Outside the Lines

Editor Michael Haupert

Vol. 24 No. 2 Winter 2018-19

A publication of the Society for American Baseball Research Business of Baseball Committee

Babe Ruth with some of his Brave teammates in 1935

In This Issue

Salaries and the Impact of Players on Team Revenue: a comparison of the AAGBPL and MLB[1]

By Lisa Giddings and Mike Haupert

Introduction

Using a unique financial dataset from the All American Girls Professional Baseball League (AAGPBL) as well as financial data from Major League Baseball from the years 1947-52 we compare male and female salaries relative to the revenue those players generated for their teams. We find that while women earned only about 10 percent of what their male counterparts earned, they took home nearly twice as much of their contribution to team revenue as did the men. The salary of the average MLB player was less than 10 percent of the revenue he generated for his team (in economics, this is known as marginal revenue) while women's salaries were on average more than 20 percent of their marginal revenue.

A Brief History of the All American Girls Professional Baseball League

In the fall of 1942, with America at war and men subject to the military draft, the rosters of

[1]This is adapted from Giddings and Haupert, "Earning Like a Woman: the gender gap in professional baseball 1944-1954," *Journal of Sports Economics* 20, no. 2 (February 2019).

professional baseball teams were rapidly being depleted. More than 500 Major League Baseball (MLB) players would ultimately enlist, and the minor leagues, the chief source of new talent for MLB, had already been decimated by the demands for soldiers and war industry labor. Just five years earlier there were 38 minor leagues supporting 261 teams. The 1943 season opened for only ten of those leagues, consisting of 66 teams. Philip K. Wrigley, owner of the Chicago Cubs, feared the day might come when there would not be enough players left to populate the rosters of MLB teams. With both patriotism and profit preservation in mind, he assigned Ken Sells, the Cubs Assistant General Manager, to head up a task force to consider the future of MLB for the duration of the war. The committee recommended professional women's softball. Softball was a popular sport in the 1940s and women were not subject to the draft. The notion of women playing professional sports was not as radical as it might have been just a few years earlier as women were also entering the paid labor market in record numbers. Labor shortages during the war had forced more than four million women into the labor force already.

Philip Wrigley, founder of the AAGPBL

Because the new league was prompted by war conditions, it was to be formed as a non-profit corporation. As such, Wrigley hoped that the MLB parks would host teams, scheduling women's games while men were on the road, but the idea was not well received. Instead, four non-Major League cities close to the league headquarters in Chicago were chosen to host the first four teams: Racine, Wisconsin, Kenosha, Wisconsin, Rockford, Illinois, and South Bend, Indiana. Wrigley put up half of the nearly $200,000 required for the first year's operating costs, which included player salaries, equipment, coaches, chaperones, publicity, scouting, travel, and umpires. He encouraged local businesses to contribute the other half of the start-up costs as a way for them to demonstrate their patriotism by providing wholesome entertainment for war workers and their families. Their only other responsibility was to draw a crowd. Each of the four initial cities in the league matched Wrigley's $22,500 subsidy to establish a $45,000 operating budget for each team.

Wrigley sent out scouts and set up tryouts in dozens of cities across the country. Ultimately, 280 women were invited to a final tryout in Chicago, and 60 were chosen to play in the inaugural season. Player salaries were large enough to warrant their playing softball as their sole means of livelihood during the season. They ranged from $45 to $85 per week during the first years of play, increasing to as much as $125 per week by the final years.

Players who signed professional league contracts were required not to have any other employment during the season, and to abide by a set of high moral standards and rules of conduct imposed by the league. Additionally, the league had standards of femininity that the players were expected to meet. Wrigley hired Helena Rubenstein's Beauty Salon to conduct charm classes for the women after practices as well as to establish dress and codes of conduct such as requiring long hair and lipstick in an effort to make each player as attractive as possible.

The 1943 season saw 176,612 tickets sold to the women's softball games. This attendance was boosted by the limits American people faced during the war including rations on foods, luxury items, tires and gas, forcing people to spend time closer to home. The women's league offered an opportunity for cheap, local entertainment. In 1944, the league expanded by two teams (Minneapolis and Milwaukee). The larger cities proved to be less hospitable to the women's league. In the smaller cities, fans sat very close to the field and dugouts. In doing so, fans became friendly with the players as individuals. Also, like the men's teams, the women's teams got extensive media support in the smaller cities, including box scores and photographs from the games. In the larger cities, the women played on larger fields, which not only made the play less exciting, it distanced the players from the fans. The

media provided little (or even negative) publicity for the women's leagues, which did not help their cause. Lastly, even though the larger cities offered a greater population base, many other entertainment opportunities competed with the new league for the limited leisure time available, including professional baseball at the minor league level in both Milwaukee and Minneapolis.

Over the course of the post-war years, Wrigley began to ease his way out of his position as the league's financial backstop. After the 1944 season, Wrigley's advertising agent, Arthur Meyerhoff, purchased the league for $10,000, and created the Management Corporation to operate league affairs. The league became more decentralized over the next decade, and the game started to look more like baseball. Rules were modified to lengthen the infield distances and approve first side-arm pitching (1946) and then overhand pitching (1948). The league acquired franchises for two more teams in Peoria, Illinois and Muskegon, Michigan and a four-team minor league was established in Chicago. The Springfield, Illinois Sallies and Chicago Colleens were added to the league's roster in 1948. The All American Girls Professional Baseball League (AAGPBL), as it had come to be known, peaked in attendance during the 1948 season, when 10 teams attracted 910,000 paying fans. Teams played a 112 game schedule, compared to a 154 game MLB schedule.

Attendance declined in the following years while expenses increased and financial losses mounted. By 1947, only three teams reported profits and in 1948, seven out of eight franchises reported losses. Only South Bend was in the black, and then only to the tune of $217. Problems for the AAGPBL only increased in the 1950s. Televised MLB games and a shrinking local fan base caused attendance to continue to decline. Changing social conditions that favored women in the home, a more mobile society, and the rising economic tide and choices of entertainment that developed to satisfy the increased demand, proved a deadly combination. 1954 marked the last season of the AAGPBL.

AAGPBL contracts differed from MLB contracts in their absence of a reserve clause. In addition, all players were contracted by the league, rather than individual teams. The league granted players an option to renew each year for a predetermined salary, which, if not exercised by the league, made the player a free agent. In practice, however, it functioned much like a reserve clause, and it certainly did not allow the player to be a free agent, since the league was the only employer. Furthermore, by renewing the contract each year, the renewal option was essentially perpetual. In other words, like their MLB brethren, AAGPBL players had no right to determine where they would play, and had little leverage when it came to contract negotiations.

Bats, gloves, and lipstick were required for AAGPBL players

Since the league contracted all of the players, it allowed them to allocate talent in order to promote competitive balance. Between seasons, and occasionally even during seasons, players were moved, and rookies assigned, to maintain competitive balance. But wholesale changes were avoided in an effort to promote team loyalty and identity among fans.

The AAGPBL was organized as a non-profit entity. Local franchises could choose their own manager and chaperone, but the league paid all player salaries. When Wrigley sold the league to Meyerhoff in 1944, he did so on the condition that it remain a non-profit entity.

Meyerhoff appointed former MLB star and future Hall of Famer Max Carey commissioner and changed the management structure. Teams were organized as an association of member clubs identified as the "All-American Girls Professional Ball League." The member clubs then entered into an agreement with a for-profit organization known as "The Management Corporation of the All-American Girls Professional Ball League." The new

organizational structure consisted of non-profit teams administered by a for-profit management organization. The Management Corporation oversaw a league president, who presided over a board of directors (composed of one representative of each team), giving the local franchises a say in league operations for the first time.

In 1943 league finances were guaranteed by Wrigley. The franchise system instituted for 1944 shifted the financial burden of the league's operations to team stockholders, but deficits were still covered by Wrigley.

When Meyerhoff took over, he initially retained the 1944 model, including a three cent per admission tax, and continued to cover the same expenses. However, franchise owners were now responsible for the entire financial burden. Gone was the Wrigley financial backstop.

Meyerhoff shifted the focus shifted from national marketing to local civic involvement. Individual teams emphasized their non-profit status by channeling a portion of their proceeds to fund local community recreation programs. Local ownership was just one source of civic backing. Teams gained additional support from local service organizations, such as the Elks, and players made personal contacts with community members by rooming with local families and making public appearances at community events. This kind of community involvement worked better in the smaller cities that came to define the league.

Previous Research

In 1956 Simon Rottenberg was the first economist to suggest that professional baseball players' salaries were less than their marginal revenue, implying a degree of exploitation by the owners. The seminal work of measuring the economic contributions of baseball players, however, is that of Gerald Scully. Using salary data from the 1968 and 1969 seasons, Scully calculated the marginal revenue (MR) of MLB players. He compared players' MRs to their actual salaries. In this manner, he attempted to determine the extent to which the power of owners under the reserve clause exploited players by keeping a larger fraction of their marginal revenue product. If labor markets are competitive, as they tend to be in free agency, where a player can market his skills to any MLB team, then player salaries would be equated with their MR. That is, if Clayton Kershaw can generate an additional $32 million for the Dodgers, his salary will be $32 million. Scully found that only lower quality players received salaries that exceeded their MR, while average players received salaries that were about 11 percent and superstar players received about 15 percent of their MR.

Andrew Zimbalist looked at player salaries and MR during the 1980s, after free agency had been established. He reported that the average free agent earned 23 percent more than his MR and that arbitration-eligible players received 60 percent of their MR.

Several authors following Scully have focused on different eras, modified his original model, and used different variables to measure player productivity, but none has overturned the fundamental conclusions of Scully's original work. Players who are not free to bargain with other teams will be paid only a fraction of their MR. Our study exploits newly available salary data to extend the analysis backward in time, and compares it to the AAGPBL.

Data

One of the major contributions of our work is its use of unique data from the financial records of male and female professional baseball teams in the 1940s and 1950s. Our sample of AAGPBL players covers the years 1947-1952. This time period includes all the team financial information and player salary data necessary to calculate MR. Comprehensive financial data were not available for the other years of the AAGPBL. The business records of the AAGPBL are housed in the Joyce Sports Research Collection at the University of Notre Dame. The archives include not only financial data, but minutes of league meetings, correspondence, photos, season summaries, miscellaneous contracts, schedules, season statistics, attendance records, and summaries of playoff and all-star games.

The financial information includes both actual and estimated amounts for a long list of revenues and expenses. There are more than 60 items listed in the expense column alone, ranging from salaries and radio ads to laundry expenses and prizes for players. Revenues include breakdowns by type of ticket sold and parking and concession income, among others. Because we have ticket price data for all teams as well as attendance data for all teams, we estimate team revenues as attendance multiplied by ticket

price. The ticket revenues represent the vast majority of team revenues. For example, for the South Bend franchise we have a detailed account of expenditures and revenues, which shows that on average each season ticket revenues account for 83 percent of total income.

The performance records of the AAGPBL players are taken from W. C. Madden. There is limited performance data for women because the record keeping simply was not as thorough as it was for MLB. Our data includes 81 female professional ballplayers: 52 hitters and 29 pitchers. The 81 observations we have for the women account for 9.0 percent of the total pool of player years during our time period.

Major League Baseball performance data are taken from Baseball-Reference.com. All MLB salary data are from the Haupert Baseball Salary Database. This salary information was compiled from the transaction card files at the National Baseball Library. These transaction cards provide all of the salary detail from individual player contracts. There are 840 randomly selected players in our MLB sample, which constitutes 16.3 percent of total players during the years of the study.

Summary Statistics			
	Max	Mean	Min
Age men	42	28.65	18
Age women	31	23.30	15
Salary M pitchers	$70,000	$9945	$300
Salary M hitters	$100,000	$12,166	$600
Salary F pitchers	$2166	$1229	$650
Salary F hitters	$1908	$1230	$780
IP men	371	119.91	2
IP women	290	151.0	17
ERA men	81.0	4.14	0.77
ERA women	4.12	2.37	1.06
AB men	756	333.41	1
AB women	468	250.75	18
SLG men	.900	0.371	.040
SLG women	.345	0.247	.093

The female ballplayers are significantly younger than the men, an issue that we discuss in greater detail later. Despite the men playing a longer season, the women pitched significantly more innings, averagine 151 innings pitched compared to 120 for the men. This difference is largely due to the smaller number of women on the AAGPBL rosters, and their less frequent use of relief pitchers. Male pitchers have a significantly higher average ERA, but male hitters batted more often and had higher slugging averages. These highlight a major difference in the on-field game between the two leagues: the women's game was much more pitcher dominated. Finally, we note that female ballplayers, like their sisters in the non-baseball labor force, were paid far less than their male counterparts. Female pitchers earned ten percent of what the men earned, while hitters earned less than nine percent of what the men took home.

Modelling and Estimating Marginal Revenue

A baseball player's marginal revenue is the performance that he contributes to the team and the effect of that performance on gate receipts. Scully established links between player performance and team winning, and team winning and team revenue. Thus, MR is measured in a two equation model. Team revenue, Equation (1), is a linear function of the team's wins as well as other independent variables, such as population and age of stadium, that affect total revenues.

Team wins are a function of the team's pitching and hitting performance. Scully experimented with a variety of performance measures before settling on slugging average and strikeout to walk ratio (K/BB). In later work, Zimbalist used On-base Percentage Plus Slugging Average (OPS) and Earned Run Average (ERA).

We use a hybrid approach and rely on SLG and ERA to measure hitter and pitcher performance. Data limitations dictate this choice. The AAGPBL data are not detailed enough for us to use either OPS or K/BB as performance variables. After testing several combinations of performance variables for our dataset, we find that ERA is the best explanatory performance variable for pitchers, while SLG is the best fit for hitters.

Equations:

(1) Total Revenue = $\alpha_0 + \alpha_1$ win% $_t + \alpha_2$ win% $_{t-1}$ +

α_3 population + α_4 New Stadium + α_5Years in City + u_i

(2) $Win\%_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1$Team Slugging Percentage + β_2 Team ERA + v_i

(3a) Hitter $MR_i = \beta_1$ slugging $percentage_i$ x AB_i / team AB x α_1

(3b) Pitcher $MR_i = \beta_2$ ERA_i x IP_i / team IP x α_1

Following Scully, we estimate the equations using OLS regressions. The process to determine MR for individual hitters (equation 3a) and pitchers (3b) is similar. In both cases it is a three stage process. The first stage involves determining the impact of winning percentage on total revenue (equation 1). Because a player's primary impact on team revenue is his/her impact on team winning percentage, we are interested in α_1, which is the value of winning (as measured by the impact of one more win on a team's winning percentage) on total revenue.

In order to measure the impact of an individual player on the team's ability to win, we need to first determine what impacts winning (equation 2). As discussed earlier, we use SLG and ERA as our measures of team performance that impact winning percentage. The value of SLG and ERA to winning are measured by β_1 and β_2 respectively.

Finally, in equation 3a we calculate the MR of hitter i by multiplying his/her contribution to team SLG, which is the SLG of player i weighted by player i AB as a percentage of team AB, multiplied by the contribution of SLG to winning (β_1), and then multiplied by the contribution of winning percentage to total revenue (α_1). Equation 3b similarly measures the MR of pitchers. Each of these regressions are run separately for the male and female leagues.

Once a player's MR is calculated, we can measure the extent to which a player's salary differs from his or her marginal revenue. The simplest way to look at this is to take the ratio of salary to MR, which ranges between zero (maximum exploitation) and 1 (no exploitation). If players are experiencing zero exploitation their salary will equal their MR, thus the ratio of salary/MR will equal 1. The lower their salary relative to their MR, the greater the degree to which the team is exploiting the player. For example, if a player is paid \$5000 but generates \$50,000 in additional revenues for his team, his exploitation would be measured as \$5000/\$50,000 = 0.1, i.e. he is being paid 10% of the revenue he is generating, while the team is appropriating the other 90%.



Results

The results of equations 1 and 2 appear in equations 1M-2F below. In all four equations, the variables of interest (winning percentage, SLG, ERA) were significant at the 99% confidence level. All dollar values in these results are adjusted for inflation into current value dollars. Equation 1F does not include the variable for new stadium, because there were no new stadiums built for the AAGPBL teams. The value of α_1 in equation 1M indicates that each one-point increase in win percentage is worth \$4.5 million in revenue for an MLB team. From equation 2M we see that a one point increase in slugging percentage raises the winning percentage of an MLB team by 1.9 points, and a one point decrease in ERA will increase winning percentage by 1.6 points. The value of α_1 in equation 1F indicates that each one-point increase in win percentage is worth \$143,380 in revenue for an AAGPBL franchise. From equation 2F we see that a one point increase in slugging average raises winning percentage by 1.5 points, and a one point decrease in ERA will increase it by .53 points in the AAGPBL.

These two equations form the basis of the Scully model. Using the results we can now determine the MR of individual players. We know the impact of our performance measures for hitters (SLG) and pitchers (ERA) on team performance (winning percentage) and the dollar value of an extra win. For MLB players, a one point increase in team slugging average translates into an $8.6 million increase in total revenue (1.9 x $4.5) and a one point decrease in team ERA is worth $5.9 million dollars. For AAGPBL players the MR values are $215,070 for SLG and $75,991 for ERA. Individual player marginal revenues are calculated using these figures and weighting the SLG and ERA variables by the percentage of at bats or innings pitched each player contributes to the team (equations 3a and 3b).

For MLB players:

(1M) Total Revenue = -2,303,111 + 4,539,733 $win\%_t$ + 1,282,333 $win\%_{t-1}$ + .19526443 population + 2,273,075 New Stadium + 10,707 Years in City + u_i

(2M) $Win\%_t$ = -.651+ 1.910 Team Slugging Percentage - 1.637 Team ERA + v_i

For AAGPBL players:

(1F) Total Revenue = -10,300 + 143,380 $win\%_t$ - 57,298 $win\%_{t-1}$ + .3613396 population + u_i

(2F) $Win\%_t$ = -.079 + 1.465 Team Slugging Percentage - .526 Team ERA + v_i

On average male hitters earned an inflation-adjusted salary of $18,190 with an estimated marginal revenue of $214,843. Thus, MLB hitters earned 8.5% of their MR. For female hitters, the average inflation-adjusted salary is $1,343 and the estimated MR is $6,499. The ratio of salary to MR is 0.207. This indicates that while both males and females receive only a fraction of their MR, male hitters take home a much smaller fraction of their MR than do female hitters.

Among pitchers, males earn an average inflation-adjusted salary of $15,339 with an estimated MR of $188,275, or 8.1% of their MR. MLB hitters and pitchers face a similar degree of exploitation. Female pitchers earn on average an inflation-adjusted salary of $1,337 with an estimated MR of $7,202. The average salary/MR ratio is 0.186, indicating that AAGPBL pitchers face slightly more exploitation than do their teammates who wield a bat.

Discussion

The difference in salary between male and female ballplayers of the 1940s is not surprising. Not only are the leagues themselves not comparable (for-profit versus not-for-profit), but it is also common knowledge that professional male sports enjoy much larger consumer demand and hence garner larger revenues. What is fascinating, however, is the difference in the degree to which the male and female ballplayers captured the revenue that they generated. Women took home twice as much of their marginal revenue as the men did.

Among hitters, male salaries were about 9 percent of their MR while female hitters earned over 20 percent of their MR. Like the hitters, Male pitcher salaries were about 9 percent of their MR while female hitters earned over 19 percent of their MR.

Why would the owners of the female teams pay the female players relatively more of their revenue contribution than did the owners of the male teams? We offer two possible explanations for this difference. The first may be the difference in structure in the two leagues. MLB is now and always has been a for-profit entity. On the other hand, the AAGPBL was organized as a non-profit league and as such, it likely affected the amount of the additional revenue the women received.

According to research by economist Emmanuel Saez, the higher the marginal tax rate on income, the more likely the residual claimant (i.e., the team) on that revenue is to share that income with labor. In essence, the choice comes down to giving the money to the government, or to employees. Even if the residual claimant is not magnanimous, s/he is more likely to gain favor from employees by being more generous – or at least appearing that way. After all, what is being shared would have gone largely to the government anyway. However, when the choice is between keeping a larger share of the additional revenue (via a lower marginal tax rate) or sharing, the residual claimant will keep the money.

We believe that the non-profit structure of the AAGPBL contributed to the women keeping a larger portion of the marginal revenue they generated in part because there was no residual claimant to take the revenue. Instead, more of the generated revenue was passed on to the players. We note that less revenue was generated because fewer games were played, tickets were cheaper, and fewer tickets were

sold than in MLB. However, because there was no residual claimant on profits, a larger share of the revenue generated was passed on to the women who were responsible for generating it.



The second possible explanation is the male and female reservation wages at the time. It is possible that there was a wage floor above which the women needed to be paid to draw them onto the field and away from a labor market that was opening up new possibilities for women at the time. Beginning in the mid-1940s, as male professions were offering new opportunities to women during the war, an increasing number of women entered the workplace. The AAGPBL was drawing from the same population of unmarried young women that would have faced these new opportunities. The average wage of women with similar demographic characteristics of the AAGPBL players in 1950 was approximately $1,200 annually, whereas men earned approximately $1,700 annually. The average MLB salary in 1950 was more than $13,000, so the male reservation wage was not binding. To the extent that ballplayers would forgo employment in order to play, the salaries that AAGPBL players earned were closer to the amount that they would have earned from regular employment, suggesting that the reservation wage may have been an important threshold to pull women into the league, thus requiring the league to pay a larger percentage of the MR to attract players.

Conclusions

The AAGPBL marked the start of professional female athletic leagues in the United States. Using heretofore-unexplored data, we have shown that women earned a small fraction of what men earned during these seasons, but kept a larger share of the revenue they generated. There is no question that men played more games, in front of bigger crowds, which generated more revenue than female ballplayers. The male ballplayers were also older and had gained more experience (and hence annual salary increases) than their female counterparts. However, while women earned less than men, they took home a larger portion of the revenues that they generated. Using team and individual performance data, we calculated an estimated marginal revenue for male and female players and then used this to calculate an exploitation measure. We conclude that league organizational differences and reservation wages explain the significantly lower exploitation measure of female ballplayers relative to their MLB brethren.

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Recently Published Research

This column highlights recently published articles on topics that may interest members of the Business of Baseball Committee. If you are aware of a source that publishes articles of interest to the readership, please alert me so that I can monitor it.

Berkowitz, Jason, Craig A. Depken, II, and John M. Gandar, "The Conversion of Money Lines Into Win Probabilities: Reconciliations and Simplifications, Journal of Sports Economics 19, no. 7 (October 2018)

We contribute to the literature on money line betting markets by investigating the relationships between the various methods used to derive subjective win probabilities from money lines. We show that, although the seven methods described appear to be unique, they actually share many common assumptions and that, surprisingly, they reduce to three distinct estimates of bookmaker commission and subjective win probabilities. We also show that among the three distinct estimates, one is biased when money lines suggest a very heavy favorite in a particular sporting event. Thus, it is important to consider the assumptions for each method when deciding which to use in a particular context. Two empirical examples demonstrate how a market inefficiency, such as a favorite-longshot bias, should influence the choice of methodology.

Bozeman, Barry and Gabel Taggart, "Markets, Clans, and Arbitrage: A Participant-Observation Study of "Coopetition" Among Baseball Ticket Scalpers," Sociological Inquiry 88, no. 3 (August 2018)

We report on a participant-observation study of baseball ticket scalpers at Chase Field in Phoenix, Arizona. Ours is a study of the market behavior of individuals working in clans. We focus on the social organization of clans and, particularly, how scalpers establish territories and engage in cooperative behavior while, at the same, time competing aggressively. The clans govern transactions not according to straightforward economic exchange or by formal rules and regulation emanating from legitimate authority, but rather through shared goals and shared values, with behavior expectations grounded in familiarity, common history, and mutual trust. During conversations with scalpers, we determined that a few of them, but not the majority, consult StubHub on a real-time basis to help them determine their spot market ticket prices. Conclusion: The rise of Internet secondary markets for tickets may ultimately have adverse consequences for street vendors, but at present, it seems more advantageous than disadvantageous.

Carvalho, Maria José, Marisa Sousa, Gustavo Paipe, Gustavo Bavaresco, and José Luis Felipe, "Economic Impact of the 11th Douro Valley Half Marathon," Physical Culture and Sport 78, no. 1 (June 2018)

The aim of this study was to analyze the direct economic impact of the 11th Douro Valley Half Marathan hled in Portugal in 2016. An ad-hoc questionnaire was designed for collecting data. It was composed of four dimensions: (i) sociodemographic data, (ii) expenses, (iii) sports practice, and (iv) satisfaction with the event (54 items in total). Ther wer 375 questionnaires randomly collected in a total of 16,330 runners. The mean expense of local participants in this half marathon was 219 euros, while non-resident participants expended about €320. Thus, the local participants' inflow was €1,036,965, while the non-resident participants' inflow was €3,709,760, resulting in a total participant inflow of €4,746,725. Regarding the participants' specific expenses, the following order was obtained: 1st, accommodation; 2nd, food; 3rd, travel costs; 4th, shopping. It was calculated that the total local economic impact of the 11th Douro Valley Half Marathon participants was almost five million euros (€4,746,725)

Catsam, Derk, "BRICS, Bats, and Balls: Nation Building, Sporting Diplomacy, and the Politics of Mega-Sporting Events in the BRICS Countries," RASAALA: Recreation and Society in Africa, Asia and Latin America 6 (2018)

This article looks at the ways that BRICS nations have consciously used sport, including hosting football's World Cup and other tournaments, the Olympic Games, and events such as the IRB Rugby World Cup and ICC Cricket World Cup in order to achieve political goals and garner international prestige. There is a great deal of variance between the BRICS nations and their use of sports, but, in every member country, sport has been part of the larger plan of nation building, broadly defined, even if not explicitly articulated as such. In just about every case, the impact of the events has been largely ephemeral even as the commitment has remained steadfast, serving as a reminder that the perceived role of sport in helping provide economic development remains higher in the public consciousness than the concrete realities of the intersection of sports, economics, and politics.

Chacar, Aya S., Sokol Celo, and William Hesterly, "Change Dynamics in Institutional Discontinuities: Do Formal or Informal Institutions Change First? Lessons From Rule Changes in Professional American Baseball," Business History 60, no. 5 (July 2018)

Extant research presents a conflicting picture of change dynamics during institutional discontinuities. Some studies propose or depict formal rules as changing first. Others argue that norms need to change before formal rules can be revisited, let alone change. An examination of the literature suggests a contingency theory. In mature organisational fields with institutionalised informal rules, norms need to be questioned and changed before any change in formal rules can take place. On the other hand, in emergent organisational fields – where no particular rules of the game have been institutionalised – change in higher-level institutions begins with a change in formal rules. The article also presents two historical cases of major institutional change in professional American baseball that illustrate the theory proposed.

Congdon-Hohman, Joshua M., and Jonathan A. Lanning, "Beyond Moneyball: Changing Compensation in MLB," Journal of Sports Economics 19, no. 7 (October 2018)

This study examines the changes in player compensation in Major League Baseball during the last three decades. Specifically, we examine the extent to which recently documented changes in players' compensation structure based on certain types of productivity fits in with the longer term trends in compensation and identify the value of specific output activities in different time periods. We examine free-agent contracts in 3-year periods across three decades and find significant changes to how players' past performances are rewarded in free agency beyond the change in those to on-base percentage seen in the mid-2000s. We find evidence that the compensation strategies of baseball teams increased the rewards to "power" statistics beyond home runs in the 1990s from a model that focused on successfully reaching base with a batted ball without a significant regard for the number of bases reached. Similarly, we confirm and expand upon the increased financial return to bases on balls in the late 2000s as found in previous research.

Depken II, Craig A., and E. Frank Stephenson, "Hotel Demand Before, During, and After Sports Events: Evidence from Charlotte, North Carolina," Economic Inquiry 56, no. 3 (July 2018)

This paper uses daily hotel occupancy data to examine the effects of a wide variety of political and sporting events on the hotel room market of Charlotte, North Carolina from 2005 to 2014. Two political conventions and NASCAR auto races are associated with large increases in hotel occupancy, prices, and revenue, but many other events have no discernable effect on Charlotte's hotel market. The results also indicate that occupancy effects before or after most events are modest at best. Back-of-the-envelope calculations show incremental hotel-tax receipts fall short of the debt service incurred in constructing and maintaining the city's sports venues.

Hawzen, Matthew G., Christopher M. McLeod, John T. Holden, and Joshua I. Newman, "Cruel Optimism in Sport Management: Fans, Affective Labor, and the Political Economy of Internships in the Sport Industry," Journal of Sport and Social Issues 42, no. 3 (June 2018)

For university students in sport management programs, working in sports is often the end goal, and internships have become the most common curricular component for achieving this end. Sport management students bring to these internships various backgrounds and active fan attachments with sports that structure their work experiences and create certain conditions of exploitation. We thus

conducted interviews with current and soon-to-be interns to understand their subjective perceptions and experiences of working in sports as fans. Drawing upon Lauren Berlant's concept of cruel optimism as well as neo-Marxist theories of affective labor, we reveal the structuring contradictions of interns' work in the contemporary sports industry.

Hersch, Philip L., and Jodi E. Pelkowski, "The Consequences (and Nonconsequences) of Ownership Change: The Case of Major League Baseball," Journal of Sports Economics 20, no. 1 (January 2019)

Although ultimate responsibility for a professional sports team lies with the owner, little is known about the repercussions of having a new owner at the helm. This article investigates ownership change in Major League Baseball. Estimates indicate that new owners do not impact on-field success relative to teams with continuous ownership. A temporary 8% bump in player payrolls, however, is observed in the first few years of owner transition. Change in ownership increases the odds of general manager and manager dismissals and is also more likely to trigger modifications to team logos and player uniforms.

Lopez-Gonzalez, Hibai, and Mark D. Griffiths, "Understanding the convergence of markets in online sports betting," International Review for the Sociology of Sport 53, no. 7 (November 2018)

Betting on sports via online platforms has rapidly become a popular form of gambling in many countries. Despite the growing body of research investigating the psychosocial and individual psychological factors determining gambling behaviour, much less attention has been devoted to understanding the market characteristics of online sports betting and its intersection with products from adjacent industries. From an economic convergence perspective, the present paper explores the integration of online sports betting within the digital, sporting and gambling sectors, examining how data markets, eSports, virtual sports, social gaming, immersive reality tools, sports media, sport sponsorship, fantasy sports, in-venue and in-stadium betting, poker and trading are all converging around betting activity. Through this convergence process, it is argued that internet-based sports gambling is colonizing different forms of entertainment, and expanding marketing opportunities, as well as raising psychosocial concerns about the influence of such an integration process.

McGehee, Glynn M., Armin A. Marquez, Beth A Cianfrone, and Timothy Kellison, "Understanding Organizational and Public Perspectives on Stadium Redevelopment Through Social Media: A Case Study of Georgia State University's "New" Stadium," International Journal of Sport Communication 11, no. 2 (June 2018)

Stadium-construction projects are costly and affect the community—positively and negatively. At urban universities, these impacts extend beyond campuses into the broader community. Thus, athletic-department communication about the value of stadium projects to a diverse group of stakeholders becomes important. Following stakeholder theory, the purpose of the study was to investigate social-media messages disseminated by an urban university engaged in a stadium-redevelopment project (Georgia State University [GSU]) and the public response. A content analysis of Facebook and Twitter posts by GSU (N = 39) and the public response (N = 359) yielded 8 themes: a focus on athletics, a focus on university, informing about urban community development impact, explaining capital project funding source, maintaining the stadium legacy, promoting public–private partnerships, and understanding effects on transit. Findings support previous literature that organizational communication reflects organizational priorities.

Mills, Brian M., and Rodney Fort, "Team-Level Time Series Analysis in MLB, the NBA, and the NHL: Attendance and Outcome Uncertainty", Journal of Sports Economics 19, no. 7 (October 2018)

We extend the attendance break point literature to the team level, addressing structural change and season aggregated outcome uncertainty for franchises in three of the four North American major leagues. We compare the larger variation at the team level with past time series analysis of league-level annual aggregate attendance. We also note that there is at best mixed evidence of outcome uncertainty impacts on team-level attendance. We discuss the implications for these findings with respect to future research that attempts to

comprehensively estimate the demand for attendance.

Payne, Brian C., Jiri Tresl & Geoffrey C. Friesen, "Sentiment and Stock Returns: Anticipating a Major Sporting Event," Journal of Sports Economics 19, no. 6 (August 2018)

This study documents the effect of the Super Bowl on the stock returns of firms that are geographically associated with the competing teams. We find significant upward return drift in the 9 trading days leading up to the Super Bowl, a pattern consistent with investors trading in anticipation of the game itself. The "anticipatory behavior" among investors leads to widespread pregame returns, which is not documented in prior studies. These pre-event abnormal returns are positive and statistically and economically significant for all firms, and the size of pre-event returns varies according to each team's favored status. In addition, firms associated with the winning team exhibit significant positive return drift over the 10-day period after their win. Firms associated with the losing team exhibit moderate downward drift. Our findings are strongest among the smallest quintile of firms and are robust to various risk adjustments and using a matched sample control group. The collective findings suggest that only by standing on the sideline will investors avoid winning around the Super Bowl.

Rockerbie, Duane W., and Stephen T. Easton, "Of Bricks and Bats: New Stadiums, Talent Supply, and Team Performance in Major League Baseball," Journal of Sports Economics 20, no. 1 (January 2019)

This article considers whether publicly financed new facility investments encourage professional sports team owners to increase their investments in costly talent. We develop a model of a sports league that incorporates publicly financed facility investments, the unique characteristics of the talent market, and revenue sharing to explore the complementarity between new facility amenities, the team budget decision, and team performance. Our empirical results suggest that publicly financed new stadiums do little to improve team performance, not due to restrictions in the talent market, but rather due to a lack of fan response.

Schausteck de Almeida, Bárbara, Suélen Barboza Eiras de Castro, Fernando Marinho Mezzadri, and Doralice Lange de Souza, "Do sports mega-events boost public funding in sports programs? The case of Brazil (2004-2015)," International Review for the Sociology of Sport 53, no. 6 (September 2018)

This article explores public expenditure in Brazilian sport from 2004 to 2015 and aims to understand if hosting sport mega-events has influenced investments in different types of sport (elite sport and educational/participation sport). Data were collected through governmental records and examined through descriptive statistics. Positive and negative variations of spending were reported, regarding both the overall budget allocated to sport and among the different types of sport. This study concluded that sport mega-events have influenced the funding of sports programs to some extent, but other aspects of public funding are likely to be more significant influencers on the observed variations. The study also argues that further research on different host countries is necessary to understand the impact of sport mega-events on public sport funding.

Vamplew, Wray, "Products, Promotion, and (Possibly) Profits: Sports Entrepreneurship Revisited," Journal of Sport History 45, no. 2 (Summer 2018)

This article provides two new definitions in sports history: first, the sport product, which is seen as encompassing player, spectator, and associated products; and, second, sports entrepreneurship, which covers the four categories of direct income seeking, indirect income seeking, psychic income seeking, and nonprofit promotional activities. Within these categories, attention is drawn to sports entertainment and "dark" entrepreneurs, as well as the historical importance of examining entrepreneurial failure. Two typologies of sports entrepreneurs are presented, one looking at aims and objectives and the other at function. It is argued that sociocultural sports historians should not ignore economic aspects of sports provision.

Wen, Riguang, "Does Racial Discrimination Exist Within the NBA? An Analysis Based on Salary-per Contribution," Social Science Quarterly 99, no. 3 (September 2018)

The purpose of this research is to explore whether racial discrimination exists in athlete pay within the National Basketball Association. I use the ratio between annual salary and standardized contribution to establish a salary-per-contribution

index as a basis for comparison of salary differences between black and white NBA players. Given poor fit of measuring salary discrimination, existing literature exploring racism in the NBA from the perspective of salary may have inaccurate conclusions.



Team Ownership Histories Project -- A subset of Bioproject and the Business of Baseball Committee

By Andy McCue

We've seen some real progress on the project this past six months. Jacob Pomrenke of the SABR staff created a webpage for our work at https://sabr.org/bioproj/topic/team-ownership-histories.

Posted so far are the Mets (Leslie Heaphy), the Boston Braves (Bob LeMoine), the Red Sox and Yankees (Dan Levitt and Mark Armour), the Indians (Dave Bohmer), the Dodgers (Andy McCue), the New York Giants (Bill Lamb) and the Diamondbacks (Clayton Trutor).

On the desk of demon copy editor Len Levin are the San Francisco Giants (Rob Garratt), the Phillies (Rich Westcott), the Mariners (Steve Friedman), the St. Louis Browns (Greg Erion), and the second Washington Senators (Andy Sharp).

Working on drafts are Mike Haupert (Cubs), Brian Erts (Reds to '68), Steve West (Rangers), Nick Waddell and Jeff Samoray (Tigers), Andy Sharp (original Washington Senators) and Gary Olson (Twins).

That leaves the Milwaukee Braves, Atlanta Braves, Milwaukee Brewers, St. Louis Cardinals, Miami Marlins, Montreal Expos, Washington Nationals, San Diego Padres, Colorado Rockies, Cincinnati Reds since 1968, Los Angeles Angels, Houston Astros, Philadelphia/Kansas City/Oakland Athletics, Toronto Blue Jays, Baltimore Orioles, Kansas City Royals, Chicago White Sox and the Pirates (where I hope to snap up a volunteer at the convention this summer).

Anyone interested in the un-assigned teams should contact Andy McCue at agmccue44@earthlink.net

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A Call for Submissions

The Business of Baseball Committee has more than 700 registered members. We are sure many of you are doing research that would be of interest to your fellow SABR members. Please consider sharing your work in the newsletter, which is especially well suited to preliminary versions of work you may wish to publish elsewhere. *Outside the Lines* is an excellent outlet for the publication of your research on any topic of baseball that occurs "outside" the playing field. Submissions can be directed to Mike Haupert at mhaupert@uwlax.edu.

A History of the Boston Braves Franchise

By Bob LeMoine

The Boston Braves ownership history here is part of a joint project between the Business of Baseball Committee and the BioProject site. As they are completed, the histories will appear in this newsletter and be posted permanently at https://sabr.org/bioproj/topic/team-ownership-histories. *If you are interested in doing a team's history, or part of a team's history, such as the St.*

Louis Browns years of the current Baltimore franchise, please contact Andy McCue, agmccue44@earthlink.net, who will be coordinating the project. Several team ownership histories are already completed or under preparation, but many still need authors.

The histories should be as comprehensive as possible, covering the changes in ownership, the price paid, the makeup of partnerships, the division of responsibilities among the partners, the reasoning of both the buyers and the sellers, and economically significant events within the era of each ownership group. There is no need to talk about events on the field unless they have a direct impact on the bottom line or a change in ownership. It is likely that arguments with cities over stadiums and threatened (or actual) re-locations will play a role in the essays. The histories should be long enough to tell the story, but should be as tight as possible. There is no set word limit. The essays should include endnotes on sources. Heavy detail, such as the holdings of minor partners, might well be left to those endnotes.

Research guidance will be available if needed. Over the long run, it will be necessary to keep updating these essays and the original researchers will be given first opportunity to do those updates.

THE BOSTON BRAVES: 1923-1953

(part 2 of 2)

Part 1 was published in the Spring 2018 edition of Outside the Lines

Judge Emil Fuchs, 1923-1935

"Without any preliminary blare of trumpets, without signs, tokens or portents, the announcement of the sale of the club came like a bolt out of the blue sky," wrote James C. O'Leary in the *Globe*.[1] The new era began with a dinner party at the Lambs Club in New York City, according to Harold Kaese.[2] John McGraw, New York Giants manager, had invited actor and songwriter George M. Cohan, noted commissary operator Harry M. Stevens, and Judge Emil Fuchs, a prominent attorney in New York City who had also been a city magistrate and deputy attorney general. Fuchs had defended such prominent clients as major leaguer Benny Kauff and Gov. Charles S. Whitman. McGraw excitedly pointed out to them the current owner of the Braves. "Why, there's George Washington Grant. Did you know you can buy his ball club for half a million dollars?" None of the three guests knew the Braves were for sale, and gave expressions of interest and curiosity. McGraw directly asked Cohan, who said he wasn't interested.

Judge Emil Fuchs

The purchase of the Braves took place on February 20, 1923, although it was the legendary pitcher Christy Mathewson who garnered the headlines. George Washington Grant, after four years of ownership, sold the Braves to Mathewson, Judge Fuchs, and James Macdonough, vice president of Columbia Bank. Twenty-five percent of the club's stock "has been and is still owned by Bostonians," the *Herald* reported. "It is the idea of the new owners to interest Boston capital."[3] Both manager Fred Mitchell and business manager Eddie Riley were retained. Mathewson became the club president and treasurer, and Fuchs the vice president. The price was listed as more than $500,000.

"The matter has been under consideration less than three weeks," O'Leary wrote of the hush-hush deal, "and the interested parties kept it so closely to themselves that there was no inkling of the sale known outside until late yesterday afternoon."[4] O'Leary also reported that this new ownership group was the only one he had ever disclosed a price for, and "were the only ones that had ever seriously asked him to do so."[5]

While Mathewson had the baseball know-how and the popular name, it was Fuchs & Co. who took on the financial burden. "I told (Mathewson) not to assume any financial burden," Fuchs said years later in his memoirs. "The opportunity would always be there at the original price if the club were successful. I was always glad I did not permit him to assume that additional worry."[6]

Mathewson had been gassed in World War I and had suffered from tuberculosis for the previous few years. He had been recuperating in the fresh air of Saranac Lake in upstate New York, and his

physician warned that he might live only a couple of years if he attempted to return to baseball. But Mathewson accepted Fuchs' offer, declaring, "I would rather spend another two or three years in the only occupation and vocation I know than to linger many years up in Saranac Lake."[7]

"We will try to give Boston the best," Fuchs said. "We have enough money. You must have patience. It is a fact in baseball history that the best loved teams have been those developed in the city where they have won championships. The process of building up such a team requires time."[8]

Fuchs and Mathewson were the stars of Boston in the first month after the purchase as they stirred up interest in the Braves. "They are taking the city by storm," wrote Burt Whitman in the *Herald*. "They chat affably and intelligently with the chamber of commerce, the City Club, the Engineers, the newsboys or the Press Club. They have a message of better baseball at Braves Field, believe in that message, and talk manfully and cleanly of what they plan and hope to do."[9] These good vibes also extended to the players when it was announced that every Braves player would receive a raise for the 1923 season, as Fuchs announced Mathewson's desire "to have satisfied and contented players on the team."[10]

Fuchs admired Mathewson not just for his baseball wisdom but also his temperament. Known as "The Christian Gentleman," Mathewson served as a moral model Fuchs wanted the Braves to be known for, whether they were a winning club or not. "He wants his team to win," wrote O'Leary, "but he wants it to win without resorting to tactics that will injure players, that take an unfair advantage of opponents, or that offend the high ideals of patrons. … The new Braves will stand for only that which is clean and aboveboard. Fuchs wants the Braves to be a family."[11]

Fuchs and Mathewson not only had dreams of improving the team on the field, but also using the field in other capacities to generate needed income. On May 1 the *Herald* displayed a picture of Fuchs and Mathewson signing contracts with Marcus Loew, motion-picture entrepreneur and vaudeville magnate. The caption read that Loew was to "stage night motion pictures, band concerts, fireworks and vaudeville at Braves Field this summer."[12] Anticipation built over the highly publicized "Loew's Opening Night," on June 25, and a crowd of 8,000 came to enjoy the dancing, the stars of stage and screen, the movie *Trifling with Honor* shown on two large screens facing the grandstand with projectors mounted on the dugouts, and the fireworks. Two immense dance floors had been constructed between the grandstand and the baselines running from home plate, and Alex Hyde led a 40-piece orchestra on a stand erected under the netting behind the plate. Soft orange lights dominated the field with ever-changing colors from the spotlights. Deemed a success, "the huge stunt is booked for all clear evenings throughout the summer," wrote the *Herald*.[13] Loew created the Braves Field Exhibition Company as a corporation,[14] but the costs were too high to continue.[15]

Another idea was ladies' day, started in July. Women could enter the ballpark free of charge.[16] This would become a regular feature at both Braves Field and Fenway Park.

The Braves finished the 1923 season 54-100, "good" enough for seventh place, four games better than the last-place Philadelphia Phillies. Fred Mitchell resigned as manager on November 12, but would remain with the Braves as a scout and business manager until retirement in 1938.[17] The new manager would come from the New York Giants. In a major trade that Whitman of the *Herald* called "the biggest in which the Braves have figured in years," the club acquired shortstop Dave Bancroft, who would become the team's player-manager. Boston acquired in the deal outfielders Casey Stengel and Bill Cunningham, while sending to New York outfielder Billy Southworth, pitcher Joe Oeschger, and cash. Bancroft, wrote Whitman, "will be shortstop, captain and manager of a team that needs a lot of upbuilding."[18] At age 31, Bancroft was the National League's youngest manager.

There was an unproved but widely believed rumor that the Braves were simply a farm club of the New York Giants and were under their influence. This idea harkened back even to the days of Gaffney and the Tammany Hall crowd. This trade did nothing to silence those whispers. The facts that Fuchs and MacDonough were from New York and were friendly with Charles Stoneham, the Giants owner; and that Mathewson was a disciple of McGraw, brought scrutiny to every transaction made. Whitman even wrote a piece to stop the "sputtering at New York control." The biggest shareholder of the Braves, he wrote, was Albert H. Powell, a millionaire coal dealer in New Haven, Connecticut, who was "the owner of the biggest office building in Connecticut." Powell had been buying up the remaining available stock in the club.[19]

Apparently this was enough to convince Whitman that there was no conniving, despite the fact that New Haven is closer to New York City than Boston. Nevertheless, this fact made it "fit and proper for the baseball muck-rackers to forget their jeering innuendo directed against the New York ownership of the Braves or the 'pipe-line' which leads … direct into the New York Giants office." Powell also owned the Worcester Panthers club in the Eastern League, and his stock in the Braves was listed at $250,000.[20]

Despite the optimism and the offseason trades, the Braves were in the cellar in 1924. They also finished last in league attendance, at just 177,478. One way to increase attendance and revenue would be playing on Sundays, which the Massachusetts legislature was discussing. The *Herald* reported that Fuchs said he was solicited by a lobbyist for $100,000 to add to a slush fund for bribing the legislators. "I will say that I was much astonished when the proposition was made," the *Herald* quoted Fuchs as saying, "but the interview was a very short one, for I told the man ... that the owners of the Braves would not pay a red cent for legislation of any character."[21] The next day Fuchs said he was misquoted and he denied getting the bribe offer.[22]

There were two historically significant games at Braves Field in the early part of 1925. Opening Day on April 14 included the first radio broadcast from Braves Field. WBZ had a microphone set up, and an announcer (whose name was not mentioned) called the action. The *Springfield Republican* said it was believed to be the first time a game other than a World Series contest had been broadcast.[23] On May 9, the Braves hosted the Chicago Cubs in the first Jubilee Game, celebrating 50 years of the National League. Among the honored guests were old-time Braves player George Wright and former Triumvir William Conant.[24]

On May 20, the report came that the Braves were officially purchasing the Worcester club, making Powell and Fuchs the co-owners. "Their intent," wrote the *Herald*, "will be to give Worcester a winning team in the Eastern League, put in a high-class manager, and incidentally develop a lot of young talent."[25] The very next day came the report of the new "high-class manager," who was beginning a legendary managerial career. Casey Stengel, a veteran outfielder, saw his playing career end that very month. One of the World Series heroes for the New York Giants in 1923, Stengel was now a 34-year-old reserve outfielder on the Braves batting a meager .077. He was released by the Braves, and then hired to be the team president and player-manager of the Panthers. "The team will be run without doubt in close co-operation with the Braves," wrote the *Herald*, but neither Powell nor Fuchs would be an officer of the club itself. The move was approved by the Eastern League in June.[26]


Christy Mathewson, Braves President

"This was not wholly altruism on Fuchs' part, not just a gesture of kindness toward an aging warrior," wrote Stengel's biographer, Robert W. Creamer. "In those days a minor-league team would be a good investment. Casey could still hit well enough to shine in the minors, and he was a headline name, certain to draw crowds in Worcester."[27] Stengel's flamboyance entertained the crowds for the 1925 season, and the team finished a satisfying third.

Fuchs was in Pittsburgh to see Game One of the World Series on October 7. Later that night he was interrupted during his bridge game and told that Mathewson had died. The flag was lowered to half-staff for Game Two, and both the Senators and Pirates wore black armbands.[28] On October 21st the Braves board of directors named Fuchs club president. Powell was elected vice president and would continue as treasurer.[29]

On November 20, Fuchs and Powell moved the Panthers from Worcester to Providence, Rhode Island.[30] Stengel requested and was denied a raise for 1926. He instead became manager of the Toledo club. To make this happen, Stengel the manager released Stengel the player, and then Stengel the president fired Stengel the manager. Stengel the president then resigned.[31] Albert M. Lyon, a Boston-area lawyer, became a member of the Braves board of directors in January 1926.[32]

On August 31, 1926, Fuchs bought out the 33⅓ percent stock holdings of Powell, who would remain in office until the end of the year. "This transaction makes Judge Fuchs one of the big powers in the National League," proclaimed the *Herald*. Powell had recently acquired a coal mine in Pennsylvania to add to his real estate and wholesale and retail business ventures, and was devoting his time to these. "The Boston Braves franchise is now considered to be worth a million dollars," the *Herald* reported.[33] Powell remained in control of the Providence Grays, who were no longer associated with the Braves.[34]

Braves Field and its frequently changing outfield dimensions

The Powell shares didn't stay in Fuchs' hands very long. On May 15, 1927, they were purchased by Charles F. Adams, V.C. Bruce Wetmore, and Charles F. Farnsworth, with Adams being the major shareholder. Adams was well known in the Boston area as president of the Boston Bruins hockey club. He would now become vice president of the Braves, and was praised by Fuchs as "a true sportsman, a successful businessman and a lover of baseball."[35] Wetmore, president of an electrical supply company, and Farnsworth were business associates of Adams.

"It is with great personal gratification," said Fuchs, "that I am able to announce my success in inducing Mr. Charles F. Adams of Boston and Framingham, a true sportsman, a successful business executive and a lover of baseball, to purchase the holdings of Mr. Albert H. Powell from me, and join me in continuing our effort to give Boston an improved baseball club worthy of its approval and support."[36]

Before the season ended, the Braves reacquired the Providence minor-league club, reportedly for $18,000.[37]

Manager Dave Bancroft was released at the conclusion of the 1927 season.[38] Despite the optimism when he arrived in 1924, Bancroft's tenure as manager saw the Braves finish eighth, fifth, and seventh (twice), with a record of 249-363. Jack Slattery was named the new manager in early November.[39] Slattery was a Boston-area native who had been coaching baseball at Boston College. Despite Fuchs' word that Slattery was "a man of unquestioned character and loyalty, who we are absolutely satisfied, will give his all to his city and his club,"[40] the outcome was a disaster.

Another move by Fuchs in the offseason was moving in the fences of Braves Field to provide more home runs for Braves' hitters. The proposal was approved at the December meeting of the National League owners. "It seems that practically every other team in the league, as far as its players and managers were concerned, disliked to come to Braves Field and play on a field where the outfielders needed motorcycles to retrieve drives between the outfielders," Fuchs said.[41] The Braves had finished last and next to last in home runs the

past two seasons. "I feel that the shortening of Braves Field will have the sure tendency to make the Braves of 1928 a more confident, fighting, aggressive ballclub," said Slattery. "It surely was a liability to the Braves to play on that rifle range."[42] While dimensions varied in the accounts of the time, the left field fence was moved in from 402 to 320 feet, left-center from 402 to 330, center field from 550 to 387, and right field from 365 to 310.[43]

On January 10, 1928, the Braves made front-page headlines with a trade that Whitman of the *Herald* called "the most important in which a Boston club has participated in many years."[44] The Braves acquired future Hall of Famer and .400 hitter Rogers Hornsby. His salary was $40,000 and included being "field captain" of the Braves, so the owners would need to "dig down deeply as a result of the trade," Whitman wrote.

In spring training, Fuchs gave Hornsby a new contract "as a reward for the remarkable spirit he has demonstrated in coming to the preseason training in advance of the date on which he was ordered to report, and the industrious manner in which he had gone about the tedious work of preparing himself physically for the campaign." The three-year contract was for $40,600 a year, with $600 being the expenses in being the "field captain." It was the second highest salary in the major leagues, trailing only that of Babe Ruth.[45]

The new-look Braves Field brought a startling realization to fans immediately. After an 8-3 Opening Day loss to the Giants, Whitman remarked, "there was quick evidence that the new outfield bleachers will mean a tremendous number of homers at Braves Field." Already, it was the opposing team hitting the majority of them. "It hurts to switch around your yard to help your rivals and so handicap yourself."[46] Fuchs made a quick solution in a matter of days. "We will put up a 10- or 15-foot wire netting," he said. "If that is not enough to preserve the decent standards of the game, we'll move back the stands, but not this year."[47] The *Herald* even joked that the new slogan of Braves Field should be "Buy a 75-cent left field bleacher seat and get a baseball free."[48] Finally in June, a 30-foot canvas was erected above the left-field fence. "We have received a large number of protests," Fuchs said, "and all that I can say is that I agree with them all and will endeavor to remedy the situation as speedily as possible."[49]

That trend of opposing team home runs continued all season, however, and the Braves home runs allowed rose from 43 in 1927 to 100 in 1928, while the Braves themselves hit 52, up from 37 in 1927.

With the Braves in seventh place in May, Slattery suddenly resigned, and Hornsby was "persuaded" to become manager.[50] The Hornsby experiment ended on November 7 when he was traded to the Chicago Cubs for five pitchers and $200,000 of needed cash. Fuchs announced that he himself would manage the team in 1929, with Johnny Evers as his assistant and "right eye." "These are the ingredients of the most sensational and most unusual baseball story which has broken in Boston in many and many a year," Whitman wrote in the *Herald*.[51] Now with money to spend, Fuchs seemed to be comfortable acquiring veteran players around him, and in addition to Evers, brought shortstop Rabbit Maranville and catcher Hank Gowdy, all three members of the Braves 1914 championship team. "If I don't make good," Fuchs reportedly said, "no one will realize it quicker than I, and it will be perfectly simple for me to remove myself as manager."[52]

Boston voters in November 1928 passed a Sunday sports referendum bill allowing events to be played on Sunday. Fuchs was a major supporter of the measure, so much so that he was fined $1,000 for attempting to influence the vote. Fuchs spent $200,000 out of his own pocket, Kaese noted, which allowed him to print a million booklets and 4 million sample ballots. Placards were even placed in streetcars.[53] Some Boston legislators tried to delay or stop the referendum from becoming law, but in late December the Boston City Council agreed to implement it.[54]

Fuchs looked like a genius becoming manager, as the Braves started strong and were 9-4 and in first place on May 7. But they finished last (56-98). Attendance did grow to 372,351. In October, Fuchs resigned and Bill McKechnie was given a four-year contract to manage the club.[55]

McKechnie was able to see improved play in 1930, as the Braves moved up to sixth with a 70-84 record and attendance jumped to 464, 835. The biggest sensation of the season, however, was rookie slugger Wally Berger and his 38 home runs. After this season, the outfield fences were gradually

moved back. Philip Lowry determined that left field, 340 feet in 1930, was moved back to 359 feet in 1933, in to 353 feet in 1934, and to its longest distance of 368 feet in 1936. Center field changed every year or two as well, moving back from 359 feet in 1928 to 365 feet in 1942. Right field evolved from 297 feet in 1929 to 378 feet in 1938.[56] "Braves Field never looks the same in any two photographs from this period," wrote baseball historian Ray Miller.[57]

The 1931 team took a step backward, however, falling to 64-90, 37 games behind first-place St. Louis. Despite the losses, attendance in Boston rose to 515,005 while baseball as a whole fell just over 1.6 million as the Great Depression began to take hold. "There's absolutely nothing to indicate that anything approaching panic times will hit big league baseball in 1932," Fuchs confidently declared. "[T]here are many people who turn to baseball, comparatively cheap, inexpensive and not too great a thief of time, when their money and their time must be considered."[58] Fuchs hosted a "Jobless Carnival" at Braves Field on June 29, 1932, to raise money for the unemployed.[59] On the field, the 1932 Braves finished .500 (77-77), their first .500 or better season since 1921. Boston fans continued to buck national trends, and the 507,606 attendance was third in the league, while across baseball attendance was down almost 1.5 million.

Fuchs increased the number of lowest priced seats at Braves Field, extending the 1,500-seat 50-cent "Jury Box" section in right field to 5,200 seats extending to the left-field line. Both Fuchs and Red Sox President Bob Quinn moved the ladies day games" from Fridays to Saturdays.[60] Fuchs changed the times of Saturday games to 2:15 P.M. "out of consideration of women employed in offices and department stores, and who have a week-end half-holiday."[61] Fuchs also announced it was necessary to cut player salaries "under the present circumstances." "Baseball, like every other business is affected by the depression, and the players should realize this fact as well as the club owners," he said.[62]

On July 7, it was announced that Fuchs no longer had majority control of the Braves. Desperate for cash, he had borrowed money from Adams and Wetmore, and put some of his stock up as security. Adams and Wetmore had the controlling interest in the club. Later that month, Fuchs began the process of buying out the shares owned by Adams and Wetmore in an effort to regain control of the Braves. It was reported that the first payment was $100,000. "I have just made the first payment under an agreement with Charles F. Adams, which will enable me to pay off my financial obligation to Mr. Adams and to purchase the stock of the Boston National League Baseball Club, which is now held by both Mr. Adams and V.C. Bruce Wetmore, providing I meet the terms and payments specified in that agreement," Fuchs said. "Mr. Adams has personally loaned me money and took over a loan that I had in New York stating that he desired to have all the Boston baseball stock in Boston. His investment, through his purchase of stock and his loan to me, is very large and substantial. He has drawn neither salary nor expenses."[63]

Emil Fuchs and Charles Adams brought the Babe back to Boston

The 1933 season saw the Braves win more games (83) than they had since 1916 and be in the pennant race, only six games behind New York on August 31. Attendance increased to 517,803 while league attendance still continued to drop (down 885,535). For the fourth year in a row, the Braves outdrew the Red Sox, who saw only 268,715 at Fenway Park. Wally Berger hit 27 home runs but the Braves' pitching was the biggest feature with a 2.96 team ERA (third best in the NL). "The flame of baseball interest in Boston burned brightly in 1933," wrote Kaese. McKechnie was rewarded with a new five-year contract.[64] It would, however, be another 13 years before the Braves won as many games as they did in 1933.

The Braves of 1934 were at least competitive, finishing in fourth at 78-73, but the team ERA rose to 4.11 and their batting average was next to last at .272. There was a huge drop in attendance, which at 303,205 was a loss of 214,598. This was at a time when baseball as a whole seemed to be recovering from the Depression, as attendance in the entire league rose 1,084,431, and even closer to home, fans deserted Braves Field for Fenway Park. The attendance at Fenway grew to 610,640, an increase of 341,925. But fans had motivation to enter the turnstiles at Fenway. New Red Sox owner Tom Yawkey was spending loads of money: modernizing Fenway Park and bringing in fresh faces like pitching ace Lefty Grove. Kaese wrote, "[A]bout this time in their history, more attention was being paid to Braves owners than to Braves players. It wasn't so much a question where the Braves would finish, but if they would finish."[65]

According to Fuchs, the Braves had made money between 1929 and 1933, to the tune of $500,000, but most of the money had been put right back into the club. But by the end of the 1934 season there were financial problems and Fuchs felt desperate.[66] Fuchs saw an opportunity to raise revenue for the Braves by having greyhound racing at Braves Field in the evenings after baseball games. The plan was to construct a portable race track. "It would not interfere with baseball at all," Fuchs said. "I have implicit faith in what engineers can do."[67] Although no horse-racing track could come within a 15-mile radius of the Boston city limits, entrepreneurs were seeking out greyhound-racing permits.

The Braves board of directors, including Fuchs, Adams, Wetmore, Charles H. Innis, and Leopold M. Goulson, were in favor of the petition to be given to the newly organized Massachusetts State Racing Commission.[68] Fuchs received a favorable response from the commission but now "found himself the center of what may develop into quite a verbal tempest before it's all over," the Associated Press reported.[69] The next step was to get the other National League owners to approve the measure, which was already making waves as Fuchs arrived in New York City for the Winter Meetings.

"Absolutely preposterous," NL President-elect Ford C. Frick said of the proposal.[70] "It is entirely at variance with the principles for which baseball has battled so strenuously. … Organized Baseball has outlawed players for gambling and it is ridiculous to conceive that baseball now could permit a sport founded on gambling to move into the same premises with it."[71] The AP reported that sentiments from major-league baseball owners as well as Commissioner Kenesaw M. Landis were mostly negative.[72] A National League rule stipulated that a club would lose its membership in the league if it allowed "open gambling or betting pools on its grounds or any of the buildings that are the property of that club."[73]

"It looks as though I've already talked too much," Fuchs said. "I am not combating anybody. In Boston we have a proposition that looks very good to us and one that will in no way cast any reflections on baseball. … But I am still confident that when other owners have heard my complete story they will take another view of the situation."[74] The issue never was voted on at the Winter Meetings as other business, mainly the hotly contested issue of night baseball, took center stage. There were undoubtedly plenty of conversations behind closed doors and at the water fountains. The sentiments against the greyhound proposal were strong, and on December 12 Fuchs issued the following statement to the owners: "Nothing will be done by me which will embarrass baseball or the National League. Under the constitution of the National League, betting, legal or otherwise, is prohibited in its ballparks, where baseball is played. I have and always will abide by the constitution of the National League. This statement is simply a reiteration of the only statement for publication ever issued affecting this subject or authorized by me as published by the Associated Press."[75]

The racing issue would not go away. In January of 1935, the Boston Kennel Club submitted an application for a license to run the dog races at Braves Field irrespective of what the National League ruled.[76] The Commonwealth Realty Trust, the holding company of the Gaffney Estate and the current landlord of Braves Field, even told Frick that he had no authority in such matters and that it believed dog racing "is a better investment in the way of a lease than baseball."[77] The realty group revealed that the Braves had already violated their lease through late rental payments. "We no longer consider the Braves as our tenant," said Arthur C. Wise, treasurer of Commonwealth Realty Trust. "They have not lived up to the terms of their lease

and we have declared it broken. We are now negotiating with the Boston Kennel Club, Inc., and a lease is in the process of being written."[78]

The possibility of the Braves using Fenway Park for home games was also not a reality, as Yawkey wanted no such agreement.[79] The Braves suddenly found themselves homeless, and rumors came that Baltimore and Montreal were both interested in a major-league club if the Braves had to leave Boston, a situation called "very unlikely."[80] Frick called an emergency meeting of National League club owners.[81] The National League had taken over the 11-year lease on Braves Field from the Gaffney Estate. This gave the Braves exclusive rights to the field and dog racing was disallowed. Frick even disclosed that the estate had never officially signed a lease with the kennel club.[82]

Meanwhile, Frick was seeking new owners for the Braves. Fuchs was generally cooperative with the league in recognizing that new ownership was needed, and said he was more concerned about the welfare of the stockholders: "I am willing to sacrifice my equity in the Boston club if by so doing I can save the other stockholders from any loss through their investment in the club since I have been connected with it."[83] Fuchs still had large financial obligations that were due February 5, and Massachusetts Governor James Michael Curley promised "to use his influence with Boston bankers on behalf of the judge to get an extension of the notes that fall due next week."[84] "It is generally recognized," wrote the *Herald*, "that the morale of the players is at a low ebb, and that former patrons of the Braves have turned to the popular Red Sox for their baseball entertainment."[85]

Fuchs and Adams met at the State House with Governor Curley, Boston Mayor Frederick Mansfield, and Massachusetts Attorney General Paul A. Dever to discuss financial options for the club. One was the encouragement of fans to buy booklets of five tickets each for $5, good for any games. "Wide-spread patronage of this method would provide sufficient capital to permit the Braves to finance their approaching spring training trip," reported the *Herald*.[86] The plan was an immediate success, with $30,000 raised by February 1 for Opening Day and five-game block tickets.[87]

National League owners on February 5 ruled that Fuchs could remain as owner. The owners were convinced by Fuchs' report that $43,400 had been raised in ticket sales to that point, as well as $10,000 in cash, enough money to keep the team afloat. It was now up to Fuchs, who had an idea of someone who could save the Braves.

The *Boston Globe* headline on February 27 stirred more talk in baseball about the Braves than there had been for years: "Boston Fans Hail Ruth's Return: Babe Is Coming to Braves for Three Years as Player and Official."[88] It was reported that Ruth carried three titles as player, assistant manager, and second vice president.[89] "The obtaining of Ruth undoubtedly will have a wonderful effect on the interest in the National pastime by all lovers of baseball in New England," O'Leary wrote in the *Globe*. "It looks like a masterful stroke of business for the Boston club."[90] It was reported Ruth's salary was $25,000 as a player with $5,000 more as second vice president.[91] "The landing of Babe Ruth by the Braves was one of the master strokes of Boston's baseball history," said the "Sportsman" column in the *Globe*.[92]

Correspondence from Fuchs to Ruth contained the ambiguous idea of Ruth managing the club in 1936. "If it was determined," Fuchs wrote, "after your affiliation with the ball club in 1935, that it was for the mutual interest of the club for you to take up the active management on the field, there would be absolutely no handicap in having you so appointed."[93] Wires were crossed, however, as Ruth publicly stated, "It's been definitely decided that I will take charge of the Braves on the field next year."[94] To Adams, 1935 was a probationary year for Ruth that would show whether he had the skills to guide the Braves ship in 1936. "There can be but one boss," Adams said, "and no one can ever be fit to give orders until he has learned how to take orders."[95] In any event, Ruth was quite at home that night as he devoured broiled scrod, baked beans, and brown bread covered in relish. "We're on our way to become real Bostonians once again," he bellowed.[96] McKechnie, while saying Ruth at the plate would help any team, still made it clear who the manager was. "There never has been a ball club that could stand two managers and there never will be," he said. "I'm manager until such a time as the club sees fit to ask me to step down or I think it right to step down myself."[97]

By May 13, Fuchs owed the first payment to Adams, and the second and larger payment was due by August 1. Time was running out. The Braves did draw well early in the season, but damp and rainy weather caused postponements and also led to Ruth catching a cold he couldn't shake off for several days.[98] By the time Fuchs gave the Braves a "fight talk" on May 14,[99] threatening major changes unless play improved, the team was already 6-14 and Ruth was hitting .171 with two home runs. Ruth had already been telling friends he should retire from active playing, but felt obligated to try to help Fuchs and the team, as his presence in the lineup could still draw fans.

The Ruth/Braves era ended on June 2. Ruth asked permission of Fuchs to represent baseball at a social function in New York City, which Fuchs denied. "I do not have to put up with this sort of treatment," Ruth declared to the newspapermen pressing around him just as they had three months earlier upon his arrival. "I will not return to the Braves so long as Fuchs remains in control of the club."[100] Ruth apparently had not been given the notice that he had already been released. Fuchs also acknowledged that he did not have the capital needed to acquire quality ballplayers or even keep the top talent the club currently had. "So far as I am concerned," confessed the judge, "I am unable to provide such capital, as I have exhausted every personal financial means. My heart and soul is for Boston and New England. They deserve the best, and it occurred to me that it may be my situation, just described, that is handicapping the course. I am willing to sacrifice the large equity I have in the Braves."[101]

Fuchs had until August 1 to repay Adams, and was busy until that time in unsuccessful bids to sell the Braves. He failed, and resigned on that date, turning over full control of the club to Adams, who was busily involved as president of the Boston Bruins hockey team and a major force in the Suffolk Downs racetrack. Fuchs' equity in the club was listed at $400,000.[102] Kaese reported that Adams already held 65 percent of the shares, so this implies a franchise value around $1.2 million. "I expect that (Adams) will make an effort to sell the club as soon as possible," Ford Frick said. "I believe his chances of selling are considerably increased now that there is a single ownership."[103]

Charles F. Adams , 1935

Ironically, control of the Boston Braves was now in the hands, temporarily, of Charles F. Adams, who was directly involved in horse racing and the culture of betting that the National League denounced when Fuchs sought permission for greyhounds races less than a year before.

It was not a long ownership period.

Adams assumed the presidency of the Braves from Judge Fuchs out of necessity: Fuchs owed him money. Adams, president of the Boston Bruins and one of the key movers and shakers of the Suffolk Downs racetrack, had no desire to be heavily involved in the Braves, not even considering himself a "baseball man." His other business ventures kept him busy enough, so his energies were engaged in finding a buyer for the Braves. George Preston Marshall, who owned a chain of laundries in Washington, D.C., as well as the Boston Redskins football club, had a plan to buy the Braves,[104] as did other groups.

In September Adams made a public plea to all Braves stockholders to contribute a loan of $15,000 ($1 per share) to keep the team afloat through the end of the year. Adams's goal for reorganizing the team would cost an estimated $500,000. "It is so serious," Adams said, "that unless the club finds some immediate financial support there is danger of the loss of its franchise and player assets. Briefly stated, the club now owes $200,000 on demand notes and approximately $50,000 of known current liabilities. … The club has practically no liquid assets with which to meet these obligations." The financial statement said administrative costs for the team, reaching $152,541 in 1929, had been cut to $74,504 in 1934, but that player salaries had not been cut.[105] A stockholder meeting later in September gave Adams the go-ahead for financial reorganization of the club.[106] There would need to be major reorganizing, as the Braves finished with one of the worst records in baseball history: 38-115, a .248 winning percentage, 61½ games behind the first-place Cubs.

In early November, $175,000 of the announced $350,000 needed to put the Braves on a sound financial basis had already been pledged, with the other half to be raised by November 15. "It was agreed that for every five shares of stock now held, we would take one of the shares of new common stock," Adams said. "For instance, if a man held

5,000 shares at present, he would turn that in for 1,000 shares of new stock."[107] Stockholders hoped they could reorganize the Braves on their own, and one of the largest stockholders was Major Francis P. Murphy, a future New Hampshire governor.[108]

However, the plan failed, because the cash was not raised. On November 26, at a meeting in New York of National League club owners, action was taken to dissolve the stockholder group, and the National League now owned the Boston Braves. NL President Ford Frick curiously described the change as a "friendly forfeiture" of the team.[109] The league would now receive proposals from potential buyers for the club. "The club is not bankrupt," Adams declared. "It ought to be able to pay dollar for dollar and clear off all its debts. In fact, I myself am no small creditor."[110] Adams, however, was not willing to step aside until the Braves creditors were repaid in full. The estimate of debt the Braves owed Adams was $110,000.[111]

Bob Quinn was a recognized name in the Boston area; he had served as president of the Red Sox from 1923 to 1933. He was now general manager of the Brooklyn Dodgers, and his name alone carried with it respect and local Boston credibility. Quinn estimated the value of the Braves franchise at $325,000.[112]

"Twin earthquakes changed the Boston big league map," wrote Whitman, describing the first day of the baseball Winter Meetings.[113] The Red Sox acquired slugger Jimmie Foxx and pitcher Johnny Marcum from the Philadelphia Athletics. This was a huge move that would definitely get droves of fans to Fenway Park. Two hours later, Frick announced that the Braves franchise had been awarded to Quinn, "who will have the credit of C.F. Adams behind him. … [H]is proposition was the only one received by the league which would enable the payment of debts and the protection of creditors for 100 cents on the dollar."[114] Meanwhile, the acquisition of Foxx and Marcum, boasted a hopeful Whitman, "make(s) the Sox loom as sure pennant contenders for 1936."[115]

Quinn was the first person in baseball history to be president of both American and National League clubs. Adams would no longer have any stock in the Braves or hold any official position. "Adams has voluntarily taken this position because of the ruling of the commissioner of baseball concerning any tie-up between racing and baseball," the official statement read, calling it "a stand on the part of the commissioner for which Adams has every respect."[116]

On December 31, majority and minority stockholders held a "snappy" meeting (in O'Leary's words), and voted to sell all assets of the Braves to Quinn. But it didn't happen without a squabble. At Boston's Copley Plaza hotel, a last-minute offer of $250,000 (including Murphy's cash offer of $100,000) to purchase the Braves was declined. Fuchs was present at the meeting and stated that his losses in the Braves amounted to $700,000. "I paid $450,000 cash for the ball club, and … I borrowed money subsequently to purchase other shares in order to add to my holdings, and that there were several lean years during the period 1922 to 1928 inclusive, before the advent of Sunday baseball, in which financial losses were incurred."[117] The Adams-V.C. Wetmore stock interests totaled 11,184 shares out of the 15,000 total.[118] Despite the newspaper stories, Quinn did not actually take ownership of the club, which remained with Adams and his associates.

"Thus," wrote O'Leary, "the Boston National League Baseball Company bows itself into retirement."[119]

Bob Quinn, 1936-1944

Bob Quinn had many challenges in taking over as president of the Braves, a nearly bankrupt franchise losing its fan base to the crosstown rival Red Sox. For whatever reason, Quinn saw his first act of business changing the team's nickname, which had been Braves since 1912. As the old Braves organizational structure was being replaced, so was the club name. Boston National Sports Inc. was the new corporate name of the team, established at the law office of Goodwin, Proctor & Hoar at 84 State Street in Boston. Quinn wanted the fans to vote on the new team name, with six finalists to be selected. The fan with the chosen team name would win two season passes.[120]

Fans submitted 1,327 names, 15 of them with the winning selection of Bees. The winning fan was Arthur J. Rockwood of East Weymouth,

Massachusetts, who wrote, "As a new name for your club, I submit 'The Boston Bees.' The 'B' is significant of many things, Boston, beans, baseball, etc., and not too hard to learn, being similar to 'Braves.' And if your club develops the bees' characteristics, you should have honey this Fall."[121] The team's corporate name was changed to "The National League Baseball Club of Boston," and the ballpark would be renamed National League Park, although it was expected that fans would call it the Beehive.[122]

While there was a buzz over the new name, this did not produce success on the field. But the fourth annual All-Star Game was held on July 7 at the Beehive, which had the lowest attendance in All-Star Game history (25,534). A newspaper reported incorrectly that the game was already sold out, contributing to the Braves' latest debacle.[123] As far as the Bees on the field were concerned, a sixth-place finish at 71-83 was considered a success considering all that had happened with the club's uncertainty. Attendance rose to 340,585, a sign of improvement. The 1937 Braves were a winning club, finishing in fifth place at 79-73. They were again last in major offensive categories but were stellar on the mound with two 20-game winners in Lou Fette and Jim Turner, and the lowest ERA in the NL. Attendance rose slightly, to 385,339.

After eight seasons as manager, Bill McKechnie resigned to become manager of the last-place Cincinnati Reds.[124] In an unlikely modern-day scenario, McKechnie actually received *The Sporting News* manager of the year award for guiding the mediocre Bees to fifth place.[125] Quinn chose Casey Stengel, who was manager in Brooklyn from 1934 to 1936 (including the time when Quinn was the GM), as the new manager. Stengel already had a reputation that would make him one of the beloved characters in baseball history. "I know he's got a reputation for being a clown," Quinn said, "but actually he's one of the most serious-minded baseball men I've ever had work for me. He's a hustler from the word go, is not afraid to try things with his ballclub and above all is unflinchingly loyal."[126] Stengel approached the job as a wait-and-see endeavor with talent: "All the players we now have, and any that we may acquire later, will be given a chance to show what they can do, and it will be a case of the survival of those who in our opinion are the most fit."[127]

The Boston baseball landscape changed drastically in 1937. The Red Sox signed "a string-bean 19-year-old outfielder from San Diego in the Pacific Coast League," wrote Hy Hurwitz of the *Globe*.[128] Ted Williams would spend a year in the minors, and then burst on the scene in 1939, becoming arguably the greatest hitter who ever lived and an American sports icon.

The 1938 Bees finished 77-75 in fifth place, and were last in batting average, and on-base percentage. Pitching was a strength with a second-best 3.40 team ERA. "They had courage," Stengel said of the '38 team. "All you had to do was tape 'em together."[129] Vince DiMaggio didn't remind anyone of his brother Joe of the Yankees, especially when he struck out 134 times. Attendance fell slightly, to 341,149.

The Bees ended the 1930s disastrously, finishing seventh at 63-88 in 1939. Offensively, the team finished near the bottom in most categories, and the pitching was mediocre. Even acquiring an aging star in Al Simmons proved to be meaningless, and he was traded late in the season to Bill McKechnie's pennant-winning Reds. Attendance dropped again, to 285,994, while the Red Sox drew 573,070.

The 1940 season was no better as the Bees finished seventh again (65-87) with attendance dropping to 241,616. Prior to the season, the left-field wall was moved in from 368 feet to 350 feet from home plate, and right field was reduced from 373 feet to the same 350 feet. A 24- foot wire screen was erected atop the 4-foot-high wall from left to right,

with the farthest distance being 400 feet. "The building inspectors have ordered the club, as a matter of public safety, to rebuild the center-field bleachers or to remove those there at present, and so it was decided to remove them altogether," O'Leary reported in the *Globe*.[130]

Prior to the 1941 season, Adams's majority 73 percent stock in the Bees was purchased by a group headed by Quinn himself, and including Stengel, Louis Perini, and 12 other men, mostly based in the Boston area.[131] Quinn remained in his position as team president, and the syndicate voted to drop the Bees nickname and become the Braves again.[132] The name change did not produce changes on the field, however.

By early 1944, after two more dismal seasons, Jerry Nason of the *Globe* reported on the financial difficulties of the Braves. "The club has faltered financially during the past season," Nason wrote, "with attendance sloping off – due to both an inadequate team and the war. Quinn has several times enabled the club to show a profit by his genius for cutting down overhead expenses. The point has been reached where it is impossible to reduce salaries or sell prominent players without permanent injury to the team and the value of the franchise."[133]

Before the 1944 season a new ownership group emerged and took control of the Braves. A trio of stockholders, Louis Perini, Guido Rugo, and C. Joseph Maney, bought out the shares of other stockholders, giving them the majority. Perini had started in his father's construction company and never looked back, becoming president of the company he ran with his brothers. The construction company went international, and as of 2016 existed as Tutor Perini. He and fellow contractors Rugo and Maney, once they bought out the other stockholders, each pitched in an additional $250,000 to pay off creditors and provide some needed cash to run the team.[134] Called "the Steam Shovels" by Harold Kaese, the trio were all contractors "who had made fortunes building ammunition dumps, wharves, piers, roads, tunnels, and airports during the war."[135] Stengel, who had commented that they should stick to their cement mixers and let him run the team, resigned as manager.[136] Bob Coleman, one of his coaches, succeeded him. The new contractor-owners already had an eye on making changes to Braves Field, and they put in a 10-foot warning track in front of the outfield wall, moved the right-field wall in to 320 feet, and moved the Braves bullpen to center field.[137] The Braves struggled to another sixth-place finish at 65-89. The 1944 attendance of 208,691 was the smallest in both leagues, and the smallest Braves attendance since 1924.

Quinn resigned as team president on his 75th birthday on February 14, 1945, to head up the Braves farm system. The man who had come to the rescue of the bankrupt Braves in 1936 was now going to work with the future of the team. Quinn's son John became general manager of the Braves.[138]

Lou Perini, 1945-1958

Louis Perini had baseball and management in his blood from an early age, raising money in the community of Ashland, Massachusetts, for his youth baseball team.[139] He was now taking over a team that had been through a lot financially and emotionally in the past several years. The Braves had survived near-bankruptcy during the Great Depression, before Quinn brought stability in the late 1930s. Yet, the team still failed to finish higher than fifth from 1935 to 1944. The Braves were consistently outdrawn by the Red Sox. Also, the Braves were hit hard, as all teams were, by the demands of World War II. Military service took 31 players, including two young pitchers, Warren Spahn and Johnny Sain, who appeared in 1942 but did not return until 1946.[140]

Perini and business partners Rugo and Maney had made their fortunes in the construction business, which Perini saw as an advantage. "Lack of baseball background is an advantage," he said. "We take a sound business approach to the game. As contractors we are planners, and we know that good organization will accomplish wonders. Baseball is a side line with us, but it is also a business challenge that we want to meet."[141]

The 1945 season was another lost cause for the Braves and a difficult beginning for Perini as president. The Braves finished sixth (67-85), although attendance (374,178) was the highest since 1938. An improved offense was led by Tommy Holmes, who led the NL in hits (224), total bases (367), and home runs (28), had a 37-game hitting streak, and missed the batting title by three points (.352). With travel restrictions in place, the All-Star

Game was canceled, and both Boston teams decided to play a game for the benefit of the War Fund. The Red Sox beat the Braves 8-1 and $70,000 was raised by the crowd of 22,809.[142]

For 1946, former Braves outfielder Billy Southworth, who had managed the Cardinals to two pennants and one World Series title in the previous four years, was named manager in November.[143] Perini offered a multiyear deal and $100,000 in salary and bonuses.[144] He was one of several former Cardinals that Perini and company sought, and sportswriters nicknamed the club the Cape Cod Cardinals.[145]

The 1946 season was a turning point for the Braves and baseball in general. Attendance was up everywhere as the postwar boom began. The Braves' attendance rose 39 percent to 969,673, the highest in franchise history, helped by night games, the first of which was on May 11 when 37,407 saw that "Braves Field looked like a Christmas tree," in the words of the *Globe's* Jerry Nason.[146] The home opener against Brooklyn was a "colorful" affair as damp weather prevented the newly painted green grandstands from drying. "Hundreds of fans, well-decorated with green in the region of the rumble seat, filed in steady procession up the stairs to the front offices after the game, to leave their names and addresses," wrote Nason.[147] The trio was stuck with a bill around $6,000 to cover dry-cleaning costs, and needed lawyers to sort out true claims from the false (such as those from California, Nebraska, and Florida). The owners concluded that it had not been smart business, but the publicity and good will made it worthwhile.[148] Perini also lured Boston College and its football schedule away from Fenway Park.[149]

The 1947 team built on the success of 1946 and for the first time in club history passed a million in attendance (1,277,361). A crowd of 36,006 came in August for Appreciation Day, with one fan winning a brand-new Packard automobile and another a Ford via a 95-cent raffle ticket. Neither man owned an automobile.[150] Times were definitely good at Braves Field. A third-place finish, their first since 1916, and a record of 86-68 (their highest win total since the 1914 world championship year), brought baseball alive at Braves Field in a way few had ever seen. Spahn and Sain each won 21 games and the Braves had the best batting average in the league at .275, powered by the ferocious hitting of Bob Elliott, whose .317 average, 22 home runs, and 113 RBIs made him the National League MVP, the first Brave so honored since Johnny Evers in 1914.

The stage was now set for the remarkable Braves season of 1948, "the most exciting Boston had ever known," wrote Kaese.[151] Only a Red Sox one-game playoff loss prevented baseball's first all-Boston World Series. The Braves won their first pennant in 34 years, as Holmes led the team in hitting (.325), Elliott in home runs and RBIs (23, 100), and shortstop Alvin Dark was the NL Rookie of the Year. Sain was 24-15 and the Braves had the league's best ERA. They finished 91-62 and saw 1,455,439 come to Braves Field. "The Steam Shovels have built roads, docks, airports, tunnels and piers," wrote Nason, "but the real monument to their ability to build is the Boston Braves of 1948." The cost was estimated at over $2 million.[152] The Braves lost the World Series to the Cleveland Indians and would never look so good in Boston again.

Lou Perini moved the Braves to Milwaukee

In fact, trouble started brewing during 1948 itself, when Perini paid a $52,000 bonus to Johnny Antonelli, a left-handed pitcher who had just graduated from high school. Veteran players were understandably upset, and friction between players and management began. Players even refused to vote for a World Series share for Antonelli, and Commissioner Happy Chandler had to intercede. A player revolt was led by Spahn and Sain, and salary increases were demanded. Players lost confidence in Southworth, whom they saw as weak.[153]

Two off-the-field events made the 1948 season historic. The popular radio game show *Truth or Consequences* was airing part of a live episode from

Boston Children's Hospital. Host Ralph Edwards asked questions of young Einar Gustafson, who was given the name "Jimmy" to protect his identity. Gustafson, a 12-year-old patient of Dr. Sydney Farber, was being treated for Burkitt's non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. Gustafson mentioned that his favorite baseball team was the Braves, which prompted Braves publicity director (and future Boston/New England Patriots owner Billy Sullivan) to arrange for Braves players to visit Jimmy at his bedside while the program was airing, bringing autographed bats and balls. Southworth brought a uniform for the young fan and invited him to Braves Field for the doubleheader on May 23. Edwards told his listeners that if they could raise $20,000, a new television set would be given to Jimmy so he could watch Braves games. In the weeks to come, donations flooded in from all over the country, many of the envelopes marked "Jimmy – Boston, Mass." The Braves won both games of the doubleheader for Jimmy,[154] and by the end of the summer, $231,485.51 had been raised for what became known as the Jimmy Fund. Perini organized cookouts, clinics, and other events for Braves players to raise money for cancer research, and his family continued that support over the decades. After the Braves left Boston, the Red Sox adopted the Jimmy Fund as their official charity. In 1998, Jimmy was reunited with Edwards at Fenway Park to celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Jimmy Fund.[155]

The other event was the first televised baseball game in Boston, which took place on June 15. WBZ-TV, which had just debuted on June 9, broadcast the game with play-by-play announcer Jim Britt.[156] Perini, undoubtedly anxious about this new endeavor, addressed the crowd in pregame festivities and said, "On this hysterical occasion," then caught himself, "I mean historical – you know I was hysterical when the Braves came home (from their road trip)."[157]

Perini purchased Braves Field, which the Braves had been leasing for years, in January of 1949,[158] with a goal of expanding the seating capacity to 50,000.[159] Meanwhile, the team was falling apart. Faced with rumors that his players were threatening mutiny, Southworth requested a meeting for them to take a vote of confidence in him, which he didn't receive.[160] "We don't want you to ruin your career for just a few weeks," Perini told Southworth in August. "Why don't you go home for the rest of the season and come back next spring good as ever?"[161] Southworth took a paid leave of absence. The Braves dropped to fourth place (75-79) and attendance dropped slightly.

Southworth returned in 1950 and along with him came Boston's first African-American professional baseball player, Sam Jethroe. The trio of owners became a duo when Rugo sold his stock to Perini and Maney in January of 1951.[162] In June the *Globe* reported that attendance was down 24 percent after a lackluster crowd of 1,577 on June 4. At that rate, the writer quipped, Perini was not going to get a beautiful new stadium because "it does not look as though they would even be able to buy a new gas oven."[163] Attendance for the year was 487,475, an almost 50 percent drop from 1950. The Braves again finished fourth (76-78). Southworth finally left for good and Tommy Holmes became manager.

The 1952 season was the final season in Boston for the team that had begun as the Red Stockings in 1871. Holmes didn't last until June and was replaced by Charley Grimm. Perini denied rumors that he was going to move the club.[164] Yet by the end of September, the situation was grim, and there were estimates that the Braves had lost $600,000, more than any team in a given season in baseball history. "We are picking up the greatest check in baseball history this season," Perini admitted.[165] While the estimated losses were high, Perini's description stands. According to a congressional investigation, the Braves showed a 1952 loss of $459,009. That made the total loss for the Perini years at least $257,995 and probably close to double that.[166] The fans didn't know it at the time, but the game on September 21 was the last Braves game ever at Braves Field.

Perini, with his brothers Joseph and Charles, bought up all remaining stock of the minority stockholders, mostly held by Maney.[167] On March 14, Perini made the announcement. "I have a difficult announcement to make. We are moving the Braves to Milwaukee. I shall make an application to the commissioner." The club was in Florida for spring training, with less than a month before the regular season began. The Braves owned a farm team in Milwaukee, and reports circulated in the spring of 1953 that the city wanted Perini to give up his territorial rights so Bill Veeck could move the St.

Louis Browns there.[168] The deal was confirmed by National League owners on March 18. The Browns moved to Baltimore for the 1954 season.

The club that began at Boston's Parker House on January 20, 1871, was now moving to Milwaukee, where their story would continue.

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

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Outside the Lines is published semi-annually, each spring and fall. Contributions should be sent to Mike Haupert at mhaupert@uwlax.edu.

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