring, 2013): 37.

6. Steve Hirdt, personal communication via telephone call, June 20, 2013.

7. Pete Palmer, personal communication via email correspondence, June 26, 2013.

8. Tom Ruane, personal communication via email correspondence, July 3, 2013.

The Future of Baseball Contracts

A Look at the Growing Trend in Long-Term Contracts

Jim Turvey

Baseball contracts seem to be headed increasingly in the same direction; teams are trying to lock up their younger (particularly homegrown) stars to long-term deals before they hit the free agent market, which would drive up the price for a player. The Reds did it with Joey Votto (10 years, $225 million), and Ryan Braun inked a five-year extension on top of his current seven-year deal. Ryan Zimmerman got six years on top of five, and Troy Tulowitski is locked up through 2020. Even pitchers such as Madison Bumgarner have deals with club options until 2019, despite pitchers formerly being considered high-risk commodities. To a lesser extent, we see the signings of Chris Sale (five years, $32.5 million with two team-option years), Andrew McCutchen (six years, $51.5 million with one team-option year), and the contracts given to Matt Cain, Cole Hamels, Ian Kinsler, Adam Wainwright, David Wright, and numerous others, as heralding the future of baseball contracts.

These contracts carry “boom or bust” potential for both the player and the franchise. In the player’s case, he is guaranteeing himself a great deal of money, but at the same time, he is putting a ceiling on his earnings. He is potentially giving up an even greater sum if he were to hit the open market of free agency. When teams try to outbid each other, the player’s payday can skyrocket without the player having to do anything.

On the flip side, the same can be said of the team’s long-term investment in the player. They can keep him from hitting the open market and prevent that salary jump, but there is also a great amount of risk in committing several millions of dollars a year for a decade. A lot can change in a year, let alone 10: Players can be injured, skills can erode, projections can be wrong. Balancing this risk-reward is a huge part of building a successful franchise.

In the NHL, contracts have moved to ridiculous lengths with players receiving 13-, 14-, and 15-year deals, with some offers up to 17 years.1 These contracts extend an unprecedented distance into the future and pay their players well past their fortieth birthdays. Even goalies, often considered on par with pitchers risk-wise, are receiving well over 10 years regularly in contracts. Despite the fact that teams have already been burned by this (the two longest were bought out or had the player leave the NHL less than halfway through the contract), not much has slowed down near-sighted owners looking to guarantee their franchise a “star” at any cost.

The success/failure rate of those contracts in hockey is a matter for a different publication, but whether the same can be said for baseball is certainly relevant. First of all, baseball teams have much higher revenue than hockey teams. In 2013, baseball payrolls topped $3 billion for the first time. The Dodgers, in particular, have become a team with bottomless pockets. Just to get Adrian Gonzalez at six years and $127 million, LA took on the poisonous contracts of Carl Crawford (five years, $102.5 million remaining) and Josh Beckett (two years and $31.5 million to go). In the offseason shortly thereafter they dropped just shy of $150 million on Zach Greinke and paid over $25 million “Dice-K dollars” to negotiate a $36 million contract on Hyun-Jin Ryu.

Revenue for player salaries used to be tied to attendance, drawn from the team’s ticket sales, concessions, and merchandise. Recently, though, teams that have traditionally not spent as much are finding a way to join the bigger spending teams at the top of the payroll billing: TV contracts. The Los Angeles Angels have become big spenders entering the top ten in payroll for the 2013 season thanks to big ticket signings like Albert Pujols and CJ Wilson before the 2012 season, and Josh Hamilton before 2013. TV deals have given some teams a significant bump in revenue—not quite Dodgers money, but enough to affect the economics of the sport.

Baseball is already on a substantial revenue upswing. Accounting for inflation, baseball has increased its revenue by 257 percent since 1995, and due to—you guessed it—TV contracts is potentially looking at nearly a $1.5 billion increase from only 2012 to 2014.2 What will this mean when it comes to handing out contracts? How much does a win really cost? There have been several different analyses done surrounding this question, but for these two case studies, Fangraphs studies of how $/WAR are valued in the open market will be used. According to Matt Swartz’s comprehensive breakdown of player contracts over a five-year window (2007–11), the average $/WAR in baseball was $4.92.3 With long-term contracts, teams assume the risk that their players will remain healthy and productive, as well as that contract values will keep rising. Some researchers argue that locking these players up before they hit the open market is actually the more risk-averse tactic. The long-term deal shifts the risk into the future, specifically, to the end of the contract when the player is not as productive, and the contract can possibly be moved (a la Alfonso Soriano from the Cubs to the Yankees in 2013).4

This article is not meant to be an in-depth analysis of every long-term contract, but a case study of two of the high profile deals signed by franchises which, in recent years, have climbed from years of obscurity into perennial pennant contention: the Tampa Bay Rays’ signing of Evan Longoria and the Texas Rangers doing the same for Elvis Andrus.

Longoria seems to be at a crossroads in his young career right now. He is the face of the franchise, which makes sense, as he is an immensely talented, highly touted, marketable, young superstar. He won Rookie of the Year his first year with the Rays, and posted 100/33/113 R/HR/RBI totals in his second year. He won the Gold Glove twice in his first three years, and probably deserved it in 2011, despite missing almost 30 games.

And therein lies the question: Longoria not only missed that time in 2011, but significant action in 2012. In 2011, he posted a batting average under .250, by far his lowest during his time in the majors. The Rays have contracted through 2023, and will pay him nearly $20 million in 2022. They need him to be the elite player he seemed at the outset.

Longoria’s career arc has resembled another player’s: Scott Rolen. Baseball-Reference.com has Rolen as the most similar player to Longoria at the ages of 24 and 25. Rolen is an excellent choice for comparison because, like Longoria, he won Rookie of the Year, was an excellent fielder, started his career with excellen power numbers, and had injury concerns creep up early in his playing days.

Projecting a player’s career arc is an art that has been attempted since the beginning of baseball, and has yet to be perfected. Comparing two players is a dangerous endeavor as no two careers are perfectly parallel; however, the comparison can offer a road map of how Longoria’s career could unfold. Looking back in an attempt to look forward is a tried and true method that spans all fields of study, giving us an inexact lens through which to view the future.

Table 1 looks at Scott Rolen’s rWAR totals. Each season of Rolen’s coincides with a specific year of Longoria’s contract and the money he will receive that season. This begins with Rolen in his age-27 season, the age Longoria was in 2013. The next two columns show the league average $/WAR (projected) and the verdict on whether or not the contract would be worth its value in the open market for the Rays. The $/WAR starts at 5.2 million, which was derived from the previously mentioned 4.92 million $/WAR found in Matt Swartz’s study, accounting for the time value of money outside of baseball. Being two years removed from that 2011 study, and with a three percent inflation rate increase accounted for, 5.2 million $/WAR is the result. Each progressive year is prorated at the three percent interest rate, as well.

According to this analysis, Longoria will certainly be worth the value of his contract as a whole and would only be overpaid in four of the 11 seasons. Those rough seasons, if due in most part to injuries—certainly something Longoria is not immune to— would be more than made up for if his career was to follow Rolen’s career arc. The end of the contract does get a little messy for the Rays, but the middle and front-end bargains make it more than worthwhile overall. The team banks on getting so much out of the deal at the beginning that the end can be less than ideal and still have the whole contract be beneficial to the club. Note these data were collected before the beginning of the 2013 season, and as this article was going to press, Longoria has been worth 5.2 rWAR through 142 Rays games. Prorated to 162 games this becomes 5.9 rWAR, which is very close to Rolen’s 6.2 rWAR that was projected for 2013.

The upticks in $/rWAR that have been accounted for in Table 1 could potentially be more gradual than we will see in baseball. With the aforementioned large TV contracts on the way for most ball clubs, we could see some absolutely absurd contracts going forward. On the other hand, the future of baseball contracts may be headed in the direction of more efficient spending. The Dodgers may be able to spend without limit, but we’ve already seen the Yankees cutting payroll, which is something that seemed unheard of a few seasons ago. With the success of teams like the Rays, A’s, Pirates, and Royals, building up a farm system may seem preferable to being profligate with contracts. Another possibility that could steer teams away from going wild with spending would be if MLB adopted a salary cap, and with it, some harsh repercussions for repeat violators, as the latest collective bargaining agreement in the NBA does. The NBA has also seen a movement toward draft picks being valued more highly, as some small market teams have become contenders without big free agents.

One issue with a limited case study is that it relies on a small sample size for comparison. If Bob Horner, another player with a high similarity score to Longoria, had been used, the 3.9 rWAR he was worth after the age of 26 would have been a complete disaster for the Longoria contract. The same goes for Hank Blalock, who was worth only 1.1 WAR after the age of 26. On the other hand, Chipper Jones was worth 57.3 WAR during the eleven corresponding years of his career. Right in the middle is Aramis Ramirez: worth 24.2 WAR and counting. Looking at Longoria’s contract through the lens of Scott Rolen’s career from a strictly $/WAR perspective is one thing, but there is more to it.

Of all the long-term deals signed, Longoria’s is for the least amount per year, and could very well be the best bang-for-your-buck deal. It takes a lot of guts (or in some cases not a lot of brains) to sign a guy to a contract that runs until this year’s second graders are graduating from high school, and baseball history is littered with proof of contracts gone wrong (see Zito, Barry) but the Rays needed to make a statement. Analyzing wins says nothing about the other contributions to franchise success that the Longoria deal makes. By signing the face of their franchise to a mega-deal, the Rays show their fan base a different side from what they are used to.

Although the front office may be frugal with money, they show they do know how to reward their stars and place a significant emphasis on winning. (Elsewhere in Florida Jeffrey Loria should be paying attention.)

The second part of this case study is a look at Elvis Andrus and the Rangers. Andrus is a solid player and already has two All-Star game appearances at the ripe age of 24. However, he also hasn’t posted a season with an OPS+ over 94, and has only topped 150 R+RBI in one season (156 in 2011). There’s also the fact that in Jurickson Profar, the Rangers have one of baseball’s top prospects and their supposed future starting shortstop, sitting in a reserve role and stuck behind Andrus in the depth chart. Barring an Andrus trade, Profar isn’t going to see any time at shortstop in Arlington for a while. With Ian Kinsler locked up through 2017, and Adrian Beltre playing at an All-Star level at third, even with a position-switch Profar seems to be pretty well blocked to any consistent starting job in Texas.

Putting that aside for the time being, however, let’s take a look at Andrus’s contract from a strictly dollars and WAR sense as we did for Longoria. The highest similarity score on Baseball-Reference for Andrus is Alan Trammell. Both players reached the big leagues at a very young age and relied heavily on their gloves in their first four years to make their impact with their respective teams. A quick comparison of the two through their age-23 seasons shows the similarities:

Table 2. Elvis Andrus and Alan Trammel Career Totals through Age-23 Season

Andrus, so far, has contributed 12.8 rWAR with 10.6 oWAR and 5.5 dWAR (oWAR and dWAR can not simply be added together because there is also positional adjustment included) while Trammell’s numbers through 1981 were as follows: 11.4 rWAR with 10.4 oWAR and 4.8 dWAR. So the players clearly have very similar numbers, and the slightly lower R/HR/RBI splits for Trammell can be attributed to playing in a time in which offense was harder to come by, as well as Andrus having the boost of a potent Rangers lineup behind him. Using Trammell as the basis for Andrus’s future, as we did for the Rolen/Longoria comparison; the eight-year contract extension would play out as shown in Table 3.

Andrus’s chart is very different from Longoria’s. By this measure, the Rangers won’t pay over market value for Andrus until 2023, which they wouldn’t even be on the hook for using Trammell’s career numbers.

Both the rWAR total, and the salary for Andrus are higher than Longoria’s, but Trammell stayed much healthier than Rolen, which was a huge factor. Andrus has never missed more than twenty games in a season—a feat Longoria has “achieved” each of the last two years—making the comparison a fair one.

To say that Trammell had an exceptionally healthy career is a bit of an understatement. Trammell was able to average 143 GP per season 1982–90, a task that Andrus may find difficult to replicate. Despite the fact that through his first four seasons, he averaged 150 GP, the health Trammell achieved over such an extended period of time is a challenge for any player. Another difference of note is that while Elvis may start to leave the building a little more frequently, he will be hard-pressed to reach the 49 home runs in a two-year stretch that Trammell did in 1986–87. Andrus has shown no signs of a decline in his fielding ability, a key component to his value to the Rangers in the past and potentially the future. As noted with Longoria above, these data were collected before the 2013 season, when this paper went to press, Elvis Andrus has been worth 3.4 rWAR through 143 Rangers’ games. Prorated to 162 games, this total would be 3.9 rWAR, once again, nearly on par with his projection of 4.2 rWAR.

In 2011, Evan Longoria posted a batting average under .250, far below the expectations of the team that has him under contract through 2023. (Photo credit: NATIONAL BASEBALL HALL OF FAME LIBRARY, COOPERSTOWN, NY)

Trammell is only one of the possible comparisons for Andrus. The second-best comparison on Baseball-Reference for Andrus at his current age is 1925–36 journeyman shortstop Mark Koenig. After the age of 23, Koenig was worth barely over 3.5 rWAR. On the other hand, Roberto Alomar was also worth over 50.0 WAR for the same years as Andrus’s contract. Edgar Renteria provides the middle-of-the-road example in this case, being worth 23.1 WAR for the length of Andrus’s contract. Both Rolen and Trammell were selected because they provided the most similar styles to Longoria and Andrus, while putting up very similar numbers, but as previously noted, a case study such as this is limited.

But as with Longoria, there are other elements of value to consider in the big picture. As mentioned, there is still the matter of Profar. He is baseball’s top prospect, and will need a home soon. If the Rangers deal him because Andrus is blocking his way, it could very well be something the Rangers regret for a long while, as the Red Sox did with Jeff Bagwell.

More intriguing, however, is something raised in another of Matt Swartz's studies at Fangraphs. This one, examining positional values through the 2011 season, concludes that shortstop is the position on which teams pay the least amount of $/fWAR, and the price is dropping. According to his research, teams paid 4.6 million $/fWAR at SS in 2009, 3.2 million $/fWAR in 2010, and 2.7 $/fWAR in 2011—a trend that has to be disturbing to Rangers’ fans.6

This information from Fangraphs was not incorporated into Table 2 for two reasons. First, the previous analysis of Longoria’s contract used the progressive $/rWAR system and we retained it for consistency. The other reason is that with Profar lurking, Andrus may be switched to third to make room for him (if Beltre were to leave). In such a case, his positional value might be different for the majority of his contract. However, knowing that the shortstop position is worth $3 million/fWAR and may be trending down, one can start to see the cracks in this contract for the Rangers. For the entirety of Andrus’ contract, the Rangers do spend less than 3 million $/fWAR—and that number drops to around 2.5 million $/fWAR with that final season eliminated.

One worry we have not touched on is that players with long-term contracts may begin to rest on their laurels, enjoying the guaranteed income they have received, and no longer pushing themselves. Multiple researchers have dispelled this worry, including J.G. Maxcy, Anthony Krautmann, and John Solow.7,8

Their work has shown that even if it is due to their hopes for yet another contract, there won’t be a drop in production from these players merely because of the long-term nature of their contracts.

The results of this case study show that both Longoria’s and Andrus’s contracts are a good value for the Rays and Rangers respectively. There’s no perfect way to analyze contracts into the future, but the future of combating small sample size problems may be in clustering players by similarity, as SABR President Vince Gennaro discussed during his presentation at SABR 43. Gennaro's analysis in that presentation was on batter-pitcher match-ups, but the technique of extrapolating potential performance based on clustering can be extended to other parts of the game. The idea is that by using the minute breakdowns in performance data now available to us, we can group pitchers with similar performance attributes into clusters.

In the future, we may be able to compare Longoria not only to Rolen, but perhaps to all players in the Rolen similarity cluster, thereby eliminating the extremes of small sample size error.

To cite Gennaro again, another point that has to be made in this analysis is that not all wins—or in this case WAR—are created equal. A prime example would be to go back to the beginning of this paper, and use the case of Troy Tulowitski. Tulowitski and Longoria will both be worth around 6.0 WAR in 2013, but this does not mean each team has gotten the same return on the value of their contracts. The six wins that Longoria has been worth for the Rays have kept them in the Wild Card race, and as of this minute, are the difference between the Rays making the playoffs as the second Wild Card, or missing out on the playoffs entirely. Making the playoffs can be a huge source of revenue for a team, and is part of the reason Gennaro states that wins 91–100 are worth exponentially more than wins 86–90 (which in turn are worth exponentially more than wins 1–86).9

Elvis Andrus already has two All-Star appearances by age 24, but is his value to his team tempered by the fact that the top prospect in all of MLB is behind him on the depth chart? (Photo credit: NATIONAL BASEBALL HALL OF FAME LIBRARY, COOPERSTOWN, NY)

The six wins that Tulowitski has produced are the difference between the Rockies finishing with 76 wins, or merely 70. Both the Rays and Rangers are currently in that tier in which 3.0–4.0 WAR can be the difference between making the playoffs or missing out, which adds even more value to both Longoria’s and Andrus’s contracts as of this moment. If either team were to slip out of the playoff picture in the coming years, those contracts essentially decrease in value, which is yet another risk for the team when it comes to long-term deals.

One final note is on a related question: will baseball ever see another free-agent class stocked with multiple, bona fide super-stars? Except for Robinson Cano, the biggest names set to become free agents after the 2013 season are Shin-Soo Choo and Hideki Kuroda—not exactly the A-list free agents seen in the past. Teams are locking their players up more and more often, preventing teams like the Yankees and Red Sox from being able to sign all the big names in the off-season. This trend puts an emphasis on producing home grown talent, and being able to coach this talent to succeed at the big league level. This leveling of the playing field seems to be a generally good thing for baseball, so if that means more uber-contracts for players before they hit the open market, I’m all for it.

Notes

1. Nicholas Goss, “Why NHL ‘Lifetime’ Contracts are a Terrible Idea,” Bleacher Report, August 22, 2012, http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1306796-why-lifetime-contracts-are-a-terrible-idea-in-the-nhl; Chris Yuscavage, “New Jersey Devils Forward Ilya Kovalchuk Retires at 30, Gives Up $77 Million Remaining on Contract,” Complex Sports, July 11, 2013, www.complex.com/sports/2013/07/ilya-kovalchukretires-30-gives-up-77-million.

2. Maury Brown, “MLB Revenues Could Approach $9 Billion by 2014,” The Biz of Baseball, December 10, 2012, http://bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5769:mlb-revenues-75bfor-2012-could-approach-9b-by-2014&catid=30:mlb-news&Itemid=42.

3. Matt Swartz, “A Retrospective Look at the Price of a Win,” Fangraphs.com, August 14, 2012, www.fangraphs.com/blogs/a-retrospective-look-at-the-price-of-a-win.

4. Joel G. Maxcy, “Motivating Long-term Employment Contracts: Risk Management in Major League Baseball.” Journal of Sports Economics 25.2 (2004): 109–20. Accessed September 10, 2013.

5. www.baseball-reference.com/players/l/longoev01.shtml#contracts.

6. Matt Swartz, “Positional Differences in the Price of WAR,” Fangraphs.com, February 16, 2012, http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/index.php/positional-differences-in-the-price-of-war-2.

7. Joel G. Maxcy, “Do Long-term Contracts Influence Performance in Major League Baseball?” Advances in the Economics of Sport. Wallace E. Hendricks (ed.) Vol. 2. Greenwich, CT: JAI, 1997. 157–76.

8. Anthony C. Krautmann and John L. Solow, “The Dynamics of Performance Over the Duration of Major League Baseball Long-Term Contracts,” Journal of Sports Economics 10.1 (2009): 6–22. Accessed September 10, 2013.

9. Vince Gennaro, Diamond Dollars: The Economics of Winning in Baseball, Hingham, MA: Maple Street Press, 2007.

Prospects, Promotions and Play-off Races

Do They Bring Fans to Minor League Games?

David C. Ogden, Ph.D., John Shorey, M.S., and Kevin Warneke, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

Minor league baseball has undergone a resurgence, exemplified by record-setting attendance and a growing number of new ballparks. Much research has focused on factors that drive attendance. Chief among those factors is promotions, with numerous studies showing that giveaways and sponsored off-the-field activities at games can increase gate receipts. The quality of the team and the draw of the game itself may play a lesser role, at least at the minor league level. Research has also focused on spectator demographics (particularly sex and age) and their influence on baseball consumption.

This study of 560 spectators at triple-A games in Omaha, Nebraska, and Des Moines, Iowa, found that the impact of promotions and “non-baseball” diversions at the park may be overestimated. The study also found that women, while being less likely to pay attention to the game, comprise a major component of minor league attendance.

INTRODUCTION

Minor league baseball in the U.S. has undergone a renaissance. Not only has attendance averaged just over41 million during the past four years,1 but new minor league stadia dot urban and suburban landscapes throughout the nation. Many of these new stadia have been designed to accommodate more than just baseball fans. These facilities cater to the family with non-baseball activities for children and adults. New Britain Stadium, which opened in 1996 as the home of the double-A New Britain (CT) Rock Cats, has its “Fun Zone,” featuring an interactive game area, where spectators can play computerized games, such as Guitar Hero.2 New Britain Stadium has an inflatable “moon bounce” and slide, an amenity that one can also find at Joseph L. Bruno Stadium, built in 2002 in Troy, NY, home to the Tri-City Valley Cats of the New York-Penn League.3

One of the newer minor league stadia, Werner Park, offers even more side activities. Werner Park, home to the triple-A Omaha Storm Chasers (an affiliate of the Kansas City Royals), boasts a merry-go-round, a kids inflatable play area, a basketball court, a whiffle ball field, a picnic/party pavilion, and food and drink vendors throughout the concourse. Werner Park opened in 2011 and was designed to offer entertainment that catered to the entire family. New parks such as Werner are built on the premise that the experience “has to be more than just a baseball game.”4 Without other activities, a stadium and its team are likely to suffer at the turnstiles and neglect the entertainment needs of the entire family. That’s what much of the literature on minor league baseball attendance would lead one to believe. Some minor league team executives believe that most spectators at their ballparks don’t pay much attention to the game. Instead spectators spend as much time enjoying stadium amenities and between-inning activities, such as promotions or giveaways.5

However, quality of play on the field also matters, according to some literature; but it begs the question: How do minor league teams balance what they offer on the field with the entertainment and diversions off the field? This study offers insight to baseball administrators as to what entices baseball fans to attend their games and what brings them back.

Considering the large sums of money spent by minor league teams and their sponsors on off-field entertainment, the answer to the question has ramifications for the business and the patrons of minor league baseball.

Knowing what spectators enjoy most is the first step in addressing this. The researchers intend to use this study to determine what draws spectator attention most: the game itself or the side attractions, many of which have little to do with the game. So the overriding questions are: In offering non-baseball activities, does minor league management detract from the main event, the play on the field? If fans pay attention to the game and cite that as the main attraction, do minor league teams need to devote as much of their budget to non-baseball activities as they do? The answers can be found only by first addressing the research questions (RQs) that guide this study. The following RQs served as the basis for developing a survey to tap spectators’ interests during their visits to the ballpark.

RQ1: Do spectators pay attention to off-field activities as much, if not more, than they pay attention to the game itself?

RQ2: Are there differences in what spectators enjoy in a stadium like Werner Park, when compared to Principal Park, an older stadium in Des Moines, Iowa, which offers less in the way of off-field family entertainment?

RQ3: Do a spectator’s demographics (specifically sex and age) affect what that person enjoys most at the ballpark?

This paper will address those questions and discuss other aspects related to a spectator’s experience at minor league games by drawing from the spectators’ responses to the survey during minor league (triple-A) baseball games. The methodology departs from most baseball spectator studies that depend on year-to-year attendance figures in comparing attendance trends with team records and promotions or that are based on recall by respondents long after they have attended a game. Thus, the research for this paper has immediacy as an advantage by tapping into spectators’ feelings and preferences during (or immediately after) the actual event and reflects how those attending games view their experiences at the ballpark.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Much of the research on baseball spectatorship in the minor leagues follows two divergent paths. Studies focus on the economics of baseball spectatorship. These studies compare various characteristics of minor league baseball organizations (i.e. team record, promotions, give-aways, marketing strategies, multi-season won-loss record) and how those characteristics influence overall attendance and the organization’s revenues. Other studies take a sociological perspective in profiling the demographics of baseball spectators and focus on rituals or behaviors of baseball spectators either watching or listening to games via mass media or attending games.

Many of the studies by sports economists on minor league baseball focus on the impact of promotions and give-aways on attendance. For example, researchers Lorna Gifis and Paul Sommers found that among all promotions, post-game fireworks shows had the greatest impact on attendance.6 Richard Cebula and his colleagues estimated that in the Carolina League, postgame fireworks increased game attendance by an average of 32 percent.7 The Savannah Sand Gnats, a minor league team in the South Atlantic League, claim that Friday-night fireworks are a main attraction and draw a primary target audience—families with young children.8 “Fireworks are family fun and increase the entertainment,” said Sand Gnats general manager Bradley Dodson. “Kids want to see baseball and parents want to see wholesomeness. There is nothing more wholesome than fireworks with patriotic music in the background.”9

Give-aways, especially player bobbleheads, also drove up attendance, as did giveaways of such items as magnetized team schedules, caps, jerseys, and helmets. 10,11 John Siegfried and Jeff Eisenberg estimated that free merchandise could result in an extra 1,600 fans during the course of the season for a team that draws 69,000 fans annually, and reduced ticket prices can yield another 975 spectators.12 Similarly, research has shown that discounts on tickets for families and groups are also attendance generators.13 The research on other promotions, such as food and drink specials, yield mixed results. Cebula found that such specials contribute to attendance, while Tyler Anthony and colleagues found that reduced food and beer prices had no impact.14,15 Anthony also reported that theme nights and even free tickets had a negligible effect.

The quality of the team and the stadium or field where it plays may also impact attendance. Young Lee and Trenton Smith argue that access to and layout of the ballpark can keep fans coming back or keep them away.16 Kirk Wakefield, Jeffrey Blodgett, and Hugh Sloan maintain that the “sportscape,” or the layout of the stadium, “was shown to strongly influence spectators [sic] desire to stay and re-patronize games at that facility.”17 Spectators want easy access to concessions and restrooms, and those interested in the game itself want to be close to the action on the field. Wakefield advises sports venue managers to pay attention to what spectators want and where spectators sit in relation to what those patrons desire from the event.18

Team quality is also a mitigating factor for attendance, especially at the major league level. But team quality can also affect attendance in the minor leagues, despite spectators’ realization that players are more transient as they move up the minor league ladder or as they are called up by the parent major league club (although some spectators might not be aware that the players are controlled and owned by the parent major league club and not by the minor league team management).

Siegfried and Eisenberg said this is especially true at the double-A and triple-A level, where quality of play has a “substantial” effect on attendance.19 Some of this effect for triple-A teams may be related to top-ranked prospects who are one level away from making the roster of the parent major league team.

Seth Gitter and Thomas Rhoads said that a top five prospect can increase attendance during a season by 2%, and some top prospects may have a more dramatic effect on attendance.20 The authors point to Stephen Strasburg, a minor league phenom who made a quick ascension through the minor league ranks of the Washington Nationals. “In his first three games pitching for the Syracuse Chiefs [the National’s triple- A club], attendance was about three times greater than games when he did not pitch and two of these games became the top two attendance days for his team.”21 A visitor to Alliance Bank Stadium in Syracuse in early June 2010 was told by some fans that he would not have been able to buy tickets to the game at the main gate that evening had Strasburg been pitching that day.22

In earlier research, Gitter and Rhoads found that quality of play also affects attendance at the single-A minor league level. They found that a 10 percent increase in winning percentage translates to a two percent increase in attendance.23 Those findings support the research of Cebula and colleagues. Their research on teams in the Carolina League (single-A) found that ticket sales and attendance was “positively impacted by runs scored by the home team. Team performance counts!”24

However, there seems to be some debate over how much attention minor league spectators give to the play on the field. Some officials in minor league sports believe that quality of play takes a backseat to promotions and off-field entertainment. Craig Bommert, a vice-president of a minor league sports team, reflects the opinions of many minor league executives when he says that minor league sports are strictly about entertainment and minor league organizations are more likely competing with restaurants and movies than other sporting venues. Said Bommert: “Most of your crowd will not even know what the score is when they leave the building. Don’t make it about the game. If you lose you still want them to leave with a smile.”25

The results of this study state otherwise. While the impact of promotions and team and stadium dynamics on attendance and ticket revenues has been the primary focus of minor league baseball research by sports economists, sports sociologists have looked at various demographic and psychographic differences among those who attend games and consume sports via mass media. Sex and age have been two variables commonly studied in sports sociology. Numerous studies have shown that men are more likely than women to be socialized to embrace individualism and to engage in competition, while women are more likely to be socialized to support the welfare of family and other primary groups. These differences carry over into sport.26

Men are more likely than women to learn that social standing and image “hinge on accomplishments in a competitive world”27 while women are more likely to measure their lives through their “webs of connection.” 28 In a study of more than 1,100 spectators at minor league games, David Ogden found that men were more apt to focus on the contest on the field, while women’s interest at the ball game was more likely to be centered on “the group or person with whom they attended, and they sought affiliation with the larger group of spectators through stadium activities.” 29 More current research verifies those traditional specialization trends. Some studies found that women’s tendencies to engage in sports spectatorship are often driven by the interests of a male family member or male friend.30 Women may attend sporting events to support the interests of their significant others, but Kevin Byon and fellow researchers take it a step further. Women were more likely than males to see sporting events as an opportunity to re-affirm and strengthen social bonds.31 Byon and his colleagues say that “attending sporting events in order to spend time with family was a more salient motive among females than males.”32 Indeed, women may attend as many baseball games as men do during the course of a season, but they attend for different reasons. Women not only attend to support the interests of and to bond with significant others, but once at the game they attend to different aspects of the event. While men are more likely to attend to the action on the field, women are more interested in other aspects of the event, such as promotions or entertainment between innings.33

Ogden found that women were more likely than men to “get more enjoyment from crowd activities...making noise with the crowd, watching the team mascot, giveaways, special events and talking with family and friends.”34

Minor league spectators’ ages also play a role in what aspects of the game those fans attend to. Ogden’s study of minor league spectators showed that the older a person is, the more games that he or she attends in a season.35 That research and other research also showed that the older a spectator was, the more that person followed baseball via mass media and the more likely the person was to have a favorite team.36 Robin Snipes and Rhea Ingram found similar results in their research on spectators at collegiate sporting events.

While older spectators were more likely to pay attention to the game itself, younger spectators were more interested in “the promotional and entertainment items, such as special prizes and giveaways, participation games and half-time entertainment.”37

Taken together, sex and age play significant roles in predicting what drives spectators’ interests in sporting events and what aspects of the event they most like.

METHODOLOGY

The researchers surveyed spectators at five Triple-A minor league games in the Midwest on June 28 and 29, and July 15, 2012. The surveys were conducted concurrently at Thursday and Friday night games at Werner Park at the southwest edge of Omaha, Nebraska, and Principal Park in downtown Des Moines, Iowa, and during a Sunday game only at Werner Park. Those parks were chosen not only for their geographic convenience, but also because Werner Park offers numerous off-field activities (as previously stated), while Principal Park offers little more than a small children’s playground, which is located under the stands away from the field. Werner Park also features open concourses from which spectators can still view the field while buying food and beverages. Food vendors at Principal Park are located in a concourse beneath the stadium seats. The days for conducting the surveys were selected because, according to team officials, crowds at those particular parks are larger during those days when compared to Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays.

The 10-item self-completion survey consisted of single and multiple response questions to determine the spectators’ age and sex, how many professional games they attend in a typical year, with whom they attended a game, where they sat during the game, what they most enjoyed about the experience, and their knowledge of the players and the game’s outcome or status. Spectators were approached as they left the ballpark beginning in the seventh inning. The researchers surveyed every 15th spectator coming through the exit gates. To be surveyed, spectators had to be 19 years or older, as required by the University of Nebraska’s Institutional Review Board. If a spectator declined to be surveyed, the researchers continued approaching spectators until one agreed to be surveyed. Then, the 15th spectator after that respondent was approached, and so on.

The researchers used the software program SPSS for statistical analysis.

RESULTS

In all, 560 spectators participated in the survey (270 at Werner Park and 290 at Principal Park), with 543 surveys used for the final analysis (the 17 surveys were not used either because of lack of sufficient data or the respondent was not age 19 or older). In some cases respondents skipped answering certain items, although the rest of their responses were used in the study. This explains why the total number of spectators in some of the statistical analyses is less than 543. The mean age of all respondents was 43, with 374 men and 169 women responding.

The first research question examined whether spectators pay attention to off-field activities as much, if not more, than they pay attention to the game itself. Approximately 74 percent of the spectators were paying close enough attention that they knew the score of the game, while 95 percent knew which team won or was ahead. Slightly more than 67 percent could correctly identify at least one player who played in the game. One-half of those surveyed said that the game was the most enjoyable part of their experience, while six percent cited promotions and 12 percent identified activities between innings as their favorite part of the ballpark experience. Overall, the on-field action got more attention than any other activity in the ballpark.

For the second research question (“Are there differences in what spectators enjoy in a stadium like Werner Park, compared to Principal Park, an older stadium that offers less in the way of off-field family entertainment?”), the researchers tested for differences between what Werner Park fans and Principal Park fans found most enjoyable. Results were mixed. Chisquare calculations showed that while Principal Park spectators were more likely to know the score of the game (p=.079), Werner Park spectators were more likely to know which team won or was ahead at the time they left the ballpark (p<.05). However, Principal Park spectators were significantly more likely than Werner Park spectators to be able to name a specific player who was in the game (p<.05).

There was no significant difference between the percentage of Werner Park spectators and Principal Park spectators who cited the game as the most enjoyable part of their experience. Approximately 50 percent of both groups did so (50.1 percent and 49.9 percent respectively). When it came to enjoyment of off-field activities, there was little difference between Werner Park and Principal Park spectators. The exceptions were promotions and the children’s playground.

While Werner Park spectators were more likely to cite promotions and the children’s playground as the most enjoyable aspects, the chi-square to test differences in enjoyment of promotions (p=.075) was not significant at the 95% confidence level; and while the differences in enjoyment of the children’s playground were significant (p<.01), only 27 respondents (19 at Werner and 8 at Principal) marked that item. Otherwise there were no significant differences between spectators at Werner Park and Principal Park in the percentage who said they enjoyed the mascot (5.1 percent and 5.0 percent respectively), concessions (17 percent and 12 percent), activities between innings (13 percent and 11.4 percent), attending with a group of people (35 percent and 33 percent), the ballpark and atmosphere (7.6 percent and 5.3 percent), and fireworks (1.3 percent and 2.1 percent).

The third research question (“Do a spectator’s demographics, specifically sex and age, affect what that person enjoys most at the ballpark?”) was addressed through a series of chi-square calculations and t-tests. Men were significantly more likely than women to know the score of the game (p<.001) and to know which team won or was ahead at the time they departed (p<.05). However, women attended almost as many games as men did each season (9.8 and 11.2, respectively), and they were as likely as men to be able to name a player from the game. There were also no sex differences among those who cited the game as the most enjoyable aspect.

There is some evidence, however, that women, more so than men, enjoy off-field activities and were less likely to attend alone. Women were more apt to cite in-between inning activities as an important part of their experience (p<.01). There were also sex differences in socialization patterns. Women were significantly more likely to come with their spouse (p<.05) and men were more likely to come to the game alone, although the difference is not significant (p=.127). Otherwise, women were as likely as men to come to the ballpark with colleagues, family, and friends and to cite their attendance with family or friends as an enjoyable aspect of the game. (Approximately 57 percent of men came to the game with

family, as did almost 60 percent of women).

While both sexes appreciated the on-the-field action, older spectators seemed to do so more than younger spectators. The mean age of those who cited the game as the most enjoyable aspect of their ballpark experience was 45, compared to the mean age of 41 for those who did not cite the game (p<.01). The mean age of those who knew which team won the game (or was ahead at the time they left) was 43.3, while the mean age of those who did not know which team won or was ahead was 36.5 (p<.05). There were no significant age differences between those who noted off-field activities (the mascot, concessions, promotions, in-between-inning activities, the children’s playground, and fireworks) as enjoyable aspects of their ballpark visit and those who did not.

DISCUSSION

With the large amount of money and resources used by minor league teams on promotions, respondents to this survey downplayed the importance of those activities in describing their enjoyment of the experience. Of all those surveyed at both parks, 33 noted promotions as an enjoyable aspect; and only 9 spectators specifically mentioned fireworks, the most popular of promotions, despite the fact that surveys were conducted on a Friday at Werner and Principal when both parks featured post-game fireworks.38 Although previous research has shown the impact of promotions on attendance, minor league team officials and administrators may be overestimating the drawing power of promotions and should reconsider whether the expenditure of funds and resources in developing such off-field activities is worth the return in ticket sales.

Officials with the Savannah Sand Gnats admitted that the team cut back on promotional nights when they realized that people still came to games that didn’t offer a promotion.39 Matthew Bernthal and Peter Graham sum it up well when they say that “minor league promoters often operate with the mindset that fan-oriented promotions, in large part, drive a significant number of fans to attend their games. Our results, while based on a single study, suggest that this factor might not play as important a role as a general driver of attendance... as these promoters believe.”40

The Sand Gnats’ observation, and that of Bernthal and Graham, serve as evidence that minor league team officials may be underestimating the allure of the action on the field. One-half of all spectators in this study said the game was the most enjoyable part of their experience, and the vast majority of spectators, both men and women, knew the score of the game and which team won or was ahead. The majority of spectators were also able to name a player from the game. In fact, the player cited the most by Storm Chasers spectators was Wil Myers, one of the top prospects in the Kansas City organization and the winner of the 2012 J.G. Taylor Spink Award as the top minor league player of the year for all of baseball. The Royals traded Myers to the Tampa Bay Rays after the 2012 season.

The most cited Iowa Cub was Josh Vitters, who late in the 2012 season was called up by the Chicago Cubs and was still with the Cubs’ organization at the start of the 2013 season. Since not enough games were surveyed in this study to measure attendance with and without those prospects in the line-up, it was not possible to test Gitter and Rhoads’s contention that prospects help to bump up attendance.41 This finding, however, refutes the belief among some minor league team administrators that the game is not the focal point for most spectators.

In this research, the game was the focal point for at least one-half of the spectators and evidence is sufficient to conclude that spectators do pay attention to the play on the field and individual players. Based on such results, minor league team officials should consider featuring certain players or top prospects in their advertising and public relations, even though such players could be called to the major league team at any time. Still, underscoring a triple-A team as the incubator for future stars should be a recurring theme in their messages to potential spectators. Such findings also indicate that stadia, like Werner, with all their other nongame activities for attendants to enjoy, don’t detract from the game itself. This study offers limited evidence that people attend games in parks like Werner to enjoy nongame activities, including a children’s playground, rather than watch the game.

Women’s interest in the game is another finding that minor league teams should heed. As noted previously, women attend almost as many games as men, but they are more likely to do so with others and seldom alone.

This research gives some credence to the communal role of women spectators. That is, women may see the game as an opportunity to be with others, and to strengthen friendships, marriages, and familial bonds. In that way, women could be attendance-builders.

These results can have implications when considering retooling promotions by bringing back a decades-old promotion that is not offered as frequently at ballparks as it once was. That promotion is Ladies Day, which baseball teams used traditionally as a drawing card. The late Hall of Fame executive Larry MacPhail believed that women were the key to drawing large crowds, and major league baseball team owners in the 1920s and 1930s used Ladies Day to improve gate receipts.42,43

During that time period, every Thursday was promoted as Ladies Day in the Pacific Coast League, but that is no longer the case.44 Still, the finding that there was no significant difference between men and women in citing attendance with family and friends as an enjoyable aspect of their ballpark experience validates baseball executives’ beliefs that both sexes view a trip to the ballpark as a viable opportunity for a family outing.

Sex is not the only demographic that minor league team administrators should consider in drawing more spectators. Age is another factor. This study showed that those who cited the game as the most enjoyable part of their experience were significantly older than those who did not, as were those who knew which team won. Those results bolster the long-standing belief that baseball’s fan base is aging.45 But a closer look at the ages of those who attended the games covered by this study shows a younger spectatorship.

About 50 percent of the respondents at Storm Chasers games were under the age of 44 and half of those at Iowa Cubs games were under age 37. In fact 75 percent of those at the Iowa Cubs games were under age 52, while 75 percent at Storm Chasers games were under 57. Baseball, at least at the Triple-A level, may be catering to an increasingly younger fan base than before.

CONCLUSION

This study can serve as the starting point for more research to verify the results reported here. To get a clearer picture of what spectators enjoy and who those spectators are requires a season-long survey project, and not just five games. In addition, these findings may be specific to Triple-A baseball and may not apply to single-A or double-A minor league baseball, independent league baseball, or to the major leagues.

Surveys of spectators at lower level minor league games are needed to provide a well-rounded perspective of differences and similarities between perceptions of spectators at the various levels of minor league ball.

However, the study serves as a prototype of a research tool that could be valuable in business and promotions planning in minor league baseball. Direct feedback from minor league customers (spectators) provides data that the team can’t get otherwise. Such a survey is also a boost for community relations by demonstrating to spectators that the minor league team does care about what they think.

Finally, this study does provide some indication of what minor league team administrators should consider in marketing to a fan base and in providing a product or experience that has the broadest appeal to people in their communities.

Notes

1 Devon Teeple, “Minor League Baseball Attendance is on the Rise,” MiLB Stream, May 20, 2012, http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1189533-milb-attendance-on-the-rise (accessed September 7, 2012).

2. “New Britain Stadium A to Z,” n.d. www.milb.com/team1/page.jsp?ymd=20100304&content_id=8

(accessed September 7, 2012).

3. “Joseph L. Bruno Stadium,” n.d. www.milb.com/team1/page.jsp?ymd=20060214&content_id=4

(accessed September 7, 2012).

4. Jean Menendez, “Minor League Baseball Team Washington Wild Things Tries to Revitalize Product,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 17, 2012, www.post-gazette.com/stories/sports/pirates/local-team-washingtonwild-things (accessed August 3, 2012).

5 Tony Lachowetz, Windy Dees, Sam Todd, and Elizabeth Ryan, “Savannah Sand Gnats: Macro Strategies for Using Identity to Increase Attendance in Minor League Baseball,” Sport Marketing Quarterly 18 (2009), 222–27.

6. Lorna S. Gifis and Paul Sommers, “Promotion and Attendance in Minor League Baseball,” Atlantic Economic Journal 34 (2006), 513-14. For a further discussion on the allure of fireworks, see Tyler Anthony, Tim Kahn, Briana Madison, Rodney Paul and Andrew Weinbach, “Similarities in Fan Preferences for Minor League Baseball Across the American Southeast,” Journal of Economics and Finance (December 2, 2011), 1–14.

7. Richard Cebula, Michael Toma and Jay Carmichael, “Attendance and Promotions in Minor League Baseball: The Carolina League,” Applied Economics 41 (Nov. 19, 2009), 3,209–14.

8. Lachowetz, Dees, Todd, and Ryan, “Savannah Sand Gnats.”

9. Ibid, 226.

10. Gifis and Sommers, “Promotion and Attendance.”

11. Richard J. Cebula, “The Potential Role of Marketing in Promoting Free Enterprise in the U.S.: A Study Involving Minor League Baseball and Ticket-Sales Revenue Maximization,” Journal of International and Global Economic Studies 2 (June 2009), 31–45. See also Lachowetz, Dees, Todd, and Ryan, “Savannah Sand Gnats.”

12. John J. Siegfried and Jeff D. Eisenberg, “The Demand for Minor League Baseball,” Atlantic Economic Journal 8 (1980), 59–69.

13. Cebula, “The Potential Role,” and Anthony, Kahn, Madison, Paul and Weinbach, “Similarities in Fan Preferences.”

14. Cebula, “The Potential Role.”

15. Anthony, Kahn, Madison, Paul and Weinbach, “Similarities in Fan Preferences.”

16. Young H. Lee and Trenton G. Smith, “Why Are Americans Addicted to Baseball? An Empirical Analysis of Fandom in Korea and the United States,” Contemporary Economic Policy 26 (January 2008), 32–48.

17. Kirk L. Wakefield, Jeffrey G. Blodgett and Hugh J. Sloan, “Measurement and Management of the Sportscape,” Journal of Sport Management 10 (1996), 15–31, quote on 29.

18. Ibid.

19. Siegfried and Eisenberg, “The Demand for Minor League Baseball,” 65.

20. Seth R. Gitter and Thomas A. Rhoads, “Top Prospects and Minor League Baseball Attendance,” Journal of Sport Economics 12 (2011), 341–51.

21. Ibid, 342.

22. One of the authors of this study was told that by a gate attendant while at a game at Alliance Bank Stadium in June 2010.

23. Seth R. Gitter and Thomas A. Rhoads, “Determinants of Minor League Baseball Attendance,” Journal of Sport Economics 11 (2010), 614–28.

24. Cebula, Toma and Carmichael, “Attendance and Promotions in Minor League Baseball,” 3,212.

25. Menendez, “Minor League Baseball Team Washington Wild Things.”

26. For in-depth discussion of women’s styles of learning and socialization, see Mary F. Belenky, Blythe M. Clinchy, Nancy R. Goldberger and Jill M. Tarule, Women’s Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice and Mind (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1986); D.D. Flannery, “Changing Dominant Understandings of Adults as Learners, “in Confronting Racism and Sexism, (eds.) Elisabeth Hayes and Scipio A.J. Colin (San Francisco: Jossey-Boss, 1994), 17–26; and Mariah B. Nelson, The Stronger Women Get, the More Men Love Football (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1994).

27. Nelson, The Stronger Women Get, the More Men Love Football, 31.

28. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 42.

29. David C. Ogden, A Sports Sociological Perspective: Gender and Sense of Community of Spectators of Professional Baseball, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 1999, 136–37.

30. For example, see Li-Wen Hsieh, Chien-Hsin Wang and Tracy Wisdom Yoder, “Factors Associated With Professional Baseball Consumption: A Cross-Cultural Comparison Study,” International Journal of Business and Information 6 (December 2011), 135–59.

31. Kevin Byon, Michael Carroll, Michael Cottingham, II, John Grady and James Allen, “Examining Gender Differences in the Effect of Spectator Motivation on Sport Consumption Behaviors at Collegiate Wheelchair Basketball Games,” Journal of Venue & Event Management 3 (2011), 12–27.

32. Ibid, 15.

33. Robin Snipes and Rhea Ingram, “Motivators of Collegiate Sport Attendance: A Comparison Across Demographic Groups,” Innovative Marketing 3 (2007), 65–74. See also Ogden, A Sports Sociological Perspective.

34. Ogden, A Sports Sociological Perspective, 104.

35. Ibid.

36. David C. Ogden and Michael L. Hilt, “Baseball and Its Appeal to Older Americans,” in The Cooperstown Symposium on Baseball and American Culture, 2002, (ed.) William M. Simons (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., Inc., Publishers, 2002), 330–38.

37. Snipes and Ingram, “Motivators of Collegiate Sport Attendance,” 71.

38. Gifis and Sommers, “Promotion and Attendance;” Anthony, Kahn, Madison, Paul and Weinbach, “Similarities in Fan Preferences;” Cebula, Toma and Carmichael, “Attendance and Promotions in Minor League Baseball.”

39. Lachowetz, Dees, Todd, and Ryan, “Savannah Sand Gnats.”

40. Matthew J. Bernthal and Peter J. Graham, “The Effect of Sport Setting on Fan Attendance Motivation: The Case of Minor League vs. Collegiate Baseball,” Journal of Sport Behavior 26 (2003), 223-39, quote on 234.

41. Gitter and Rhoads, “Top Prospects and Minor League Baseball Attendance.”

42. Red Barber, 1947: When All Hell Broke Loose in Baseball (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1982) and The Broadcasters (New York: Dial Press, 1970).

43. Janet Lever and Stanton Wheeler, “Mass Media and the Experience of Sport,” Communication Research, 20 (1993), 125–43.

44. David Eskenazi and Steve Rudman, “Wayback Machine: Lou, Mel—The Almada Brothers,” Sportspress Northwest, August 28, 2012, http://sportspressnw.com/2012/08/wayback-machine-lou-mel-thealmada-brothers. html. (accessed September 21, 2012).

45. Ogden and Hilt, “Baseball and Its Appeal to Older Americans."

The Chadwick Awards

IN NOVEMBER 2009, SABR established the Henry Chadwick Award, intended to honor the game’s great researchers— historians, statisticians, analysts, and archivists—for their invaluable contributions to making baseball the game that links America’s present with its past. In addition to honoring individuals for the length and breadth of their contribution to the study of baseball and their deepening of our enjoyment of the game, the Chadwick Award educates SABR members and the greater baseball community about sometimes little-known but vastly important research contributions, thus encouraging the next generation of researchers.

The roster of the previous 20 Chadwick honorees includes researchers from the past and present: Some are our colleagues, others our predecessors. All have contributed greatly to the field. This year we add five names to the ranks, and present their biographies, written by SABR members, here.

Bill Carle

by Rob Neyer

Bartlesville, Oklahoma, is famous as the longtime home of the Phillips Petroleum Company. When it comes to baseball players, though, Bartlesville’s chief claim to fame is probably Tim

Pugh, who went to Bartlesville High School and pitched for the Reds (and two other teams) in the 1990s. When it comes to superstars of baseball research, though, few cities can top

Bartlesville. Because that’s where 2013 Chadwick Award winner Bill Carle was born, on the 29th of December in 1955.

Carle might also take the “B-ville” cake for his birth date, as the best-known December 29thers in major-league history are probably Richie Sexson and Devon White. Fortunately, Carle wasn’t short of inspiration. He recalls, “My grandfather was watching the Game of the Week on TV, some Saturday afternoon. I was reading, but I kept looking up at the television, and eventually I just tossed the book aside and watched the game.”

Young Bill was hooked, thanks to his grandfather, who upon his death left behind a treasured copy of The Fireside Book of Baseball. Or maybe Bill was always destined for his place in the game. His uncle had served as a batboy for the Iola Cubs in the old Kansas- Oklahoma-Missouri League, and in 1947 Bill’s mom was crowned Iola’s Queen of the K-O-M League. Carle attended the University of Tulsa before moving in 1978 to Kansas City, where he became a devoted fan of the dynastic Royals. Around the same time, Bill joined SABR, and attended his first national convention in 1979, in St. Louis. There, Carle attended the business meeting and was intrigued by Cliff Kachline’s report on the Biographical Committee’s activities. Bill contacted the committee; before long, researcher

extraordinaire Joe Simenic sent Carle a list of leads in the Kansas City area. Bill was off and running.

Today, Carle’s favorite biographical find remains one of his first. Nobody had the death date or place for Ben Harris, who’d pitched for the Federal League’s Kansas City Packers 1914–15. Carle began his research with the local newspapers in 1914, and found a note about Harris’s little brother Ed pitching for a local high school. That seemed a dead end… until just a few days later, when a K.C. paper published a history of that same high school’s athletics, and mentioned that an Ed Harris had coached Kansas City (Kansas) High School’s basketball team in 1916. Bill went to the city directory for that year, found a teacher named Ed Harris, and followed him all the way up to 1981. One phone call later, Bill stood on Ed Harris’s doorstep, and soon had all the previously missing information about Ed’s big brother Ben. Before he left, though, Carle had something else: an actual Federal League baseball, presented to him by one proud, grateful little brother.

In 1988, Bill took over as chairman of the Biographical Committee, and he’s held the position ever since.

There are, of course, always those elusive bits of information. Carle would love to know more about Hugh “One Arm” Daily, and about a lefty named George Crable (who started a game for the Dodgers in 1910 and later performed in a vaudeville group, “The Baseball Four”). At the top of Bill’s list, though? Nineteenth-century outfielder Harry Decker. “He led a life of crime,” Bill says, “and the last I have on him is when he was released from San Quentin Prison in 1915.”

Paul Dickson

by Steven P. Gietschier

Paul Dickson (1939– ) vaulted to the front rank of baseball researchers immediately following publication of The Dickson Baseball Dictionary in 1989. Lauded as “a staggering piece of scholarship” by the Wall Street Journal, the book won the 1989 Macmillan-SABR Baseball Research Award and quickly became a well-thumbed addition to baseball bookshelves everywhere. Dickson published a second edition in 1999, and in 2009 he produced a third edition (with Skip McAfee) that is twice as large as the first. With definitions for more than 10,000 baseball words and phrases, the book has its own website,www.baseballdictionary.com. A fourth edition is in the works.

Born in Yonkers, New York, Dickson graduated from Wesleyan University in Connecticut in 1961 and served in the United States Navy where he began his writing career. “I always wanted to be a writer,” he said. “When I was thirteen, I was bedridden for a while after an accident. My mother brought me a ton of books, including one written by a man who drove around the country interviewing people in anachronistic professions, like a guy who raised oxen for plowing. I said to myself, ‘You can do this for a living?’ And so I did. I haven’t gotten a real paycheck from an employer since 1968.”

That’s when Dickson stopped working as a reporter for McGraw-Hill Publications to become a full-time freelance writer. He contributed to The New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and a host of magazines, including Esquire, Smithsonian, and The Nation. He published his first book, Think Tanks, in 1971. His bibliography now contains more than sixty-six books and countless articles on a wide variety of subjects. Next on the docket is a book about sports and Jim Crow, why some sports desegregated a lot faster than others.

“I became a baseball fan in 1944 when I was five,” Dickson said. “My uncle—my hero—came home from the navy and took me from Yonkers to Yankee Stadium. He was in full uniform, so the ticket taker let us in for free and escorted us right to the Yankees’ clubhouse. Tommy Henrich was there. He was in the Coast Guard, and we watched the game from the owners’ box. I was hooked.”

The Dictionary was Dickson’s first baseball book. He took his boys to the ball park, and they were full of questions about the game and its vernacular. Dickson promised them a visit to the library to check out a book on baseball terminology, but there were none. “So I figured that this might be a good project,” he said, “with some legs.” Indeed, that is the case, thanks, in part, to the many SABR members who have contributed to each edition. “SABR is wonderful,” Dickson said. “The members are helpful, non-territorial, and non-competitive. They want to help and share.”

Besides the dictionary, Dickson has written several other baseball books, including The Unwritten Rules of Baseball, Baseball’s Greatest Quotations, The Hidden Language of Baseball, The Joy of Keeping Score, Baseball: The Presidents’ Game (with William B. Mead), and Bill Veeck: Baseball’s Greatest Maverick, winner of the 2012 Casey Award. “It’s amazing,” Dickson said, “that they are all still in print.”

Living in Garrett Park, Maryland, Dickson is close to two major league parks. “I like them both,” he said, “but going to Camden Yards is a real treat. The fans there are blue-collar. They love their team and are excited just to be there.”

Fred Lieb

by Daniel R. Levitt

Fred Lieb (1888–1980) started writing for Baseball Magazine in 1909 and was still contributing to The Baseball Research Journal 67 years later. In between he was one of baseball’s top New York sportswriters and a key correspondent for The Sporting News. At mid-century Lieb packaged his extensive knowledge into a half-dozen team histories, invaluable to anyone researching the game behind the scenes over the first half of the twentieth century.

Lieb grew up in South Philadelphia with a love of both baseball and writing, and one year his parents gave him a small printing press for Christmas. He took a job as a clerk in the railroad office of Norfolk & Western, working at writing on the side. He contributed several player biographies to Baseball Magazine and wrote a couple of baseball short stories. Lieb’s first player interview was with Eddie Collins, who at the end convinced Lieb to give up his straight razor for a new safety razor. He moved to Clarence Barron’s Philadelphia News Bureau to advance his writing career, but when he saw an opening for a baseball writer at the New York Press he jumped at it.

With the Press Lieb joined what many consider the golden age of New York sportswriting, and Lieb became friends with many of America’s most famous sportswriters, including Damon Runyon, Heywood Broun, Grantland Rice, and Sid Mercer. Because the Press writer was also the official scorer for the Giants games, Lieb assumed that duty too as a 23-year-old rookie sportswriter. Over the next couple of decades Lieb covered baseball in New York for several papers and was president of the BBWAA from 1921 to 1924.

Lieb is also credited for labeling Yankee Stadium “The House That Ruth Built.” Lieb became a friend and confidant of some of New York’s best known baseball personalities.

He was one of only a handful of guests with a baseball connection at Gehrig’s wedding reception, and it was Lieb that Gehrig asked to convince his mother to come despite her dislike of the future Mrs. Gehrig. Lieb also had a strange fascination for the occult and spiritualism, authoring two books on the subject and taking seriously the results of Ouija

boards.

In 1934 Lieb moved to St. Petersburg, Florida and began freelancing. The next year The Sporting News recruited him, and Lieb spent many summers over the next decade working in St. Louis, covering the All-Star game and World Series, writing obituaries for Hall of Famers and contributing weekly reports and features.

Most importantly for baseball researchers, Lieb wrote ten invaluable books on baseball including seven team histories. In writing these Lieb was granted access to sources inaccessible to most researchers: he talked to key executives; he talked to players; he talked to the teams’ beat writers, presumably with the benefit of their scrapbooks and clippings; and he used The Sporting News archives. As a consequence his team histories offer stories and insights into baseball over the first half of the twentieth century unavailable elsewhere. His book Baseball as I Have Known It embraces a lifetime of memories and stories, many previously unexplored and revealing.

Lieb lived his two loves, baseball and writing. “There’s nothing else I would rather have done,” Lieb told Jerome Holtzman. “When I walked into the New York press box for the first time I couldn’t have been happier, not if I made it to the Oval Office in the White House.”

Francis Richter

by Lyle Spatz

Francis C. Richter was born in Philadelphia in 1854 and was later a noted amateur player in that city. He began his journalistic career with the Philadelphia Day in1872, before moving on to the Public Ledger, Philadelphia’s highest circulation newspaper. While at the Public Ledger, Richter started the nation’s first newspaper sports department.

In December 1887, Richter was among those baseball journalists who met in Cincinnati to form the Base Ball Reporters Association of America. Along with other sportswriters, like Henry Chadwick, he was a member of the rules committee that sought to strike a balance between offense and defense that would make the game exciting to spectators.

Richter had helped form the American Association in 1882, which included his hometown team, the Athletics. However, he was unhappy with the sale of liquor and Sunday baseball that was a major attraction of the Association, and a year later he helped put a National League team in Philadelphia. He played a prominent role in the salary wars of the late nineteenth century, and in 1892, he was influential in engineering the amalgamation of the American Association and the National League. He was also a financial backer of the 1884 Union Association and its Philadelphia team.

In 1902, Richter switched allegiance again when he helped the founders of the new American League. Nevertheless, in 1907 the National League offered him the presidency of the league. Richter declined the offer, saying he wanted instead to promote baseball “by lift(ing) the game up to the heights” of a national pastime.

Richter’s lasting contribution to baseball and baseball research came from his association with two publications: Sporting Life and the Reach Official Guide. He was the founder and editor of Sporting Life for its entire first incarnation, 1883 until 1917. Founded three years before The Sporting News, it was baseball’s most influential paper. For years, Richter used Sporting Life to warn against corruption and gambling in baseball. He also used Sporting Life to support the Player's League in 1890. He disposed of it in 1917, during the First World War.The Sporting News had been granted a subsidy by Major League Baseball, but Sporting Life had not.

Richter later became a columnist for The Sporting News, where his column “Casual Comment” ran from December 1921 to September 1925. For many years, he was one of the official scorers for the World’s Series games, sharing the honor with J.G. Taylor Spink, publisher of The Sporting News.

In 1901, Richter, who promoted baseball all his life, was named the first Editor-In-Chief of the Reach Official Guide. He continued in that role until he died 25 years later, at the age of 71, the day after completing the 1926 edition of the Reach Guide.

His book Richter’s History and Records of Baseball, published in 1914, is one of the seminal works in baseball history. It is the first record book arranged topically rather than chronologically, and the first book to list the record-setting achievements of individuals and teams throughout professional baseball.

John Thorn

by Christina Kahrl

John Thorn (1947–) is the noted co-author of The Hidden Game of Baseball, subsequently the editor and publisher of Total Baseball: The Official Encyclopedia of Major League Baseball, an incomparable scholar of the origins of the game, and is today the Official Historian of Major League Baseball, having taken office in 2011 as just the second man so honored. But the unusual road taken to reach that role reflects both the man himself and the benefits of a love of the game for Americans from any walk of life.

Thorn was a child of Polish refugees who emigrated to the U.S. in 1949. Like the children from so many previous generations of immigrants, Thorn quickly developed a love for baseball. “I fell in love with the cards before I loved the game, when I discovered that baseball was something that all the kids on my street corner cared about. I was an immigrant kid and was looking for a way into America. With my background I saw myself as an underdog and so Brooklyn had to be my team. I began watching the game seriously when I was eight, in 1955, on my Admiral television, but I had already begun to follow their exploits in the daily newspapers my father brought home with him each night.”

After graduating from Beloit College in 1968, Thorn worked his way into the business of writing about baseball from modest beginnings, remembering, “I never wrote about the game for a newspaper and, odd as it may seem today, wrote a book about the game before I ever wrote an article,” dismissing that initial effort as “a rather wretched volume.” But Thorn's famous partnership with sabermetrician Pete Palmer was well-struck within moments of their first meeting in 1981 at the opening reception for the 1981 SABR Convention.

“We very soon afterwards began work on first, a proposal for a new kind of baseball encyclopedia,” Thorn recalled. “A publisher loved the proposal we crafted in 1982 and offered us what seemed like a king's ransom, but with an unworkable deadline. We declined the offer and turned immediately to The Hidden Game. The encyclopedia would follow, in 1989, as Total Baseball.”

In concert with Palmer's analysis, Thorn's thoughtful scholarship and articulate insights made The Hidden Game one of the great classics of baseball analysis. Total Baseball followed up with a similar commitment to rigorous scholarship, taking up the challenge of providing not simply a complete factual record of the game’s statistical history, but one willing to include sabermetric analysis of player performance.

Achieving the role of baseball’s Official Historian reflects Thorn’s contributions to baseball history, previously recognized by SABR with the 2006 Bob Davids Award.

A contributor, editor, and author of many works, Thorn served as senior creative consultant to Ken Burns for the epic documentary Baseball, and his research into the origins of the game culminated in the elegant Baseball in the Garden of Eden: The Secret History of the Early Game (2011), tracing baseball's American origins back to the eighteenth century.

His current responsibilities as Official Historian come with specific duties, some of which reflect his expertise (“The Baseball Origins report, for example,” Thorn notes), but provides him with the freedom to pursue a number of projects, some self-directed, some on demand from the game itself. Thorn observes, “the latter would include media interviews and pants-pressed-while-u-wait research for divisions of MLB—legal, marketing, promotional, the MLB.tv network.”

Reflecting on his current gig, Thorn is clearly enjoying himself. “All of this job is fun,” he said, “but I could say that about the past forty years. The line that separates work from play is invisible. I can go hard at some baseball task all day and then, tired at last, back away from the keyboard, crack open a cold one, and go downstairs to watch a ballgame.”

Thorn reflects on baseball scholarship to come through the context of his personal commitment to creating good history, observing, “The new frontier is the old frontier: perspective and context. Great new finds are certain to come—they always do—but that alone does not make for the practice of baseball history. Analysis without synthesis is expertise, which is admirable, but history is something larger.”

Contributors

JACK BALES has been the Reference and Humanities Librarian at the University of Mary Washington in Fredericksburg, Virginia, for more than thirty years. He gratefully acknowledges the individuals who have assisted him with his Chicago Cubs research and writing, including Rosemary Arneson, Carla Bailey, Dick Bales, Bill Crawley, Renee Davis, Paul Dickson, Claudine Ferrell, David Fletcher, Bill Hageman, Ed Hartig, Ray Kush, John Morello, Beth Perkins, Jan Perone, Tim Wiles, and the University of Mary Washington’s Division of Teaching and Learning Technologies.

ALAN COHEN is a retired insurance underwriter who is spending his retirement doing baseball research. A native of Long Island, he continues to root for the Mets from his home in West Hartford, Connecticut, where he lives with his wife Frances and assorted pets. He did a presentation on “Baseball’s Longest Day: May 31, 1964” at the 50th Anniversary of the New York Mets Conference in April, 2012. His biographies of Dick Groat and Gino Cimoli, two players whose career were launched in the Hearst Sandlot Classic, appear in Sweet ’60: The 1960 Pittsburgh Pirates.

JOHN E. DANIELS is Associate Professor of Statistics at Central Michigan University. He is young enough to have no recollection of Bill Mazerowski’s 1960 home run against the Yankees, but old enough to remember Ron Swoboda’s catch in Game Four of the 1969 World Series (an afternoon game, if you can imagine that). A lifelong Detroit Tigers fan, John never knew all those years spent playing Strat-o-matic in the basement would amount to something so useful or so enjoyable. John has been a SABR member since 2007, can be reached at danie1je@cmich.edu, and spends his days thinking about Ernie Harwell’s reincarnation and being humbled by Miguel Cabrera’s destruction of his 2008 BRJ Triple Crown article.

DR. JOHN EIGENAUER is Professor of Philosophy at Taft College in California. He is an avid Reds fan, having fallen in love with Pete Rose’s style of play in the late 1960s. He is also a basketball enthusiast and continues to play basketball competitively. He received his Ph.D. from Syracuse University. He and his wife, Ceceilia, live in Bakersfield, California.

GREG ERION is a retired executive from the railroad industry. He and his wife live in South San Francisco, California. Greg teaches history part time at Skyline Community College. He is currently working on a book about the 1959 season.

STEVEN P. GIETSCHIER has been a SABR member since 1987. He joined the staff of The Sporting News in 1986 to take charge of the company’s archives. He turned a chaotic collection of books, periodicals, photographs, index cards, clippings, and other materials into The Sporting News Research Center and wrote the annual “Year in Review” essay in the Baseball Guide and edited the Complete Baseball Record Book for five years. When TSN moved its editorial offices from St. Louis to Charlotte, North Carolina, in July 2008, the Research Center was dismantled, its holdings boxed up, and its staff discharged. He is now the curator at the Margaret Leggat Butler Library at Lindenwood University.

J.T. GROSSMITH is a practicing journalist of 40 years who recently unretired to return as editor and publisher of The Glengarry News in Alexandria, Ontario. Grossmith’s interest in baseball dates back to the mid-50s beginning with the Toronto Maple Leafs in the International League. He attended the first game played by the Blue Jays in April 1977. He published Perfect (“the 20 pitchers who found immortality, plus numerous heartbreakers”) for Amazon Kindle in 2009. The book contains a section on a new metric for measuring game performances of starters from which this article on Game Score is drawn.

DR. ANDY LI-AN HO is currently the assistant professor as well as the strength and conditioning coach of Chinese Culture University in Taiwan. Dr. Ho has a master degree in sport coaching science from Chinese Culture University, a second master degree in strength and conditioning from Springfield College and earned his Ph.D. in Physical Education from Springfield College. He is currently teaching exercise science courses in undergrad and graduate level and coaching intercollegiate athletes. Besides teaching and coaching, Dr. Ho also conducts research and has published research articles in national and international peer-reviewed journals.

STEVEN A. KING is a physician and Clinical Professor at the New York University School of Medicine. He is the editor of the pain management section of “ConsultantLive,” an online journal for physicians, and a member of the board of editors of the journal Pain Medicine. The primary focus of his baseball research is New York City baseball at the beginning of the twentieth century and he is writing a book on the interaction between baseball and politics in the city at that time. His most recent baseball articles are on the myth of the Amos Rusie–Christy Mathewson trade that appeared in the Fall 2012 issue of Base Ball: A Journal of the Early Game and on why Rube Waddell missed the 1905 World Series in the 2013 issue of The National Pastime.

HERM KRABBENHOFT, a SABR member since 1981, is a retired research chemist. His baseball research has focused on ultimate grand slam home runs, leadoff batters, triple plays, the uniform numbers of Detroit Tigers, and consecutive games streaks for scoring runs and batting in runs—which requires having accurate game-by-game runs and RBI statistics—which requires correcting the runs and RBI errors in baseball’s official records.

STEVE KUEHL is Mathematics Instructor at Silver Lake College. He received his Master’s Degree from Central Michigan University, where he worked on multiple baseball statistics research papers with John Daniels. Also a lifelong Detroit Tigers fan, his hope is to see them win a World Series, since it hasn’t happened in his lifetime. He has always enjoyed numbers and baseball. Steve can be reached at sgkuehl@mtu.edu, and spends his days watching Tigers baseball and hoping that Miguel Cabrera can win back-to-back Triple Crowns.

NORMAN L. MACHT has recently completed Volume 3—the last— of his multivolume work on the life of Connie Mack. It will be published February 2015.

ANNE C. MARX is Assistant Professor of Sport Management at Loras College in Dubuque, Iowa. She earned her Master’s Degree from Arizona State University and doctorate degree from the University of Arkansas. She is an avid athlete and can be seen in the evenings playing baseball with her four-year-old son, Adam, in the back yard.

DAVID B. MARX is Professor of Statistics at the University of Nebraska in Lincoln, Nebraska. He works in the area of spatial statistics as well as in sports statistics. His Ph.D. is from the University of Kentucky and he was previously employed at the University of Arizon and University of Arkansas. He is a member of the American Statistical Association's section of Statistics in Sports.

LEONARD S. NEWMAN is Associate Professor of Psychology at Syracuse University, where he is the director of the social psychology program. He is also the editor of the journal Basic and Applied Social Psychology. His father grew up in Manhattan rooting for the Giants, and his mother is from Brooklyn—so needless to say, he’s a Mets fan.

BILL NOWLIN has been Vice President of SABR since 2004 and helped edit numerous BioProject team books. He is a co-founder of Rounder Records and author or editor of around 40 baseball books.

DAVID C. OGDEN, Ph.D. is a professor in the School of Communication at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. Ogden’s research focuses on baseball and culture, with specific emphasis on the relationship between African American communities and baseball. Since 1995, he has presented his research at the National Baseball Hall of Fame Conference on Baseball and Culture, Indiana State University’s Conference on Baseball in Literature and Culture, the Nine Spring Training Conference and others. He is co-editor of the books, Reconstructing Fame: Sport Race and Evolving Reputations, Fame to Infamy: Race, Sport, and the Fall from Grace, and A Locker Room of Her Own.

MARK RANDALL has been an award-winning journalist for the past 15 years. He has covered a number of beats for newspapers in Massachusetts, New Mexico, Florida, Utah, Alabama, Arizona and Arkansas. He holds a bachelor’s degree in history from Northeastern University, a master’s degree in broadcast journalism from Syracuse University, and a second master’s degree in history from Arkansas State University, where he has also taught undergraduate history courses.

BOB RUZZO is a Boston lawyer with considerable affordable housing and transportation policy experience. He is hopelessly obsessed with both the Federal League and how Jewel Box ballparks wove themselves into the fabric of their host cities. He has previously authored an article on Braves Field for the BRJ and is working on an article on the South End Grounds for inclusion in an upcoming book on the 1914 Miracle Braves.

JOHN SHOREY is Professor of History and Political Science at Iowa Western Community College in Council Bluffs, Iowa. Along with his survey courses in history and government, Shorey developed a course on “Baseball and American Culture” that he has taught at Iowa Western since 1998. Shorey has conducted research on various baseball topics and has presented his research at the National Baseball Hall of Fame at their annual Symposium on Baseball and American Culture and he has presented at Indiana State University’s Conference on Baseball in Literature and Culture. Shorey received his MA in 1986 from Illinois State University.

DR. JUSTINE SIEGAL is the Director of Sport Partnerships at Sport in Society, a Center at Northeastern University. She received her master’s degree from Kent State University in Sport Studies and her Ph.D. in Physical Education from Springfield College. She is the Founder of Baseball For All, an organization the providing meaningful opportunities for girls in baseball. In 2011, Dr. Siegal became the first woman to throw batting practice to a major league team.

MEGAN LIEDTKE TESAR is taking time away from her career as a statistics professor to be at home with her son Eli. She received her master’s degree and Ph.D. in Statistics from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. She was also a postseason-honor-winning college softball player and has great respect for the catcher position.

JIM TURVEY is a new member of SABR, having joined in February of 2013. He graduated the University of Vermont in May of 2012 with a degree in History. He currently lives in Jamaica Plain (Boston) and works in the Boston Public School system. He is also the Senior Editor for and a main contributor to threebridgesports.com. He grew up on the “Core Four” Yankees, and because he was a Yankees fan growing up in New England, he has burned the year 2004 out of his memory.

KEVIN WARNEKE, who earned his doctoral degree from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, has taught journalism, public relations, and fundraising courses at the University of Nebraska Omaha for the past 20 years. His research focus is leadership and baseball.

ROBERT D. WARRINGTON is a Philadelphia baseball historian and author.